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Abstract As the American election administration landscape changes as a 
result of major court cases, national and state legislation, changes in pro-
fessionalism, and the evolution of equipment and security, so must the 
work of on-the-ground practitioners change. This Open Access title pres-
ents a series of open access case studies designed to highlight practical 
responses to these changes from the national, state, and local levels. This 
book is designed to be a companion piece to The Future of Election 
Administration, which surveys these critical dimensions of elections from 
the perspectives of the most forward-thinking practitioner, policy, advo-
cacy, and research experts and leaders in these areas today. Drawing upon 
principles of professionalism and the practical work that is required to 
administer elections, this book lifts up the voices and experiences of prac-
titioners from around the country to describe, analyze, and anticipate the 
key areas of election administration systems on which students, research-
ers, advocates, policy makers, and practitioners should focus.
Keywords Election • Administration • Policy
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The Future of Election Administration: Cases and Conversations raises up 
the voices of election administrators from the local, state, and national 
levels across the country, as well as vendors and other experts involved in 
elections. Their perspectives are essential to our understanding of the 
democratic process, and it is vitally important that their stories are shared 
widely. Election administration functions have been under siege since the 
2000 presidential election, and media accounts of the most recent elec-
tions of 2016 and 2018 have, by and large, contributed to a negative nar-
rative about what happens on the ground. Wait times or long lines, voter 
rolls that are not accurate up to the minute, intricate processes such as 
election security protocols, how we handle voters who do not appear to be 
eligible to vote, how we determine voting districts, the time it takes to 
count (and recount) votes, the deficiencies of aging equipment—all of 
these have been oversimplified and positioned as emblems of a broken 
system. These stories present a more balanced view and will be used, we 
hope, to advance an informed conversation across the field, in the media, 
and among the general public.
In this book, practitioner experts discuss and reflect on some of the 
most important aspects of election administration today, including the 
influence of history on current practices, construction of the current archi-
tecture of election administration, challenges related to technology and 
security, professionalism of the field, and innovative tools that help the 
field address current and future challenges. This book is a companion 
book to The Future of Election Administration, which lays out the experi-
ences of practitioner, policy, advocacy, and research experts and leaders 
across election administration today. The authors address current and 
upcoming aspects of election administration systems, describing, analyz-
ing, and anticipating the key areas of election administration systems on 
which students, researchers, advocates, policy makers, and practitioners 
should focus. Both of these projects were developed out of the Auburn 
University Election Administration Symposium Series.
The Auburn universiTy elecTion AdminisTrATion 
symposium series
These books are the culmination of nearly five years of dialogue that began 
with a series of conversations between public administration and political 
science faculty at Auburn University and election officials around the 
country (including the leadership of the Election Center, the National 
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Professional Association for Election Officials) about how to gather these 
perspectives and present them collectively to critical audiences. The most 
obvious of these audiences of course include election administrative pro-
fessionals in the field, the vendors who serve it, and the researchers who 
study it. But we also hope to reach the policy arena, where local county 
and township commissions, state legislatures, and policy advisors at all 
levels of government propose ideas and make decisions that affect election 
operations, as well as the media who cover this critical aspect of American 
democratic functioning.
The Auburn Symposium on Election Administration is a vehicle to 
convene an initial set of conversations between leading academics, practi-
tioners, and advocacy groups in the field. The first gathering was held at 
Auburn University on September 14-15, 2015. Titled The Evolution of 
Election Administration Since the Voting Rights Act: 1965-2015. The 
symposium brought together a diverse set of more than 60 voices through 
plenary sessions, panels, and informal gatherings to examine how the 
field has developed over the past half century, the challenges that remain, 
and future trends. The Auburn University symposium series expanded 
in 2017, and faculty hosted Inclusion and Integrity in Election 
Administration on October 15-17, which featured the US Election 
Assistance Commissioners and data-driven conversations around the 
Election Assistance Commission’s Election Administration and Voting 
Survey (EAVS). The goals of Inclusion and Integrity were to foster con-
versations about critical issues that impact American democratic institu-
tions, support the development of common language across diverse 
professional communities engaged in the practice of election administra-
tion, and promote dialogue between those who conduct elections and 
those who study the way elections operate. Drawing more than 200 par-
ticipants over 2 days, Inclusion and Integrity advanced the conversation 
with cutting edge (and controversial) topics including the lack of diver-
sity in the election workforce, the difficulties in untangling financial 
aspects of election operations, and presentations by representatives of 
leading equipment and service providers in the field about security con-
cerns and the future of voting equipment. Through 64 separate panels 
and plenary session speakers, participants discussed data and measure-
ment issues around national surveys, voter access and participation, 
diversity, voting system vendor concerns, election professionalism, tech-
nology and security, costs and resources, measuring success, and emerg-
ing research in the field.
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The FuTure oF elecTion AdminisTrATion projecT 
As compAnion volumes
Our publisher encouraged us to develop two companion books to capture 
the range of issues and voices in election administration today. The chap-
ters in both The Future of Election Administration and The Future of 
Election Administration: Cases and Conversations reflect the presentations 
and discussions at the October 2017 Auburn symposium. As a whole, the 
project identifies several key themes of common concern to election offi-
cials, policy makers, and researchers. How do we equip election adminis-
trators with the knowledge and skills to operate effectively in a rapidly 
changing legal and technological environment? How do we equip election 
offices with voting systems and operating procedures that inspire voter 
confidence about the integrity of election administration broadly? How 
do we sustain access to registration and voting for all eligible voters? 
Underlying all of these concerns is an intergovernmental mismatch 
between resources and authority that must be addressed if modernization 
is to take effect equitably across the states. These volumes can be read 
jointly or separately as stand-alone books, but our intent (and our hope) is 
that they are used together.
The Future of Election Administration
The Future of Election Administration addresses current challenges and 
the future of access and participation; challenges in professionalizing the 
work of election officials; and emerging and future issues in the field. Each 
of these is briefly described below.
Part I of the companion volume begins with an exploration of the his-
toric components of American election administration and how these 
remain relevant today. Its chapters identify and analyze impediments to 
voting and how those have changed over time for different groups. 
Authors in this part also discuss the issues that present particular chal-
lenges, and offer prescriptions for policy change as well as for administra-
tive practice.
Part II examines the professionalism of the field of election administra-
tion as an area of public service. The chapters include perspectives from the 
administrative professionals who run elections, professionals who work in 
the field as academics, and those who work as members of professional asso-
ciations and other nonprofit organizations. The authors provide a  historical 
 B. A. KING ET AL.
5
and contextual discussion of the development of the public service profes-
sionalism generally, and the professionalism of election administration spe-
cifically. They lay out the evolution of the Election Administration and 
Voting Survey (EAVS), the Election Performance Index (EPI), and the 
Election Administration Professionalism Index (EAPI). Some authors take 
up the importance of common language and common data format across 
the field of election systems, and specifically, the challenges in building com-
mon terminology and data formats. Other authors take up the quality and 
composition of the profession, including the history and development of 
diversity and resource availability.
Part III addresses issues that have emerged recently as either challenges 
or opportunities (or both), the ways in which election administrators have 
responded, and how they are preparing to address foreseeable challenges 
in the future. Authors discuss equipment, acquisition, and security. They 
lay out the components of election integrity and how we attempt to ensure 
it. Authors take up the use of audits to increase quality and transparency. 
Additionally, there is a discussion of elections from a comparative context 
as a way to compare what is happening in the US election system as we 
attempt to modernize.
The plAn oF This book
This volume tracks the three parts in The Future of Election Administration, 
and is comprised of first-person, practical case studies written about expe-
riences in the field. These illustrative case studies bring forward issues 
addressed in the other volume through firsthand accounts of often com-
plicated and compelling issues. Taken as a whole, the pieces speak to where 
we are today as a field and where we ought to and are likely to go in 
the future.
Future of Election Administration: Cases and Conversations
The cases in this volume are presented in three groups, loosely organized 
around the ways that historical practices and reforms are reflected in 
today’s issues; the professionalization of the field and approaches to capac-
ity building; and tools that have been developed for the field. Of course, 
the experiences of election professionals are multidimensional and not 
neatly classified into categories, and so the readings provide illustrations 
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that link broadly across the spectrum of the field. That said, we find these 
categories reflective of the key current themes in the field.
Reflections on History and Links to Reform. American election admin-
istration is rooted in more than 50 years of federal prescriptions that 
address practices which imposed inequities on particular groups and, more 
recently, a tide of technological change. Cases in this part examine these 
themes from a variety of perspectives and a blend of experiences.
Robert Montjoy, former Election Director of the state of Alabama and 
emeritus professor from both Auburn University and the University of 
New Orleans, discusses how the state of Alabama proceeded to implement 
a federal court order throughout the state on a controversial issue. He 
sheds light on how a small, committed group of people on a tight budget 
were able to make substantial improvements in election administration 
and pave the way for future improvements.
Thomas Wilkey, former Executive Director of both the US Election 
Assistance Commission and the New York state election board, works with 
Donetta Davidson, former Secretary of State of Colorado and 
Election  Assistance  Commission (EAC) Commissioner, to discuss the 
impetus behind the federal Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), 
its development and evolution, and why it continues to be important 
today, especially as the relationship between election offices and vendors 
become even more critical.
Kamanzi Kalisa, formerly the Director of Election Policy and 
Programming for the Council of State Government’s Overseas Voting 
Initiative, takes up the work of that organization to improve voting for 
overseas citizens, military personnel, and dependents, and describes the 
process and its challenges.
Jill LaVine, Election Director of Sacramento County California 
(retired), and Alice Jarboe, Assistant Registrar (retired), describe the pro-
vision of language assistance for voters who speak languages other than 
English. They present their approach to service provision in a large subur-
ban county including the challenges they have faced, and how they have 
partnered with the community to enhance these efforts, particularly as 
more demands are put on their offices with the inclusion of previously 
uncovered languages.
Bruce Adelson, former lawyer for the US Department of Justice, spent 
a significant portion of his career investigating election administration 
complaints across the country. Here, he discusses his work on evaluating 
accessibility issues for poll sites and voters. He recounts problems he has 
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seen, principles for addressing those problems, and considerations for the 
field. Attention to accessibility is only expected to increase as an essential 
aspect of election administration as the voting population ages.
Cybersecurity has also emerged as an essential aspect of election admin-
istration. Matt Masterson, formerly a US EAC Commissioner and cur-
rently serving as a senior advisor for the Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) cybersecurity unit, discusses cybersecurity from a 
national perspective. He presents what DHS has done since the designa-
tion of elections as critical infrastructure in 2016, and what they hope to 
achieve in the future.
From the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to the present, election practices 
have reformed significantly to expand the franchise to all eligible voters. 
Public attention to election operations has not expanded to include the 
diverse perspectives of staff and the vendors who serve election jurisdic-
tions. And yet, the lack of staff diversity and the relatively negative media 
treatment of equipment vendors may contribute to loss of public confi-
dence in the overall election process. Lauri Ealom, Election Director in 
Kansas City, Missouri, writes about her career and diversity in election 
administration and its importance for enhancing voter experiences. She 
discusses the central place of a diverse election office to enhance official 
understanding of voter needs to create programs and enhance implemen-
tation to meet those needs. Shauna Dozier, Election Director of Clayton 
County, Georgia, continues this discussion in a case study that tracks her 
experiences in rising through the profession as a young election official to 
her work today, reflecting on the changing demographics of voters and 
election officials. Mindy Perkins, President and CEO of VR Systems, Inc., 
presents the current public relations challenges facing election equipment 
vendors. She details a firsthand account of the vendor experiences in serv-
ing customers and maintaining public confidence under conditions of sys-
tem stress and heightened public scrutiny.
The current election administration environment is chock-full of 
changes in voting methods and discussions about which methods are more 
effective in achieving policy goals. Lori Edwards, Supervisor of Elections 
in Polk County, Florida, broadens this conversation by discussing the 
financial challenges presented by policy change and highlights concerns 
that are not obvious in the current conversations about election adminis-
tration reform.
Of course, change in election practice is not limited to American 
elections; structures and operations in other countries inform our 
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 understanding of the benefits and limitations of what we do in US election 
jurisdictions. Kelly Krawczyk, Associate Professor at Auburn University 
details her observations of elections in Ghana and discusses the trade-offs 
between efficiency, transparency, and integrity and what we can learn for 
the US system from an international perspective.
Professionalizing the Field and Building Capacity. Election administra-
tion is a relatively recent arrival to the professional scene within the broader 
field of public service. Local offices face challenges in building capacity 
within the intergovernmental relationships unique to the field, and educa-
tion and training programs have emerged to provide both content knowl-
edge and practical training. Cases in this part discuss these efforts from the 
perspective of state and local election offices, graduates of university-based 
programs and professional training associations.
Ernie Hawkins, former Election Director of Sacramento County, 
California, and Chair of the Election Center Board of Directors from 
1999 to 2019, discusses the importance of training, communication, and 
peer sharing for the field of election administration. He describes the 
advent of the Election Center and his experiences in communicating with 
public officials about the complexities of the field.
Lori Augino, Election Director for the state of Washington, discusses 
how she has transformed the state election office to improve election 
administration across the state. Using principles of authentic collabora-
tion, power sharing, and streamlined communication, she illustrates how 
the office has increased the impact of state-county interactions and 
enhanced consistency and quality of elections in counties across the state 
through certification, training, and other processes and tools.
The discussion of the state role in building capacity through training is 
continued by Virginia Vander Roest, Training and Communications 
Manager, Michigan Bureau of Elections. She discusses the Michigan train-
ing program and the benefits that it brings to local election jurisdictions, 
as well as the challenges in serving more than 1000 counties and townships.
University-based curriculum for the election administration field has 
emerged, first through graduate certificate programs at Auburn University, 
and subsequently through certificates at the University of Minnesota. The 
Auburn program focuses on graduate education and this volume includes 
the experiences of several of its Master of Public Administration (MPA) 
and PhD students and recent graduates. Lindsey Forson, Cybersecurity 
Program Coordinator for the National Association of Secretaries of State 
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(NASS), tracks her journey through reflections about how she became 
interested in the topic through her  doctoral program training, and how 
that interest is converging into a career dedicated to advocacy and sup-
port. Blake Evans, formerly an Election Coordinator in Escambia County 
Florida (and now Elections Chief in Fulton County, Georgia), discusses 
the transition from being a Master of Public Administration student with 
a focus on election administration into the actual position and what infor-
mation he needed coming into the job. Auburn University graduate stu-
dents Tyler St. Clair (MPA Program Election Center Fellow) and Shaniqua 
Williams (PhD Program) discuss their experiences in Nigeria for the 2019 
presidential election, and in participating in that experience.
Professional certification in election administration has been well estab-
lished through a partnership between the Election Center (also known as 
the National Association of Election Officials) and Auburn University’s 
graduate program in election administration. Tim Mattice, Executive 
Director of the Election Center and former training director for the 
New York State Board of Elections, chronicles the evolution of national 
certification for election administrators through the Certified Elections 
Registration Administrator (CERA) program and its subsequent iterations 
for election equipment and services vendors (Certified Elections 
Registration Vendor (CERV)) and election monitors (Certified Elections 
Monitor (CEM)). The themes of these experiences are augmented by a 
discussion about education and training from Doug Chapin, a longtime 
advocate for election administrators and now working at the Fors Marsh 
consulting group.
Tools for the Field. As the field of election administration has become 
more professionalized, examples are emerging that illustrate how to 
accomplish process improvements, leverage technology, and use data to its 
best advantage. Cases in this part reflect experiences of election officials 
and other professionals with customer service, organizing to meet cyber-
security requirements, tools that can enhance capacity for infrequent but 
critical procurement and redistricting decisions, accessibility improve-
ments, the utility of the EAC’s Election Administration and Voting Survey, 
and the value of data integration tools in meeting current challenges.
Amber McReynolds, former election official from the City/County of 
Denver, Colorado, and current Executive Director for Vote-at-Home, an 
advocacy group promoting mail balloting, provides advice for election 
administrators about how to improve processes by adopting an office-wide 
customer orientation to the work that election officials do, which she 
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thinks will enhance the voter experience and by extension the quality of 
voting in the US.
Tim Tsujii, Election Director in Forsyth County, North Carolina, dis-
cusses the creation of a line management tool based on commercial off- 
the- shelf technology. Through illustrations of the pilot program and 
further evolution, he shows how it can be used to improve communica-
tion with voters to increase voter satisfaction and participation.
Noah Praetz, a former election official with Cook County, Illinois, and 
currently a contractor for DHS, discusses the challenges that cybersecurity 
protocols pose to election officials at the local level. He offers tools for 
establishing protocols that address the key dimensions of local operations, 
and that draw upon new national institutional architecture around tech-
nology security in election administration.
Procurement of major election system hardware and software does not 
occur frequently enough for most election officials, many of whom con-
duct elections using equipment and technology purchased years ago. 
David Bennett, Treasurer and Financial Officer of VR Systems, Inc. and 
former state procurement expert, discusses the procurement process from 
multiple perspectives, with an emphasis on the challenges of purchasing 
technology and how established processes can frustrate local and state 
election offices in getting the results that they are seeking. He presents 
ways in which election officials can build capacity to improve their tech-
nology acquisition processes.
Also relatively infrequent but critical is the process of drawing district 
and precinct lines. Kim Brace, President of Election Data Services, illus-
trates how to use Geographic Information System (GIS) tools to improve 
the work that election officials do. He lays out the history and attendant 
problems of precinct line maps and placement of voter residences. Brace 
implores election officials at all levels to educate policy makers about the 
negative impact of some of their redistricting practices on efficient and 
accurate administration of elections.
The staff at Evan Terry Associates, Inc., a firm that specializes in acces-
sibility, continue the discussion of accessibility and poll sites. They use 
their experiences working with election offices in New York to provide 
advice for election jurisdictions across the country about how to resolve 
common physical barriers for voters with disabilities, communication and 
etiquette considerations with these voters, and universal approaches that 
can help election officials work with all voters.
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Last, but not least, electronic datasets occupy a particular space in elec-
tion administration. The national EAVS database and corresponding 
reports produced by the EAC provide one lens for understanding the 
strengths and limitations of data flowing through local election jurisdic-
tions to state offices and then to the EAC and the field. Sean Greene, 
consultant and former employee of the EAC and Pew Center on the 
States, discusses the value of the EAVS today from a national perspective. 
Susan Gill, Supervisor of Elections in Citrus County, Florida, adds to this 
conversation with a view from the local level, discussing the challenges 
election officials have responding to the EAVS.
David Becker, Executive Director and founder of the Center for 
Election Innovation and Research and formerly with The Pew Charitable 
Trusts, closes out the volume with a case that traces his development of 
the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) and its contribu-
tion to improving the quality of data that states use in maintaining voter 
registration lists. ERIC streamlines processes that states can access to syn-
thesize voter registration data along with data from multiple sources, 
ensuring the accuracy of electronic voter registration databases.
In sum, these case studies represent the collective wisdom of people 
who have developed a significant body of professional expertise about the 
issues facing election administration today. They have worked in a variety 
of roles in American elections and their perspectives are informed by a host 
of experiences. Our contributors include local election officials, state elec-
tion officials, national government officials, academics, students in gradu-
ate programs, equipment vendors, consultants, advocates, and 
representatives of third party groups that represent associations of election 
officials and other related constituencies. Nearly all of the contributors 
have served in multiple roles across government and the election system 
more broadly. Many were selected as election officials through direct pub-
lic elections; others have been appointed by elected officials. Together, the 
collective wisdom included here provides us all with a more complete 
understanding of how to improve elections in the US and how to move 
the field forward in a way that enhances public trust, ensures integrity, and 
is efficient, accurate, and transparent. Elections are the way that we mea-
sure democracy, and election administration is the machine that runs elec-
tions; these voices are at the heart of that machine.
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Carrying Out a Federal Court Order 
in Alabama
Robert Montjoy
Abstract Administering elections requires coordination among indepen-
dent parties. The implementation of a 1988 court ruling in Alabama was an 
extreme case of this proposition. State and local officials, volunteer trainers, 
Auburn University, and the Alabama Cooperative Extension Service worked 
together in a compressed time frame to carry out new procedures for 
recruiting and training poll workers. The case illustrates the need for and 
the results of interorganizational cooperation in unusual circumstances.
Keywords Intergovernmental • Poll workers • Training • African 
Americans
Elections require the interaction of multiple agencies and individuals, 
sometimes in unexpected ways. This is one of those cases. In 1988, a fed-
eral judge issued a ruling in the case of Harris v. Seigelman that required 
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changing appointment procedures and training for Alabama poll workers. 
Implementation involved the offices of the governor, the attorney general 
and the secretary of state, the plaintiffs, the probate judges of 65 counties, 
Auburn University, Alabama Cooperative Extension Service and 63 volun-
teer trainers. By an unusual confluence of circumstances, I became the 
coordinator for implementation.
The SeTTing
In the 1980s, Alabama’s election system was decentralized and frag-
mented. At the county level, four different public officials and the local 
party chairs had various responsibilities for voter registration and elec-
tions. The important ones for this case were the probate judges, who were 
responsible for training poll workers and who served, along with circuit 
clerks and sheriffs, on the boards that appointed poll workers from lists to 
be provided by political parties. All of these officials were locally elected. 
No office at the state level had a role in their selection or authority to make 
rules governing procedures. The state attorney general could issue non-
binding interpretations of law.
In the early 1980s, Secretary of State Don Seigelman set about trying 
to strengthen his role in the election process. Lacking formal authority to 
issue orders, he obtained a grant to develop and demonstrate instructional 
materials for use by local officials in training poll workers. He contracted 
with Auburn University’s Center for Government Services (CGS) to 
implement the grant. As an associate professor of political science and 
assistant director of CGS, I managed the contract. This gave me an oppor-
tunity to learn about Alabama election law and to interact with state and 
local election officials. In 1987, when Glen Browder became secretary of 
state, he asked me to join his staff, part-time, to assist in election-related 
matters. We worked out an arrangement whereby his office paid Auburn 
for my time.
Meanwhile, an important court case was developing. It arose in 1984 
when two African Americans brought suit against the governor and attor-
ney general over several issues related to elections. Among the most 
important was that blacks, particularly the poor and elderly, were intimi-
dated by white poll workers. US District Judge Myron Thompson 
ordered that the case would be a class action including, as plaintiffs, all 
black citizens of Alabama and, as defendants, the authorities for appoint-
ing poll workers in all but 2 of the 67 counties. At the request of the 
court, the parties negotiated an agreement to appoint black poll workers 
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in proportion to their presence in the voting age population. Very little 
happened, partly because Alabama had no administrative mechanism to 
effectively implement the agreement statewide.
In 1988, the plaintiffs returned to Judge Thompson seeking enforce-
ment of the earlier ruling. In this case, they complained about the lack of 
black poll workers and about a state law that limited voters’ ability to 
obtain assistance at the polling place. There was now a new governor and 
Don Seigelman had moved on to become attorney general. They wanted 
to settle the case. Secretary of State Glen Browder agreed to become a 
defendant and manage the implementation. The parties worked out a plan 
that became the basis for a new court order. I became the coordinator for 
the project.
The CaSe
The court order required not only that the defendants cease discrimina-
tory practices, but also that they undertake a positive program to over-
come the effects of past discrimination. The program would include the 
following:
• Training materials for poll workers that included instructions on 
allowing assistance to voters under new procedures that were consis-
tent with federal law.
• Biracial teams of volunteer trainers who would conduct schools for 
poll workers in each affected county.
• Certification of the names of those who completed the schools to the 
county appointing authorities.
• Appointment of black poll workers in sufficient numbers to achieve 
racial balance.
• Removal of restrictions in state law limiting poll worker appoint-
ments to citizens living in the precincts where they would serve and 
whose names were submitted by political parties.
• An oath for poll workers that included a pledge not to discriminate.
• A complaint/evaluation form available to voters in each polling place.
• A poster that would be displayed at each polling place explaining 
voters’ rights to cast a “challenged ballot,” a precursor under state 
law to today’s provisional ballot.
The program would last through 1992, three election cycles.
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The Training and CerTifiCaTion Program
There were just over two months between the court order and the 1988 
general election. The court-approved plan left many practical questions 
unanswered, and it was clear that the defendants could not run back to 
federal court to get clarification every time an issue arose. So, the gover-
nor, the attorney general, the secretary of state and the plaintiffs each 
agreed to appoint a representative to an oversight board that could make 
decisions as the program progressed. As the secretary of state’s representa-
tive, I served as the coordinator of the board. One of the best decisions 
that we made was to schedule a regular meeting each week until the fall 
election. We could always cancel the meeting if no decisions were needed.
Complicating the 1988 schedule was the fact that poll workers had 
already been appointed under state law. The oversight board agreed that 
the training program could not be expected to affect the appointment of 
poll workers in the first year of implementation. Instead, we reached agree-
ment with the probate judges, who were by state law responsible for train-
ing and integrating new training materials into regular county schools for 
poll workers. The secretary of state contracted with CGS to develop the 
training materials and manage the program. The instructional program 
that we had developed under the earlier grant became the basis for the 
new one, allowing a quick response. We still had to modify the material to 
cover the new procedures for assistance in voting and to print copies for 
use in the schools. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs and defendants recruited vol-
unteer trainers, who attended the instruction on how to use the training 
materials. The trainers, in turn, participated in 129 county schools for poll 
workers, handed out the new material and highlighted the changes in law 
and procedure.
After this first implementation, the oversight board held a meeting in 
Montgomery, the state capital, to get input from the appointing boards, 
all of whom were invited to attend. We used this information in the design 
of the first full iteration of the program in 1990. This time we held the 
schools in the spring so that we could certify attendees to the appointing 
boards in time to influence their choices of poll workers. The idea of cer-
tification raised the question of whether there should be a test to provide 
a measure of competence. The oversight board, including the plaintiffs’ 
attorney, decided to include a simple test. It would consist of ten questions 
drawn from the material provided to the prospective poll workers, who 
were encouraged to use the material to answer the questions. Thus, the 
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test measured the ability to read and apply instructions. In order to get the 
tests graded in time, we used scan sheets that were shipped to Auburn for 
reading. We would learn that some attendees, especially the elderly, were 
not familiar with scan sheets and had difficulty filling them in.
In order to ensure uniform presentations around the state, we created 
a “sound and slide” show. This was before the time of computer-based 
programs and Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) projectors. We used 35 mm 
slides and cassette tapes to give an overview of normal polling place 
 procedures. We also provided a handheld flip chart (Fig. 2.1) on how to 
deal with unusual situations, including the need for assistance in voting. 
Fig. 2.1 State of Alabama poll workers guide
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The idea was to teach the basic polling process and provide job aids to 
cover the major exceptions that could occur. The open book test was 
designed to give poll workers experience using the job aids. The probate 
judges or their representatives covered voting equipment and any other 
county- specific issues. Counties used different voting equipment—paper 
ballots, Automatic  Voting  Machines  (AVM) and Shoup lever machines 
and, in one case, punch cards.
This plan required a substantial local effort. We coordinated with the 
probate judges to find locations and to set dates for the schools. Yet we 
needed additional local support for things such as providing and setting 
up audio-visual equipment, receiving and distributing instructional mate-
rial, and collecting the tests and forwarding them to Auburn. For this 
purpose, we turned to the Alabama Cooperative Extension Service 
(ACES), which had offices in each county. As a land-grant university, 
Auburn housed ACES, and the director agreed to help us at no cost to the 
program because of their public service mission.
Meanwhile, we had to recruit and train the trainers. As before, each 
member of the oversight board was tasked with providing a list of names. 
Persons on the list were invited to attend one of seven train-the-trainer 
schools around the state. Those who attended were asked to conduct 
schools in one or more counties as part of biracial teams. Because the 
plaintiffs wanted to demonstrate a break from traditional county election 
administration, trainers were not scheduled to teach in their home coun-
ties. They would be reimbursed for travel and given a standard meal allow-
ance, but not paid for their time. A total of 85 trainers, 63 volunteers plus 
project staff, conducted 145 workshops and administered tests to 13,616 
prospective poll workers. Almost all (97 percent) of those who took the 
test passed and had their names certified to the appointing boards. The 
boards were then able to appoint racially balanced teams of poll workers 
and satisfy the requirements of the court order. The program was repeated 
in 1992 in substantially the same fashion.
LeSSonS Learned
The circumstances of the court-ordered training program were unique 
and unlikely to be repeated. Nevertheless, I think there were a few lessons 
that can be used in other settings.
Communication  was very important. We tried to keep all parties 
involved and to learn about and respect the constraints of local authorities.
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Being able to get decisions in a timely manner was imperative. 
Unexpected developments occurred throughout the program and the 
project team had to be able to respond quickly. The creation of the over-
sight board and the pre-scheduling of weekly meetings proved to have 
been essential.
Volunteers could be responsible partners in public service. They were 
difficult to schedule because of time and travel demands, but once they 
accepted an assignment, they almost always fulfilled it. There were a few 
cases of automobile breakdowns; the trainers had to use personal vehicles 
and travel out of their home counties. Yet there were no cases in which a 
volunteer simply failed to show up without notice. And because the train-
ers were assigned in teams and we had backups available in project staff, 
we were able to conduct all schools, although with only one trainer in 
some instances.
Coordination was critical. The many different parties involved and the 
tight time constraints forced project staff to spend many hours scheduling 
and rescheduling to meet program commitments. Coordinating the vol-
unteers was especially challenging because we were asking them to break 
their normal work or family routines and travel away from their communi-
ties, sometimes at night. We had not counted on the cost in terms of staff 
time to manage that part of the program.
The level of cooperation between state and local governments, between 
former opponents in the court case, and between representatives of differ-
ent political parties was surprising and very encouraging. Of course, a 
federal court order is a big stick, but it never had to be used.
Election officials often face unexpected demands that exceed the 
resources of their own offices. Outside organizations and individuals can 
sometimes help in surprising ways. As has been demonstrated more 
recently in natural disasters like Hurricane Michael in 2018, individuals 
and offices from outside the normal realm of election administration can 
rally to meet unusual needs, in which case having a mechanism for coordi-
nation is even more important than usual.
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Abstract For some, it may be difficult to remember a time when we had 
no electronic voting equipment—no scanners accepting paper ballots, no 
touch screens—whereas the voting system today is the result of decades of 
work by federal agencies and groups of election officials about voting sys-
tems and technology. We participated in these efforts over several decades 
in different roles over time. This case reflects our observations and experi-
ences about how the current certification system came to be, and reflec-
tions about how improvements can be made.
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D. Davidson 
United States Election Assistance Commission, Silver Spring, MD, USA 
Colorado Secretary of State, Denver, CO, USA 
T. Wilkey (*) 
United States Election Assistance Commission, Silver Spring, MD, USA 
New York State Board of Elections, New York, NY, USA
24
The Role of NASeD
One of the keys to the current certification system is the role played by 
NASED, the National Association of State Election Directors. Formed in 
1989, NASED is the national professional association of state chief elec-
tion officials in the states, the District of Columbia, and the US territories. 
Both of us were involved in the formation of this group, and both served 
as one of its presidents during the early years (Donetta in 1994 and Tom 
in 1996). Around this time, it had also become obvious that standards 
would be needed for electronic voting equipment that was already in use 
and beginning to become more widely popular. The idea of standards had 
been discussed for about a decade, including a study commissioned by the 
Federal  Election  Commission (FEC), and its report in 1983 from the 
National Clearinghouse on Election Administration (housed within the 
FEC) that performance standards for voting systems were necessary.
NASED’s role in standards began during conversations with the FEC 
as the federal agency was developing standards, which were published in 
1990. NASED agreed to serve as the certifying agency for the new voting 
system standards. This meant developing the first handbook for voting 
system accreditation, which NASED did in 2001. It also meant accredit-
ing a number of testing laboratories, and these were initially known as 
Independent Testing Authorities (ITAs), then voting system testing labo-
ratories (VSTLs). The labs that were accredited evolved from labs that had 
been involved in similar work for the federal government.
During this time, the Election Center also played a key role. The 
Election Center is the only organization established for training election 
administrators and other election professionals. It offers professional 
certification through its Certified Elections  Registration Administrator 
(CERA) program, which is operated in partnership with the Auburn 
University Graduate Program in Election Administration and its Master of 
Public Administration program. When NASED agreed to take on respon-
sibility for voting system certification, it set up an Accreditation Board. 
The Election Center stepped in to assume the role of secretariat for 
NASED and the Board. These links provided election officials with a 
ready-made opportunity to share information widely across the Election 
Center membership, which reached local election officials and others in 
the election community who were not members of the national associa-
tions of state election directors or secretaries of state, NASED or NASS 
(the National Association of Secretaries of State). The Election Center 
continued as the NASED secretariat for more than 25 years, until 2018.
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In 2002, the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) transferred responsibilities 
of the National Clearinghouse on Election Administration out of the FEC 
to the newly formed Election Assistance Commission (EAC). Related to 
voting systems, the EAC was tasked with the responsibility of developing 
new voting system standards that would now be known as voluntary voting 
system guidelines (VVSG), and implementing a national testing and certifi-
cation program for voting system hardware and software. HAVA established 
a new set of administrative groups around voting system standards that 
replaced the functions that NASED had performed and expanded their 
reach. These included the Standards Board, the Board of Advisors, and the 
Technical Guidelines Development Committee (TGDC). The Standards 
Board has 110 members: 55 state election officials are selected by their 
respective chief state election official and 55 local election officials are 
selected through a process supervised by the chief state election official. The 
Board of Advisors has 35 members who are appointed by various organiza-
tions of state officials related to election operations, including NASED and 
the Election Center. The TGDC has 15 members including the chair cho-
sen by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the 
other members chosen by NIST and the EAC.
Both of us were involved quite a bit during the transition to the EAC 
and afterward. Tom was appointed in 2005 as the first executive director 
of the EAC, and Donetta was appointed in 2005 as a Commissioner, and 
Donetta chaired the TGDC during her tenure; both stepped down in 2011.
The help AmeRicA VoTe AcT
When the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) was adopted in 2002, it created 
a situation where things were actually backwards if what we wanted were 
modern voting systems that satisfied a set of national standards. Instead of 
beginning with the creation of the first set of VVSG standards and require-
ments, and getting those out so that manufacturers could build the equip-
ment, the approach was to tell everyone they had to have new equipment 
by a certain day. States in turn bought old, legacy equipment that some 
states are still using today.
At the time, there was a conflict between accessibility and moving away 
from old punch card type machines. The law was clear and had more 
about accessibility than security. At NIST there was an expert on accessi-
bility, and there was another expert on the disability community on the 
TGDC. Together they pushed for accessibility to be a part of HAVA so 
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that every voter could vote independently without any help. That was 
clear from the beginning of the creation of HAVA because it had to be done.
During the development of HAVA, it seemed like direct recording elec-
tronic (DRE), touch screen machines, would be better for accessibility. 
The activists were sure that they were not secure or accurate. The press 
picked up on this immediately and influenced the public’s understanding 
of the DRE machines. Many counties went to paper ballots as a way to 
protect themselves from bad press and public opinion. Paper activists 
could be fairly aggressive at times. A few years ago, Donetta came out to 
observe one of the election audits in Colorado. When asked why she voted 
years ago not to require paper when Colorado uses paper today, Donetta 
remarked that some states had laws that allowed them to buy equipment 
that didn’t use paper. She didn’t want those states to be  forced to buy 
entirely new systems. Further, at the time, the procedures and rules for 
handling paper were not secure across the states and counties.
The TGDc
The TGDC faced several challenges including forming its membership 
and starting up a process. Both of these would be easier today because 
something is already in place, but at the time the structure was just a shell. 
At the EAC, we fought for a vendor to be on the TGDC, though a lot of 
people did not like that. But we thought we needed at least one vendor. 
Ed Smith was on the committee for the TGDC to represent all of the 
vendors, and he did a good job representing the entire community, not 
the particular vendor he worked for.
The process for developing the rules for equipment through the TGDC 
was hard and took a long time. We found that NIST had extensive knowl-
edge, and that just blew us away. It was also challenging because it was 
easy for technical experts to talk over your head. They are scientists and 
work on testing on all kinds of things from rockets to election systems. It 
took a great deal of time for experts and election officials to find common 
ground on how to talk about things, and this improved over time.
There was one conversation about bar codes that was quite controver-
sial. Election Systems and Software (ES&S) actually got caught putting 
bar codes on the ballot that related to the voter. The activists on the 
 committee were up in arms about this. One advocate proved that she 
could track someone down to the voter name through the bar codes. 
ES&S changed this obviously, but bar codes are still controversial. They 
are still allowed, but cannot be used in ways that track them to the voter.
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Part of the reason that creating the VVSG standards took so long at first 
was because we had to develop the process. Now each stage takes less time 
because the process is already in place. At one point, we had standards 
ready but we couldn’t adopt them because we didn’t have a quorum. 
Once they got a quorum, the commissioners decided to add more things 
before adopting them, which created an even longer delay. They did this 
because technology had changed, and then the new ideas had to go back 
to the Standards Board for approval. There is also a comment period, and 
additional time was added because of the federal Paperwork Reduction 
Act. The Paperwork Reduction Act was created before the widespread use 
of computers and requirements still applied at the time that caused delays.
The EAC timing for certifying equipment also took a long time at first. 
Some of what looked like delay on the part of the EAC was really due to 
the approaches taken by the vendors. Equipment vendors were bringing in 
equipment for testing before even testing it themselves and, not surpris-
ingly, problems would be found. As a consequence, we at the EAC pub-
lished a certification chart that showed the different stages of the process 
and how much time each took. This allowed observers to see that what 
looked like an EAC delay was in part because the vendor had to go back 
and correct problems which took them months to fix. Now vendors are so 
much better about checking all of their equipment and testing it before 
the equipment goes in for federal testing.
There is a vendor committee now, as well as an activist committee. 
NIST and TGDC members come to those meetings so everyone can hear 
them. The process has improved by having these groups involved. The 
TGDC is small and not much of its work is open to the public—they can 
come, but there are no comments from the audience. So it’s important to 
have these committees and to listen to what the people on the committees 
have to say. This gives more input which helps the process.
The Advisory Board has not been very manageable because there are so 
many people on it. The Board has become wiser about how they do things, 
working in subcommittees, because when the whole committee is all 
together, the people with the loudest voices have the room. The represen-
tation on this is also important. In some states the Secretary would go, but 
if the Secretary wasn’t that involved in the election side of the work in that 
state, the Secretary would send a staff member. This works in some cases, 
but not in others. And the rules require that no state can have two mem-
bers of the same political party, so that also affects who is on the Board.
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chooSiNG New equipmeNT
Today, election system manufacturers will often have a variety of machines 
so they can work with the different demands from the states. These 
demands emanate from state law, the preferences of the procurement offi-
cials and preferences of the public. In addition, some states require certifi-
cation from both the EAC and the state office. This costs vendors almost 
double. Some states like California have even more rigid testing standards. 
Certification costs are paid by the vendors and can be significant; the cer-
tification cost depends on how long it takes the system to be certified. The 
cost can range usually from $50,000 to $500,000, though in one case it 
went as high as one million. Small changes to state laws can cost the ven-
dor about $50,000 in certification costs for each occurrence.
State associations are also involved in the equipment selection and cer-
tification process. Some states have strong associations and others do not. 
When Colorado Secretary of State Wayne Williams wanted to adopt a new 
system, he pulled in the activist community, the county clerks who are the 
elected officials responsible for running elections, and the county commis-
sioners. These groups all had the opportunity to weigh in on the vendors 
and give their opinions. Some of the vendors listened to the opinions of 
these groups, and some did not. This is what graded some of the vendors 
down in this process. Some of the counties tested these systems and we 
watched that process. Each state manages its voting system selection pro-
cess differently. Some secretaries of state get very involved in this and have 
strong opinions; in other states, local election officials have more say.
coNcluSioN
The national VVSG system has taken more than 30 years to develop to this 
point, and the entire voting system environment is entering a new phase. 
The states are looking at new equipment to replace the systems purchased 
with HAVA funds; virtually every system has ended its useful life in one 
way or another. New trends are coming, with the use of commercial equip-
ment such as iPads and ePollbooks, and new processes like ballot on 
demand where voters are issued onetime use access cards that are activated 
to the voter’s ballot style. With new methods come new and easier ways to 
assist all types of voters with disability. Security is also a concern in a new 
way, now that election systems are part of the US critical infrastructure. 
What we have seen through the development of this system, from the 
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earliest stages with NASED, is that the election community continues to 
operate in a way that incorporates the information from technical experts 
along with the experiences and opinions of election officials who use these 
systems. From our experiences and observations, it would not have been 
possible to develop our current system without the many critical conversa-
tions that brought forward the input of local and state election officials.
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CHAPTER 4
Improving Voting for Overseas Citizens, 
Military Personnel and Their Dependents
Kamanzi Kalisa
Abstract US citizens living overseas as well as active duty military person-
nel have unique and long-standing challenges in exercising their right to 
register and cast their vote by absentee in US elections—lack of physical 
mobility, residing in remote areas, varying laws and policies, as well as 
limited access to voting information and the actual voting process. The 
complex US overseas election system is further complicated by the admin-
istrative role played by all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the 
territories. This case study will explore the work of The Council of State 
Government’s Overseas Voting Initiative from 2014 to 2018 and the ini-
tiative’s efforts to improve the voting process for American military per-
sonnel, their families, and civilian citizens residing overseas.
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US citizens living overseas have unique and long-standing challenges in 
exercising their right to register and cast their vote by absentee ballot in 
US elections. Many active duty military personnel lack mobility and live in 
remote areas abroad. Compared to US citizens living stateside, overseas 
citizens have limited access to the voting process. The US overseas elec-
tion system is complex in design and administration as it involves the coor-
dination of federal, state, and local governments to carry out their legal 
responsibilities. The time associated with transmitting ballots overseas and 
back as well as varying laws, policies, and procedures administered in the 
50 states, the District of Columbia, and territories are other realities facing 
overseas voters.
To help improve the US military and overseas voting process, The 
Council of State Governments (CSG) in 2013 partnered with the US 
Department of Defense’s Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) to 
launch the CSG Overseas Voting Initiative. FVAP is mandated by federal 
law for establishing and maintaining a program to assist all eligible US 
service members and overseas citizens in registering to vote and casting 
ballots. The primary purpose of this $3.2 million initiative is to improve 
the voting process for American military personnel, their families, and 
civilian citizens residing overseas. CSG is uniquely qualified for this effort 
as it maintains decades of experience convening forums that foster the 
exchange of insights and ideas to help state officials shape public policy. 
Founded in 1933, CSG is the only national membership organization 
serving all three branches of state government and offering unparalleled 
regional, national, and international opportunities to network, develop 
leaders, collaborate, and create problem-solving partnerships.
Serving as CSG’s Director of Election Policy and Programming for 
over four years, I oversaw the convening and support of bipartisan work-
ing advisory groups of state and local election administrators focused on 
policy, technology, and survey analysis that promote evidence-based best 
practices as well as facilitate data standardization policy solutions affecting 
over 5 million US military and civilian overseas eligible registered voters. 
Previously, I served as the State of Georgia’s Help America Vote Act 
Program Manager for the Georgia Secretary of State in Atlanta, with an 
$85 million budget for election administration in 881 local jurisdictions in 
the State of Georgia. The Help America Vote Act is a federal election 
reform law which provides funding for states to modernize voter registra-
tion systems, improve election administration, expand disability access and 
voting technology for voters stateside as well as for those residing overseas 
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(e.g., members of the seven uniformed services, members of US Merchant 
Marine, US citizens employed by the federal government residing outside 
the United States, and other private US citizens residing outside the 
United States). In that role, I had the privilege and honor of hosting inter-
national election observation delegations representing Rwanda, Japan, 
Ethiopia, and China that involved firsthand demonstrations of election 
administration, election campaigning, voting, counting and tabulation 
processes, and other issues related to the overall electoral process in the 
United States.
The CSG Overseas Voting Initiative Policy Working Group was created 
to examine military and overseas voting recommendations from President 
Barack Obama’s Presidential Commission on Election Administration as 
well as other successful programs and practices across the country. This 
working group was a very important starting point for the Overseas Voting 
Initiative as it identified military and overseas voting barriers that election 
administrators could focus on and proactively address in their official roles 
without the creation of new laws or expanding their office budgets. The 
policy working group’s recommendations focused on voter communica-
tion, voter registration, and US military community engagement.
With respect to voter communication, the policy working group rec-
ommended that election administrators communicating with US military 
and overseas voters use clear, concise, accessible written and verbal com-
munications at every step in the voting process. Furthermore, election 
information and materials should be designed in a manner that makes it as 
easy as possible for all voters to understand. Specific suggestions include 
providing checklists to the voter explaining step by step how to vote and 
return ballots would help improve the overall voting experience and pro-
cess. Also, state policymakers should refrain from prescribing specific lan-
guage for voter communications into statute and instead provide local and 
state election officials with some degree of flexibility to tailor communica-
tions as circumstances require. The working group also recommended 
that election administrators make effective use of websites and social media 
(Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, etc.), create more user-friendly electronic 
ballot return envelopes, communicate to voters when the ballot applica-
tion is accepted, and provide as much information as possible to voters 
about what is on the ballot.
With respect to voter registration, overseas citizens and the dependents 
of military and overseas citizens registering to vote can be difficult because 
of variations in state voter registration requirements and postal reliability 
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problems in certain countries. The policy working group recommended 
that if states provide online voter registration for their voters then they 
should incorporate the same service for overseas and military voters. When 
this CSG effort first began, 29 states administered online voter registra-
tion systems, now 38 states provide this service and the number is climb-
ing. The Federal Post Card Application was initially created to simplify the 
US overseas voting experience by condensing a voter registration request 
and ballot request into one singular form for use in federal elections. Since 
then, states have accepted the form but have placed varying validity time-
line limits. The working group recommended that all states treat the 
Federal Post Card Application as a permanent request for voter registra-
tion and establish a default validity period for the ballot request.
With respect to US military community engagement, the policy work-
ing group featured  and recommended existing and successful state and 
local partnerships across the country as examples to follow. Successful and 
innovative partnership examples include direct outreach that involves the 
recruitment of military spouses to work and volunteer in local and state 
election offices. Another example is, a focus on social media and the shar-
ing of FVAP videos and written content on local and state election admin-
istration websites as well as working with military installations and their 
voting assistance officers (Fig. 4.1).
Fig. 4.1 Overseas voting initiative
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The CSG Overseas Voting Initiative’s Technology Working Group was 
created to explore the role of technology in the military and overseas vot-
ing process and determine how technology can be used to make further 
improvements. States have long been innovators in the use of technology 
in elections. Identifying and disseminating best practices has long been a 
strength of CSG and this working group built upon the existing work 
pioneered in many states. The technology working group’s recommenda-
tions focused on unreadable/damaged ballot duplication, common access 
card/digital signature verification, and data standardization/perfor-
mance metrics.
In all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and territories, certain quali-
fied voters can cast paper ballots using a vote by mail or absentee voting 
process. Many of these voters are in fact US military and overseas voters. 
According to the US  Election Assistance Commission’s Election 
Administration and Voting Survey, in the last midterm national election 
(November 2014), more than 14 million absentee ballots were cast 
nationwide. Through the course of a ballot’s delivery from a voter over-
seas to their local election office stateside for tabulation, a ballot can be 
torn or damaged, accrue coffee spills, wrinkles, and tears. Ballots can also 
be filled out using inappropriate marking devices. With respect to unread-
able/damaged ballot duplication, the technology working group recom-
mended that states and local jurisdictions administer a ballot duplication 
process for unreadable and damaged ballots that is appropriate for the 
number of paper ballots they process. Also, whether a jurisdiction uses a 
manual or an electronic ballot duplication process for unreadable and 
damaged ballots, there should be clear procedures employed that ensure 
auditability. Technologies for ballot duplication of unreadable and dam-
aged ballots should be easy to use and promote transparency not only for 
election officials, but for external observers as well.
The US Department of Defense is the largest employer in the world. 
The Common Access Card (CAC) also commonly referred to as the CAC 
is the Defense Department’s standard identification for active duty per-
sonnel, civilian and contractor employers. It also meets the security 
requirements of two-factor authentication as well as digital signature and 
data encryption technologies. The technology working group recom-
mended that all states should incorporate the use of CAC cards in the US 
military and overseas voting process by accepting the card’s digital signa-
ture as a voter identity verification requirement. States and local election 
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officials should also coordinate with FVAP to develop CAC digital signa-
ture educational resources to better inform voters about the technology 
and process.
There is an abundance of election information and data being tracked 
and maintained in the states that can be used to understand the  effectiveness 
of the US military and overseas voting process. A long-standing problem 
has always been that states track, categorize, and identify voting behavior 
and corresponding transactions differently which doesn’t allow for an 
accurate apples-to-apples comparative analysis. To address this issue, the 
technology working group recommended that state and local election 
officials work with FVAP and the US Election Assistance Commission to 
adopt and implement the Election Administration and Voting Survey 
Section B Data Standard, recognizing that it is the best vehicle for stan-
dardizing military and overseas voting data being tracked in the 50 states, 
the District of Columbia, and territories. The working group also recom-
mended that CSG and state election officials should work with FVAP to 
identify a method or partner agency that can support automated data col-
lection and validation to ensure the continued use of this standard that 
solely focuses on the US military and overseas voting community. Lastly, 
FVAP should continue to work cooperatively with the US Election 
Assistance Commission and the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology to establish data repositories and related standards to support 
the long-term sustainability of the Election Administration and Voting 
Survey Section B Data Standard.
All the work detailed in this article made significant progress in improv-
ing the US military and civilian overseas voting process. However, addi-
tional priorities were identified throughout the course of the work. 
Beginning this year in 2019, The Council of State Governments and the 
Federal Voting Assistance Program are partnering again to educate state 
policymakers about overseas voting issues. This new five-year, $3.9 million 
effort will further help uniformed services personnel and other US citizens 
overseas vote in federal elections. This new partnership will allow state 
policymakers to better understand FVAP’s mission and election adminis-
tration best practices serving US military and overseas voters. In addition, 
the partnership will access better data to evaluate the impact of federal 
election laws as well as the market viability and usability of electronic blank 
ballot delivery systems in use in the states.
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CHAPTER 5
Assisting Voters, Language Access, 
and the Role of Election Administrators
Jill LaVine and Alice Jarboe
Abstract While the federal government under the 1965 Voting Rights Act 
(VRA) Section 203 requires election jurisdictions to provide language assis-
tance to voters, there is no financial support and not enough detailed infor-
mation from the government to make this a success. Election jurisdictions 
must find the location of the voters through extensive outreach programs, 
mailings, and media efforts. This is a very costly undertaking and often still 
does not reach the voters who really need the assistance. If a jurisdiction 
does not meet the needs of their voters needing language assistance, they 
can be sued by the Department of Justice (DOJ). Community organizations 
and advocacy groups can be helpful in identifying voters who need assis-
tance, but often they have their own agenda. Election officials want to assist 
voters for the right reason—so the voter can be an informed voter. But this 
can be difficult unless we have the information we need, the financial sup-
port, and without the constant fear of being sued.
Keywords Language access • Sacramento County • Language support 
• Language advocacy organizations • Federal language requirements
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Voters who are non-English speakers and whose native language is one 
that has historically been associated with discrimination at the polls (Asian, 
Alaskan Native, Native American, and Spanish) are entitled to language 
assistance under the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Sacramento County has 
been covered under VRA Section 203 for Spanish language for almost 20 
years and for Chinese language starting in 2011. In addition, any California 
jurisdiction that has a non-English speaking population of any language 
that meets a 3% threshold is also covered under state law. For Sacramento, 
this means that there are five languages in addition to Spanish and Chinese 
that have language coverage, including Hmong, Korean, Punjabi, Tagalog, 
and Vietnamese. For our county’s 500 polling places, about 200 of them 
are staffed with a Spanish speaker. We have about 20,000 registered voters 
who want materials in Spanish.
The concept of providing language assistance seems relatively simple—
provide voting materials to voters in English and another language—but 
it is a complex undertaking. On a primary ballot, for example, the possibil-
ity of 7 languages times 9 parties at each polling place means there could 
be 63 different versions of every ballot. The cost is high both in potential 
for precinct worker confusion and in budget requirements.
Who and hoW This Work is done
The work of providing language assistance is part of everyone’s job inside 
an election office. Outreach takes the lead on this, but registration staff 
has to correctly enter the information, another unit needs to prepare the 
ballot design, and another unit develops the precinct worker training. Still 
other units are responsible for adjudicating cast ballots, budgeting for the 
additional language support, and overall management of the language 
access program. There are also community groups that assist with registra-
tion and identifying needs. For example, the CAPITAL (Council of Asian 
Pacific Islanders Together for Advocacy and Leadership) group has meet-
ings and election office outreach staff attend to encourage registrations. 
Much of this work is done by outreach staff after normal work hours.
One of the hardest parts of offering language assistance is planning the 
staffing needs for language speakers at the polls on Election Day. California 
law requires that a precinct worker is there the entire time, from opening to 
closing. In addition, we have an internal assessment to test workers on lan-
guages, and our outreach staff also tests the potential workers. Members of 
the Chinese community in particular will volunteer to come for a few hours 
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to work on Election Day but not for the entire day. County and state employ-
ees like social workers are more helpful as they will work through Election 
Day and they are already certified in the language. If a potential voter comes 
to a polling place that does not have a language speaker to help them, we 
have a phone service, LanguageLink, a live language translation service that 
serves a voter in most languages, in a three- way conversation. The election 
office pays for this phone-based service out of the election budget.
issues WiTh ouTreach
One of the most challenging issues that election officials face in language 
coverage is identifying the voters who need language assistance and under-
standing their cultural needs. In some cases, people will read the same 
language but speak it differently (e.g., Mandarin Chinese and Cantonese 
Chinese), so, although these voters use the same printed ballot style, they 
need different audio versions. There are also differences in demand by age 
of voters. The older generation wants their ballots in Chinese; the younger 
generation wants their ballots in English.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) has suggested that the election office 
search its voter registration rolls for voters with particular surnames in 
order to identify group members and their locations. It doesn’t work—
people intermarry, and change names, and surnames are dispersed across 
the county. We can use birthplaces because we get that information on the 
California voter registration form, but if they come to the US at an early 
age, they speak English. Birthplace information is not on the federal voter 
registration form, so if voters register through the federal form the infor-
mation is not available. The Geographic Information System (GIS) staff 
take the birthplace information from the Census and mail information to 
voters asking about language preference. When that information comes 
back, registration staff marks the voter’s file with their preferred language, 
and then input this into a GIS map so we can also identify which polling 
places will need that language support.
In the case of identifying those who may need Spanish assistance, we 
mailed out response cards to all voters—and have identified 500 from the 
cards. In addition, we had outreach staff at their community activities and 
groups. The resources we’ve invested in trying to find out who needs this 
assistance is tremendous.
We also had to quickly learn Chinese cultural norms before we could go 
to their outreach events. Colors, clothes, particular greetings  matter at 
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certain meetings—for example, we avoid wearing white because it is tied 
to death. We also learned there was a Chinese group that supported one 
political cause in China and they wanted us to advertise in their newspa-
per, while another group said, “Don’t you dare or we’ll not participate 
with you anymore.” So we had to choose which newspaper would reach 
the largest number of voters in the most positive way with a limited budget.
Another issue occurs when we place the Chinese translation portions 
on our ballots. We put all three languages (English, Spanish, and Chinese) 
on one ballot and on all of our materials. If we place the Chinese version 
first, people get angry and contact us about the wasted cost. If we don’t 
put all the languages on one card then we may not reach that one voter 
and the DOJ comes after us.
Outreach
Outreach staff have a tough job. There is a mismatch between the popula-
tion the Census captures and the actual market for language assistance 
within the community. The Census data doesn’t provide enough specific 
information about the particular people who need language assistance. 
This makes our job harder, and if we are noncompliant, we can be sued. 
The data from the American Community Survey (ACS) is organized by 
Census tract, however, California doesn’t use Census tracts for voting pre-
cincts, they don’t match up with district lines. ACS now reports popula-
tion estimates from Census data every five years instead of ten, which will 
likely increase demands for language assistance and also give us more 
information.
Marketing to those who may need language assistance is also very chal-
lenging. We don’t have a local Chinese paper or radio or TV station; these 
media outlets come out of San Francisco. As a result, anything we adver-
tise or promote has to be generic; outlets won’t pick it up if the informa-
tion is specific to Sacramento only. There are no outlets for Tagalog, 
Vietnamese, Hmong, Korean, or Punjabi.
The role of advocacy organizaTions
In the beginning, we didn’t have information on where the people who 
needed assistance were concentrated, and advocacy groups pushed us to 
do this work. In response, we mailed everything in two languages. The 
expense related to this practice was significant, as anything election related 
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has to have a court certified translation in compliance with California 
Election Code.
Other advocacy groups regularly monitor our polling places to make 
sure we are doing what we are supposed to as well as what they want us to 
do. They provide us feedback after elections noting what needs to be 
improved, and sometimes this is helpful, though at other times the advo-
cates are not correct and have their own agenda. We work with these 
groups to improve their feedback by attending meetings in which they 
train their observers. California Election Code is complex and the observ-
ers often do not know what to look for.
Costs
We do not have enough support to do this. We are pulled very thin. A 
Chinese speaking staff member has to work at the front counter, do out-
reach in the community, work at precincts, check voter registration cards, 
figure out how to enter that into our system, speak to the press, and go to 
citizenship classes to teach about voting. This is also true for our staff 
Spanish speaker. But we do not have the resources to pay them for all of 
these levels and types of work—all we can do is give them a language 
differential.
While language assistance is a federal requirement, there is no federal finan-
cial support. Support for language assistance administration comes through a 
statewide association of counties, the California Association of Clerks and 
Election Officials (CACEO). For uniformity in the state to comply with the 
language requirements, we have CACEO as a sounding board. We also run 
our procedures by our Secretary of State (SOS) for blessing on implementa-
tion, but they can’t provide their official stamp of approval for legal reasons. 
While we are not required to provide all election materials in the languages 
that meet the 3% state threshold, we are to provide a translated ballot and 
attempt to find a poll worker to help. We are required by the SOS to report 
our efforts. The state is supposed to tell us which precincts voters who need 
language assistance are in based on the ACS data, but they don’t.
We are providing language assistance to too many people—or at least it 
seems that we are providing language assistance to many more than need 
it or will use it. The Census determinations force us to provide Chinese 
language assistance but we have had only 500 voters request assistance. 
Without considering individuals, we are spending 80% of our money try-
ing to reach the 20% of the voters who may need assistance. In 2013, 
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implementing outreach and assistance for Spanish language speakers cost 
the county $200,000. Our expense in that year for Chinese language out-
reach and coverage was equivalent. The expense for other languages is 
even greater.
hoW should We fix This sysTem?
It is most important to have language assistance on Election Day. During 
registration, staff have more time, but on Election Day, there is immedi-
acy. It is a given that the election official will provide the opportunities. It 
makes sense to make the voter responsible for requesting language help, 
rather than making elections officials responsible for finding the voter.
There are also multiple voting system issues that come up when adding 
another language. The voting equipment that we use hasn’t caught up to 
our needs because until just recently we only had one or two languages. 
Even though our voting system allows us to use different languages, font to 
support all the languages needed wasn’t available or certified by California 
for use on the system. The vendors were not prepared for the multiple num-
bers of character-based languages on the same piece of equipment.
In thinking about the issues related to adding Chinese, for example, 
our voting system was not state-certified for Chinese. This means that our 
office in conjunction with the voting system vendor had to have the sys-
tem retested and go back to make corrections. We were under a deadline 
to get this done but we couldn’t get the Chinese piece to work. We really 
need some type of DRE (direct-recording electronic, or touch screen) 
machine for something like that—optical scan is simply too limited for the 
volume and types of languages we have now. But DREs have largely been 
banned in the state—we are only allowed one per polling place. In our 
county, we do have Ballot Marking Device (BMD) machines that anyone 
can vote on, which helps. We have a classification of “voters with specific 
needs” that covers language and disabilities and we have monthly state-
wide meetings to work on polling place surveys, accessibility issues, and 
language requirements, and so on.
A BMD has limitations with the different languages and the required 
audio files. To address this, we have to increase our BMD machines at each 
polling place, which increases the cost significantly, and we have to identify 
where to send the BMDs or send every type of equipment to every polling 
location. When we add the fourth language, we won’t be able to do this, and 
we will have to target where to send equipment; this is where we get sued.
 J. LAVINE AND A. JARBOE
45
There is also a fear of the Department of Justice and the language advo-
cates. When we get sued, it is the county that covers the cost of the law-
suit. It is easier to enter into a consent decree, but then we are bound by 
the terms of the decree for a specific term even if the issues are resolved or 
become nonissues in the following years. We never know where the advo-
cates are coming from, and no matter how closely we work with them—
even above and beyond what is required in code—it is never enough.
We would like to get rid of the fear and actually just provide the service 
to those who need it. This is the right thing to do and We would like to 
do it for that reason.
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CHAPTER 6
Accessibility Issues for Poll Sites and Voters
Bruce Adelson
Abstract Polling locations that are accessible to all voters is a cornerstone 
of elections being free and fair for all voters. Although we often think of 
accessibility as it relates to voters who have physical disabilities, accessibil-
ity can also be related to the comfort that voters feel when entering the 
place that has been designated for in-person voting. This case discusses 
these definitions of accessibility and others that have been addressed by 
legislative action and decisions made by courts in the United States.
Keywords Voting • Accessible • Equal • Convenient • Comfortable
Voting accessibility is essentially about making voting easier, open, and 
available. Voting accessibility is often used as a term of art to mean acces-
sibility to people with disabilities, without the presence of physical impedi-
ments to voting. Such impediments can be ballots without accessible 
alternatives for blind people and polling place doorways too narrow for 
wheelchairs.
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Voting accommodations for people with disabilities essentially pro-
vide equal, level playing field access to voting so as not to infringe on 
“fundamental voting rights” and cause “irreparable injury” to voters. 
1For voters with disabilities, accessibility to voting and voting accommo-
dations include talking voting machines for blind voters, as a federal 
court decided on the eve of the 2016 presidential election. Failure to 
provide such machines “and all other accessible voting technology avail-
able for persons with disabilities” violates federal guarantees against dis-
ability discrimination.2
Accessibility, though, encompasses more than disability accommoda-
tions. Accessibility means openness, availability, the quality of being able 
to be reached or entered or easy to use. In this definitional context, acces-
sibility is impacted and influenced by considerations of race, language, and 
culture. More than questions of legality and voting requirements, such as 
those of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,3 accessibility in voting also 
includes the very subjective notion of a voter not being discomfited when 
entering a polling place.
This subjectivity of comfort played out in real time in 2004, when a 
rural Southern county attempted to move a polling place to a building 
that had been a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) headquarters as recently as the 
1970s. Although the county reportedly did not realize the history of its 
proposed new voting location, the same county immediately realized the 
problematic effect such a polling place shift would have on African- 
American voters, especially those old enough to have lived through this 
county’s KKK and Jim Crow eras. These voters were so upset and adversely 
influenced by having to choose whether to vote in this problematic build-
ing or not vote at all that many planned to stay home on Election Day. 
This ostensible polling location was thus not “accessible” in the term’s 
definitional sense to those voters, which is evident from the county’s 
reversal of its decision to move the polling with the encouragement of the 
US Department of Justice.
1 League of Women Voters of North Carolina v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th 
Cir., 2014).
2 Gray et al., v. St. Louis City Board of Election Commissioners, Case No. 4:16-cv-01548, 
(W.D., Mo., 2016). The author was the Americans with Disabilities Act consulting expert for 
plaintiffs in this case.
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973aa-6.
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Anecdotal examples abound of such accessibility affecting and influenc-
ing decisions whether or not to exercise the fundamental right to vote. 
The following anecdotes are among the most telling.
The San Carlos Apache Nation is located in southeastern Arizona and 
encompasses three Arizona counties—Gila, Graham, and Pinal, with the 
Pinal County portion virtually uninhabited.
In 2002, the U.S.  Census Bureau determined4 through population 
analysis that Gila and Graham Counties must provide election information 
in the Apache language under Section 203 of the Voting Rights Act.5 
Election information as defined by Section 203 includes: “any registration 
or voting notices, forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or 
information relating to the electoral process, including ballots…. [The 
203 requirements] should be broadly construed to apply to all stages of 
the electoral process, from voter registration through activities related to 
conducting elections, including, for example the issuance, at any time dur-
ing the year, of notifications, announcements, or other informational 
materials concerning the opportunity to register, the deadline for voter 
registration, the time, places and subject matters of elections, and the 
absentee voting process.”6
For Native American and Alaska Native languages that are historically 
unwritten, as is Apache, only oral assistance concerning election informa-
tion and material is required.7
“Under Section 203, which applies nationwide, a variety of triggering 
formulas assess minority group size and high rates of illiteracy (measured 
by educational completion below the fifth grade) to determine language- 
assistance coverage. As originally enacted and as amended in 1982, Section 
203 mandates language assistance in a state or political subdivision in 
which more than 5% of the voting-age citizens are members of a language- 
minority group and are limited-English-proficient, and where the illiteracy 
rate for that group exceeds the national illiteracy rate. To address the 
problem of excluding coverage for large numbers of language-minority 
voters who might not meet the 5% test in many of the country’s largest 
4 Section 203 determinations for 2016 - Federal Register / Vol. 81, No. 233 / Monday, 
December 5, 2016.
5 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-1a.
6 28 Code of Federal Regulations PART 55 et seq., Implementation of the Provisions of 
the Voting Rights Act Regarding Language Minority Groups.
7 Id.
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population centers, Congress amended Section 203 in 1992 to impose an 
additional test focusing on absolute numbers: a jurisdiction with a 
language- minority group constituting a population with over 10,000 
voting- age limited-English-proficient citizens and possessing an illiteracy 
rate above the national average is also covered.”8
In 2002, when Gila and Graham Counties faced new Apache language 
Section 203 obligations, voting and election participation among the San 
Carlos Apaches was low. Neither county provided Apache language assis-
tance for voting and elections prior to the 2002 Census Bureau determi-
nation. The Department of Justice (DOJ), which enforces Section 203, 
launched a nationwide education and enforcement program concerning 
the 2002 Section 203 language requirements. Gila and Graham counties 
were among the counties selected by DOJ for inclusion in this program.9
DOJ worked with both counties and recommended various innova-
tions to foster Section 203 Apache language compliance. These included 
hiring new county election workers who spoke Apache; hiring new county 
poll workers who could provide Apache language assistance at the polls; 
implementing joint voter registration efforts by both counties, led by elec-
tion workers who spoke Apache; and launching a joint county publicity 
program informing the San Carlos Apache Nation of the counties’ new 
Apache Language Election Information Programs.
Gila and Graham counties publicized and held a joint Voter Registration 
Day in Bylas, the San Carlos capital, in the Bylas community center. The 
particular Voter Registration Day was selected to coincide with a well- 
known community event—a free farm animal veterinary clinic.
Inside the center, both counties set up their voter registration materials 
in two small rooms adjacent to a large open space filled with veterinarians, 
nurses, operating tables, and large, noisy farm animals. The clinic and 
voter registration event ran all day, with both featuring steady streams of 
human customers. Many San Carlos Apaches registered to vote for the 
first time in their lives, with new voters speaking approvingly of the coun-
ties’ new Apache language efforts.
The most compelling scene played out on the main road facing the 
center’s front door. Walking to the clinic to register to vote for the first 
8 Language Accommodation and The Voting Rights Act: Angelo N. Ancheta; Santa Clara 
University School of Law.




time ever were five women, tribal elders, in traditional San Carlos Apache 
dress. They had lived on the reservation all of their lives. They lived 
through the 1948 Arizona Supreme Court decision that struck down pre-
vious court rulings that infringed upon Native Americans’ right to vote.10 
As the 1948 Court decided, “In a democracy, suffrage is the most basic 
civil right, since its exercise is the chief means whereby other rights may be 
safe-guarded. To deny the right to vote where one is legally entitled to do 
so, is to do violence to the principles of freedom and equality.”
These five tribal elders, who spoke Apache and could speak and read 
little English, had never felt comfortable registering to vote, in large part 
because of the language barrier. Now, with Gila and Graham Counties 
providing voting and election information and assistance in their native 
language, the women finally felt comfortable enough to register to vote. 
Voting had become “accessible” to them. They and other San Carlos 
Apaches became first-time voters that day, signing up amidst the tumult of 
multiple large animal surgeries in the summer of 2002.
The Apache Language Election Information Program had its desired 
effect that year and subsequently the number of Apaches who registered 
to vote and voted in Gila and Graham County elections  increased. The 
nascent Apache language election program substantially contributed to 
the newly accessible election process on this Indian reservation astride 
these two rural Arizona counties.
In the early 2000s, a small town in the Deep South (population under 
2000 people) held elections for aldermen to represent residents on the 
town council. The town elected aldermen from four districts. One district 
was majority African American. For purposes of this chapter, we will refer 
to this district as District 4.
This district had not elected an African American to serve on the town 
council since the nineteenth century. Through Jim Crow, racial violence, 
discrimination, and impediments to voting, black people living in this 
town grew less and less interested in exercising their franchise.
As voting restrictions eased and voting rights for all citizens became 
part of federal law, African-American voters in District 4 continued to 
register to vote and turnout at election time in low numbers, much lower 
than comparative rates for white residents.
Black District 4 voters revealed one reason for their voting disinterest. 
The District 4 poll workers had largely remained the same for decades, 
10 Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456 (Ariz. 1948).
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going back to the 1960s when towns and cities in this state routinely 
devised invidious methods for discouraging and preventing African- 
American residents from exercising their voting rights. Black people com-
mented about how they encountered Jim Crow reminders every Election 
Day, when the same group of 1960s era white poll workers staffed the 
District 4 polling place. Instead of having to relive past racial injustice, 
they decided to just stay home and not vote.
This changed for one early 2000s Election Day when a new white elec-
tion commissioner took office on the town’s election board. The new 
commissioner told the author he wanted to increase African-American 
voter participation, especially in District 4. A town resident all of his life, 
he had long wondered why black voters turned out to vote at such low 
rates, especially with the town’s overall African-American town population 
exceeding 30 percent.
He asked the author for ways to increase African-American District 4 
turnout. Recommendations and ideas were shared. Finally, the suggestion 
was made to hire more African-American poll workers to create a differ-
ent, more welcoming, and more “accessible” election experience. The 
commissioner embraced the idea, although he noted that many longtime 
poll workers may not react well to sharing Election Day responsibilities or 
being replaced by new election workers. The commissioner also recog-
nized that some other town residents may not take kindly to his plan. 
However, he wanted to try, with some anxieties perhaps assuaged by sup-
port from the Justice Department.
The local election board implemented this small change so that on 
Election Day, there were new faces manning the voter registration tables 
at the District 4 polling place. African-American voter turnout increased 
dramatically that day, perhaps to record levels of participation. After the 
votes were tallied and the results certified, District 4 voters had elected an 
African-American alderman for the first time in over 100 years.
As discussed, accessible voting most often refers to voting accessibility 
for people with disabilities. However, accessibility should be viewed as 
more all-encompassing and far-reaching. Indeed, the following descrip-
tion of accessible voting from the United Kingdom’s Electoral Commission 
well captures this all-encompassing breadth:
Accessible Voting for All --- Anyone who’s eligible to vote on polling day 
should be able to do so in a confident manner. Polling station staff [sic] are 
trained to provide assistance to any voter who asks for it.
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The key terms of accessible to all, and being able to vote in a “confident 
manner” speak volumes about voting being equally open, available, con-
venient, and comfortable. The anecdotes recounted in this chapter are not 
unique. Similar experiences occur in communities across the United States 
with unfortunate regularity. Perhaps when “accessible” voting is embraced 
in its full definitional meaning, the occurrences of inaccessible voting will 
recede and disappear into history.
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CHAPTER 7
Protecting Election Infrastructure: 
A View from the Federal Level
Matthew Masterson
Abstract Securing elections and democracy in the United States requires 
adaptation and innovation in the field. The adoption and implementation 
of new strategies and procedures is not without risk. Ensuring the system 
is solvent and secure, once viewed solely under the purview of states and 
local governments, the security of elections in the United States has 
evolved to be an issue of concern and investment at all levels of govern-
ment. The increased involvement of federal agencies in the administration 
of elections in the United States has created new opportunities for the 
development of intergovernmental relationships and resources. Discussed 
in this case is the role of the Department of Homeland Security in election 
administration, as experienced by one election administration expert.
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I began my career in elections as Special Assistant/Counsel to Chairman 
Paul DeGregorio, working with the US Election Assistance Commission 
(EAC) updating the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) through 
the Voting System Testing and Certification Program, and working with 
the laboratory accreditation program. From there I moved to the Office 
of the Secretary of State for Ohio, and then from 2015 to 2018 I served 
as a Commissioner for the EAC including serving as its Chairman in 2017. 
Today I work as a senior advisor for the Department of Homeland Security, 
leading their election security work. The unifying theme in my career in 
US elections is equipment and technology.
I tell people all the time the best part of my job is that I wake up in the 
morning and know the importance of my work. I don’t lack motivation 
because I work with incredible people to maintain the integrity of our 
democracy. My inspiration goes beyond the “God Bless America” democ-
racy space—my commitment is to be able to help people to identify and 
manage risk in the election process, to continue to modernize that pro-
cess, and to improve services to voters. I believe that the single worst thing 
that could happen to US elections is for us to move away from improving 
services and modernization because we are afraid of risk. We need to assess 
and manage that risk in order to move forward. This is what my work in 
elections is about.
Today, election systems have been classified as critical infrastructure, 
and that has had a significant influence on my work. From my perspective, 
elections have always been a part of the critical infrastructure of the US 
because they are essential to maintaining American democracy. Being offi-
cially part of critical infrastructure since 2016 means that we, the 
Department of Homeland Security, can prioritize the efforts of the federal 
government to support the work of state and local officials, all with the 
overarching goal of providing state and local election officials and their 
private partners the tools that they need to identify and mitigate risk.
Improvements In electIon securIty, 2016–2018
Securing elections is not new to election officials. They have long worked 
to ensure the security and integrity of the process. However, following the 
2016 election and the known attempts by sophisticated actors to interfere 
with our elections, there was a paradigm shift. Improvements in cyber 
readiness began happening almost immediately after the designation of 
elections as critical infrastructure. Our work to date has focused around 
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information sharing, providing support and services, coordination across 
the federal government, and Election Day monitoring and sharing. 
Together these activities have significantly advanced our response capabil-
ity across the nation.
First, we built information sharing capacity across the elections com-
munity to understand the general risk environment, specific threats, and 
how to mitigate these. We did this through the development of the 
Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), 
created in February 2018. Between February and November 2018, we 
were able to provide all 50 states and over 1400 local jurisdictions with 
general information and specific technical indicators around election secu-
rity and a path for reporting back to the EI-ISAC. This system gives states 
and localities an avenue to report information to us, which has resulted in 
the most significant improvement to date.
In 2018, state and local officials robustly shared this information, 
including technical information and potential threats from social media 
campaigns. For example, officials in the State of Vermont provided us 
technical indicators that occurred when targeting their system. We shared 
this information widely, and several states investigated this in their own 
systems and reported back that they saw this activity as well, and as a 
result, we were able to release an alert nationally. This process took about 
a week, and was very successful and is exactly how this cycle is supposed to 
work. As good as the information from the intelligence community is, the 
best information came from election officials on the ground.
Another example comes from the deployment of Albert sensors. These 
sensors are part of an intrusion detection system collecting information 
about traffic targeting election infrastructure and alerts related to known, 
malicious actors. Prior to 2016 there were only a handful of state election 
infrastructures covered by Albert systems, and in these cases they were 
indirectly covered through other state systems that were connected to 
elections, not through the election infrastructure specifically. By Election 
Day 2018, 46 states and 90 localities had Albert sensors covering their 
specific election infrastructures. These sensors gave us a good understand-
ing of the baseline of activity that was targeting election infrastructure; this 
will help us moving into 2020 to determine when things are out of the 
range of normal.
Second, we also provided direct support and services to states and locali-
ties. As part of the critical infrastructure designation, election officials and 
their private sector partners are prioritized to receive Department of 
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Homeland Security (DHS) services. These include scanning for known vul-
nerabilities, on-site penetration testing of systems, phishing campaign assess-
ments over 12 weeks with increasing complexity, cyber resilience reviews of 
cyber architecture, and resilience reviews with advice on how to build more 
resilient physical security of election offices and polling places. All of these 
services are free and intended to identify risk and empower officials and 
vendors to mitigate those risks. A majority of states and several hundred 
jurisdictions have taken advantage of at least one of these services.
Third, we enhanced coordination across the federal government. In 
2016, we learned that federal agencies were not prepared to work together 
around cyber threats to elections. DHS took the lead to coordinate agen-
cies and organizations at the national level. This included the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of Defense (DOD), the 
National Security Agency (NSA), Cybercom, the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI), the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), and the EAC. A significant improvement comes out 
of this—our ability to take intelligence, put that in a format that can be 
shared, and push that information out nationally through the EI-ISAC, 
the EAC, the National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS), and the 
National Association of State Election Directors (NASED). These groups 
are committed to pushing that information to local offices for information 
sharing. We also offered security clearances to state chief election officials 
(CEOs) and two of their designees in each state to enhance our ability to 
share specific threat and general intelligence to help election offices pre-
pare and respond. Throughout 2018, we utilized these clearances to pro-
vide classified briefings to state election officials regarding the threat 
environment around elections and steps they can take to manage risks and 
share information with the community. To date, most of this information 
has actually involved election disinformation rather than targeting of elec-
tion infrastructure. Having the ability to push this information down to 
the election community is an incredible resource that was not there before 
the designation of elections as critical infrastructure.
Finally, on Election Day for major elections, this work is also about 
communication and coordination. As an example, on Election Day 2018, 
we stood up an operation center in Arlington, Virginia, with representa-
tives from DHS, our other federal partners, NASS, NASED, the Republican 
National Committee (RNC), the Democratic National Committee (DNC), 
voter protection hotline, and private sector vendors, all to share and 
respond to information. As part of this, we established a cyber- situational 
 M. MASTERSON
59
awareness room with over 600 active state and local election office partners 
across the country who shared information about cyber activity. We inves-
tigated and shared information with election officials around the country 
as necessary through this mechanism. This also included contact with 
social media companies throughout the day. As another example, in Ohio 
a voter released a video through social media of a piece of election equip-
ment presumably flipping votes. The officials from that county (Franklin 
County) were able to quickly identify that specific piece of equipment, 
diagnose the problem (paper jamming), and contact the state with infor-
mation about the problem and the fix of it. Then, we were able to provide 
feedback through social media and the general media to shut down misin-
formation and educate the public about what was actually happening. This 
is a great example of our information sharing capabilities.
Improvements In electIon securIty movIng Forward
Coming out of the 2018 midterm elections, there are a number of areas 
that can be improved. Nationally, we did a good job developing our infor-
mation sharing system, but we still need to work on engaging people at 
the local level, especially local election officials in the mid- to small-sized 
jurisdictions. We need to double down on what we refer to as our “Last 
Mile” project to reach these offices. The Last Mile will allow states to push 
information to counties and other election jurisdictions about risks to 
their specific election systems, possible mitigations, and state specific 
checklists to improve their cyber hygiene. We need to improve and edu-
cate those mid- to small-sized counties, townships, and cities so we can 
reach everyone. We still have over 7000 jurisdictions that we need to find 
a way to partner with and support.
We also need to work on “maturing” our discussions about risk. It is 
challenging to have open and mature discussions about risk because we are 
afraid of negatively impacting the public’s confidence in the process. But 
we need to have open, honest, and transparent conversations with all of 
the relevant stakeholders, including county commissioners, state legisla-
tures, and other funding and policy bodies. The message we need to dis-
tribute is “Here are all of the great things we were able to do given current 
funding levels, but if we had more resources and regular investment, here 
is what we could do.” We need to educate policy makers at all levels about 
what it means to meaningfully invest—in training, technology, upgrades, 
and information technology (IT) personnel. Some states are doing this. 
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For example, Washington, Illinois, and Florida are deploying cyber navi-
gators from state offices to counties that have little to no IT support—this 
is a tangible risk management technique that states can implement that is 
not just buying new equipment.
Finally, we need to both continue and broaden our engagement with 
private sector partners. Many counties are reliant on their vendors. 
Consequently, we must build strong, trusting relationships with all of the 
vendors involved in elections across election sub-systems. We must and 
will invest time and resources to build trust with this group of election 
stakeholders.
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CHAPTER 8
Diversity in Election Administration: 
Understanding and Serving Your Voters
Lauri Ealom
Abstract Successful election administration requires that election admin-
istrators not only know and follow the appropriate local, state, and federal 
policies but also understand the population of constituents they serve. 
Across the field, there is considerable variation in the professional path 
taken to a career in election administration. This case presents the experi-
ence of one election administrator’s path to election administration and 
the ways in which personal and professional experiences within and out-
side of election administration can prepare election administrators to suc-
cessfully foster relationships with constituents and adopt and implement 
approaches to administrative decision making that engage the community; 
cultivating buy-in and trust.
Keywords Understanding elections • Understanding your voters 
• Professional preparation • Experience for elections
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During college I worked as a part-time event planner and after graduation 
I transitioned to full-time. We planned conferences, special  occasion/
theme parties, luncheons, weddings, receptions, and conferences for doc-
tors, all over the country. At the Kansas City Board of Elections (KCEB), 
we serve as the event planners for elections. Envision a party where you 
have 150 parties going on all over the city simultaneously with 230,000 
partygoers. You have to provide each of the parties/locations with a wait-
staff, signage, a DJ, tables chairs, and, sometimes, security. A well-planned 
logistical setup is required to ensure that the flow of the environment is 
best for all of the participants/voters. It’s imperative that the location is 
easily accessible for all.
What we do is logistics. We plan the election from the point of origin 
to consumption (voting) in alignment with statutory requirements. We 
oversee the entire process. We create the ballot which can include issues 
from the state, city, and of course, candidates. We get the information 
about the candidates running and vet them, an effort we collaborate on 
with the county prosecutor to successfully complete. We make sure candi-
dates are registered voters in the jurisdiction that they are running for 
office. We check the validity of the signatures provided to have candidate 
names and ballot issues included on the ballot. In addition to the federal 
and midterm elections that people are most familiar with, we also conduct 
and manage many types of elections. These include church elections, 
union elections, school board elections, statewide elections, transporta-
tion development districts and community improvement district elections, 
to name a few. We are always preparing—always preparing—for the next 
task just as life prepares you for where you are going.
I grew up in Kansas City. It was the 1970s and I was one of two minor-
ity students in my elementary school. In that environment, I learned how 
to navigate in adversity. I think that is what made me who I am. I see color. 
I see differences, but that does not inhibit me from really wanting to get 
to know people and embrace everyone’s differences. I learned that at a 
very young age and I am grateful for that experience. When I was younger, 
I wondered why my parents would move me to a place where there was 
only one person who looked like me. As a teenager I recognized it was one 
of the most valuable experiences I’ve ever had. It taught me how to be, 
who I am, and how to reach across the table even though you may be dif-
ferent. It is a skill that is invaluable in my current position.
In this industry, it’s about all the different political parties. I represent 
the Democratic Party but I reach across the table and I’m able to work 
with all the parties. It is my desire to know and understand people. That 
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desire is what drove me as I moved on to college and into my professional 
life and it continues to this day. When it was time to go to college, I chose 
Clark Atlanta University (formerly Clark College) a Historically Black 
College or University (HBCU) in Atlanta, Georgia. I chose Clark Atlanta 
University (CAU) because I had spent most of my life around people that 
were not like me. I knew that in order to be a well-rounded person, I 
needed to be around kids like me who had similar backgrounds, core val-
ues, and home environments.
After I graduated from CAU, I was a lobbyist for Ford where I was 
highly engaged in a lot of legislative efforts; things that were not in keep-
ing with who I am. I felt like I wasn’t helping anybody, I was merely help-
ing the company. One part of my job that I really enjoyed was the 
management of the endowment fund. That responsibility allowed me to 
make large donations and participate in community engagement. At one 
point, they closed the Kansas City office and I went to the Union Station 
office to work in communications and marketing, I was there for six 
months and was laid off due to budgetary constraints. I then moved to 
New York. I stayed there, working for a record label with one of my friends 
from CAU, until my mother became ill. I moved back to Kansas City sev-
eral days prior to 9/11. When I returned to Kansas City, I became inter-
ested in human behavior. I was hired as a Qualified Mental Retardation 
Professional, QMRP.  I created plans that helped home care providers 
understand how to provide the person they were taking care of with the 
best quality of life experience. I felt like I had a special gift with people who 
had special needs. That experience allowed me to tap into a different side 
of myself. I became more compassionate and less spoiled. I saw people who 
were less fortunate than myself in a different light. From there, I went into 
education. I was a college guidance counselor at Frontier School of 
Excellence. Initially, I was hired as a kindergarten teacher and shortly after 
was moved to the high school. While there, I created a library, Leaders-R-
Readers program, formed a campus chapter of the  College Leadership 
Readiness and Preparedness program, and served as the chair for National 
Honor Society. In this role, I continued to think about human behavior as 
I worked with some students that others found to be challenging. What I 
learned is that every place that you touch, every environment that you 
experience is preparing you for where you are going or are supposed to be.
While I was there, one of the things I realized was that the environment 
was very political. The international teachers could speak their native lan-
guage, but the students were forbidden to speak their native tongue. Of 
course, I didn’t agree with that nor did I agree with most of the rules set 
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forth by my international colleagues. I was always ready to express my objec-
tions. After seven years, I left the school. I didn’t want to work anywhere 
that the children were looked at as merely numbers. While working at the 
school I took the children home with me: their issues, their challenges. 
There were students who took their lives. On one occasion, I didn’t check 
my mailbox at school and one of the students who committed suicide had 
left me a note. I didn’t think I was cut out for this. I enjoyed teaching and 
working with the students, but the day to day was draining on me. I loved 
the students but it was too much and I was looking forward to something 
that would allow me to release as opposed to internalize.
One of my friends was opening a sports bar so I dusted off my college 
bartender hat and agreed to tend the bar. While I was working at the bar, I 
was able to talk with retired police chiefs, retired firemen, up-and- coming 
elected officials—I got to be in an environment where I could have open 
conversations with a variety of public administrators and elected officials 
who make decisions for our city. Although I had started working at the 
Election Board as seasonal staff, nobody knew this and being in the bar I was 
able to engage in open conversation that otherwise may not have happened.
As seasonal staff, I initially worked in Voter Services, which is the first 
line of communication to the voter. Working at the Board allowed me to 
see the other side of elections. With my experience as a lobbyist, I knew 
how to conduct legislative rewrites, talk to attorneys, go to the capital in 
Missouri and other states, but at the Election Board I got to see every-
thing from start to finish. I kind of became an elections junkie—a nerd. 
We had an area called the “fishbowl” where the seasonal staff worked and 
there would often be opportunities to volunteer to do things other than 
what we were assigned to do. When these opportunities arose, I was always 
first to volunteer. This was a very busy time because of the 2012 presiden-
tial election. I worked at KCEB for three election cycles before receiving 
an offer in April of 2013 to work in the Finance Department. Working 
there allowed me to see how the election is paid for from the state alloca-
tion to the city and county’s financial responsibility. I learned the intricate 
financial process that makes elections possible. I was intrigued and began 
to interview for other permanent positions.
At that time, we did group interviews. During one of them, I was asked, 
“Where do you see yourself in five years?” I replied, “I’d like to be the 
Democratic Director.” My response was not well received. After the inter-
view, I spoke to the supervisor who told me that nobody liked my answer 




Being interested in individuals and who they are enhances my ability to 
best serve voters. Understating whom you are serving, particularly as it 
relates to thinking about ways to help citizens understand how to vote and 
the power of the vote, is especially important. During the 2018 midterm 
election I made a list of issues that are affected by voting to counteract the, 
“Why should I vote?” question which is regularly posed to me when I tell 
people what I do or am engaged in outreach. I also like to remind people 
that voting is an opportunity for you to express your pleasure or displea-
sure with a candidate, an issue, the condition of something (i.e. public 
schools, streets, programs, etc.). It is the way to ensure that your opinion 
is counted.
Another example of how I try to meet the needs of my voters and 
potential voters where they are is through our decision-making process. 
We recently purchased new voting machines. They were rolled out in April 
2018. We also purchased new poll pads (iPads tailored for voter check-in) 
and used them for the first time in October 2017 for a transportation 
development district election. Before we purchased the new equipment, 
we had equipment demonstrations because when we were deliberating the 
purchase, I didn’t think it was my place to make the final decision for the 
voters. So, because we are spending taxpayer dollars and are here to serve 
the taxpayer, we provided residents with the opportunity to test out the 
potential equipment through demonstrations that were set up across the 
city. The demonstrations allowed the constituents to touch the equipment 
they were potentially going to use and contribute to the process that 
determined the equipment that was purchased. This approach has been 
very effective. Through the demonstrations, we also provided them with 
the ability to see the results of their participation.
In addition to the voting machines and poll pads, we have a new ballot 
marking device that eliminates the voter’s need to fill in the oval to make 
their selection. At the end of the process, voters are presented a summary 
where they are alerted to races and issues they may have skipped and their 
overall selections. After viewing the summary, they have the option to go 
back and make changes or proceed with printing the ballot and feeding it 
into the scanner. The image that voters see after they have submitted the 
ballot was selected by the voters during our equipment demonstrations; 
it’s a graphic of the Union Station Clock.1
1 Although we have purchased the new equipment, we continue to have demonstration 
machines available for voters to use and ensure they are acclimated to the equipment and will 
not be dissuaded from voting because of it.
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To be an effective election administrator, you have to know your voters 
and implement new innovations to serve them. You have to leave your bias 
and policy preferences at the door. You have to go to the voters. You have 
to present information in a way that it can be received and understood. 
You have to know yourself well enough to be comfortable entering spaces 
where because of who you are, the voters may or may not want you there. 
You have to demonstrate to the voters that you value them and their input. 
You have to be comfortable in the uncomfortable because you are there to 
serve the voters, not yourself.
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Abstract Over the last 15–20 years, the election administration profes-
sion has emerged from its status as an understudied area of public 
administration. At the same time, there has also been a demographic, 
cultural, and generational shift among election administration profes-
sionals. While some have embraced the shift, others have been resistant 
resulting in the exposure of beliefs and behaviors that are ageist, sexist, 
and racist. This case presents the experience of a 17-year career profes-
sional in the field who is both a woman and African American. Discussed 
here are both the mentorship and professional development training 
opportunities which have helped her navigate the field and the barriers 
and challenges that she continues to face as an election administration 
professional.
Keywords Mentorship • Professionalism • Diversity • Outreach
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My  experiences come from an array of local jurisdictions, people, and 
situations. I have served as an election administrator in one of the smallest 
jurisdictions and the largest jurisdiction in Georgia. Throughout the evo-
lution of my career as an election administrator, I received an education 
that is not necessarily taught in a classroom. The experiences highlighted 
in this case study are a compilation of a series of situations that I have 
experienced as an election administrator for over 15 years.
Currently, I serve as the Election Director at the Clayton County, 
Georgia Board of Elections and Registration located in Jonesboro, 
Georgia. Clayton County is a metro Atlanta County located 20 miles 
south of Atlanta, Georgia. Clayton County houses one of the world’s busi-
est airports, the Hartsfield-Jackson Airport. Clayton County is also home 
of the Gone with the Wind movie (celebrating its 80th anniversary in 
2019). Clayton County has over 191,000 registered voters with 58 poll-
ing locations and a population of 285,153. The difference between the 
number of registered voters and the Voting Age Population is currently 
less than 12 percent.
Election administration was not my intentional career path, but 
unknowingly it became my professional future when I was a college stu-
dent. As I entered this profession, I quickly found myself in the minority. 
I started as an election professional in my early 20s. I began my tenure 
serving as a precinct judge for the Durham County, North Carolina Board 
of Elections as a college student. I served while pursuing a degree in politi-
cal science at North Carolina Central University (NCCU). As I attended 
poll worker training and assisted in serving voters, I began to wonder how 
one get involves in setting up elections. What are the criteria? Is there an 
educational track that can be used to get into a career in elections? I did 
not know where to start. Additionally, because historically and in my expe-
rience, election administrators and registrars were white, and were from 
50 to 80 years old, I wasn’t sure if there was room for me in this profession.
After I graduated from college, I relocated to Atlanta, Georgia. After a 
series of internship opportunities, I accepted an internship in the Georgia 
Secretary of State Elections Division. I served as an election intern for eight 
months which lead to my first full-time position as the Regional Voter 
Education Coordinator. As the coordinator, I served 53 counties in 
Northwest Georgia, under the State Elections Division in the Georgia 
Secretary of State Office. I conducted voter registration drives, coordinated 
 S. DOZIER
69
voter education programs, conducted high school as well as university elec-
tions, and served as an Elections Monitor. I served as a Regional Voter 
Education Coordinator for a year. While in this role, one of my most memo-
rable race-related experiences as an election administrator occurred about 
20 miles outside of Atlanta, Georgia.
While in Haralson County, Georgia, I engaged in a conversation with a 
local resident who served as the president of the Historical Society. He was 
recruiting members to be a part of the Historical Society at the local 
library. I had a scheduled meeting with the Probate Judge but I arrived 
earlier than expected and decided to visit the library to provide voter reg-
istration applications and materials for patrons. Although I was discussing 
the Voter Education Program, the local was only interested in me becom-
ing a member of the Historical Society to offer my family’s history. I 
informed the local that I was not from the area but told him I would be 
open to meeting with the organization to promote voter registration.
The local then became combative and stressed the need for me to join 
the Society and provided his case for my ancestry. He believed I was the 
great-granddaughter of his grandmother’s housekeeper. He assured him-
self that he was correct by stating I looked just like his grandmother’s 
housekeeper. I further reminded the local that I do not have any ancestors 
in Haralson County, Georgia, provided him my card, and told him that if 
he was interested in voter registration to give me a call. The local then 
proceeded to give me directions on avoiding the highways to dodge the 
traffic going back to Atlanta. I respectfully accepted his directions and 
used my own.
Through my travel around the state, I met most of the election 
administrators in Georgia. But one meeting in particular changed my 
professional life. I randomly stopped in the Rockdale County, Georgia 
Board of Elections and Voter Registration Office to introduce myself 
and offered the state’s voter education services. Rockdale County is 
located 25 miles east of Atlanta. It is the second smallest county in 
Georgia by area and at the time served about 55,000 registered voters. 
Shortly after the meeting, a job notice was advertised for the Assistant 
Supervisor of Elections in Rockdale. After a year of service in the State 
Elections Division, I accepted my first local election management posi-
tion in the Rockdale County Board of Elections and Voter Registration 
Office in Conyers, Georgia.
After only being an employee of the county for a few short months, my 
first elections were during the 2008 presidential election cycle. Leading 
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into the elections, I was provided training that taught me how to manage 
the day-to-day operations of elections and voter registration. The 
Supervisor of Elections, Cynthia Willingham, was responsible for my 
 election administration development at the county level. She ensured that 
I was capable of management and made sure that I was properly trained 
using a hands on approach. This was different from the primary training 
method in election administration which some may refer to as baptism by 
fire. Her approach required long hours of oversight, shadowing, and read-
ing the Georgia Elections Code page by page on a daily basis. I served as 
the Assistant Supervisor of Elections for 3.5 years.
After several years in the office, Cynthia felt that I was prepared for 
more responsibility and helped me transition into a position that would 
not only provide me with more responsibility but also more exposure. I 
accepted a position as the Administrative Coordinator of Elections (ACE) 
at the Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections in Atlanta, 
Georgia.1 Fulton County is the largest jurisdiction in Georgia with over 
774,000 registered voters. The Deputy Elections Chief is responsible for 
election coordination in the county, serving as the direct report to the 
Elections Chief. This includes managing advance voting,2 poll worker 
recruitment, the maintenance as well as preparation of voting equipment, 
and changes in polling locations. During my tenure, I was exposed to a 
vast number of elections as well as voter registration situations. Some of 
my most notable experiences provided me with the opportunity to work 
with international elections. I served as a Facilitator for the Senegal presi-
dential election held in Atlanta and I was appointed to serve as a Short 
Term Elections Observer for the 2015 early presidential election where I 
served in the Merki District of Kazakhstan. Based on the election and 
registration experience I received from previous employment, I also had 
the opportunity to serve in a dual management capacity in Fulton on a 
temporary basis.
I was appointed as the Interim Registration Chief and maintained my 
role as the ACE until I was hired as Registration Chief. I served in the 
Fulton County Board of Registration and Elections Office for five years, 
until I was hired in my current role as the Elections Director for the 
Clayton County Board of Registration and  Elections during the 2016 
presidential election cycle.
1 This position is now referred to as the Deputy Elections Chief.
2 Referred to as early voting in other jurisdictions.
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Throughout my career, in addition to challenges related to my race, I 
have also faced barriers as a professional in election administration related 
to my age. The challenge of managing a multigenerational workforce adds 
additional obstacles. Throughout my career, I typically have subordinates 
who range in age between 16 and 75 plus years old. When introducing 
myself, I receive the same question and response when I initially meet with 
my subordinates, “How old are you?” Although I do not provide a defini-
tive answer, by veterans and baby boomers I’m often told, “You look 
young enough to be my daughter/granddaughter.” This remark is occa-
sionally followed by a pat on the head.
In most of the offices where I have worked, staffers who have worked 
in the office prior to my leadership appear to be reluctant to change. For 
example, increasingly when questioned about a process, the response 
from the more senior staff has been, “It has always been done this way.” 
To the contrary, millennials may offer an easier way to complete a task 
using advanced software. That said, there is an advantage to managing a 
multigenerational workforce. Veterans, Baby Boomers, Generation X, 
Millennials, and Generation Z employees all offer experiences and skill 
sets that enhance the productivity of election administration when they 
embrace their roles in the office and jurisdiction. To bridge the gap, 
what has worked for me as a best practice has been to team the genera-
tions to work on projects together. This allows each group to learn from 
one another based on their experiences. This practice has yielded an 
increase in professional development and productivity among both 
groups involved.
In addition to challenges in the workplace, there have been times where 
my age has interfered with opportunities for professional growth. For 
example, in my late 20s, I applied for two election administration deputy 
positions in California. For one of the positions, I was one of six applicants 
that were flown to California for a two-part interview. I was in competi-
tion with other election directors including a former Secretary of State. I 
did not make it past the first round of interviews. I contacted the county’s 
Human Resources Department to seek advice on how to improve my 
interview skills and to inquire about why I was not selected for the second 
round of interviews. The Human Resources Coordinator subtly told me 
that the panel was interested in someone who was more “settled” in their 
personal life. I begin to inquire about what that meant. She further 
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explained to me that a young woman, single, and without kids presents a 
high risk of turnover. The county was not willing to take the risk.
The second position was an interview for the Assistant Registrar of Voters 
in a southern California County. I  addition to participating in a WebEx 
interview, I also submitted responses to interview scenarios that would allow 
the panel to understand how I would manage election related situations. 
The panel and the then Registrar of Voters were impressed by my resume, 
experience, and how I responded to the interview questions. After several 
reference checks, I was offered the position verbally. Two days after the 
verbal offer, Human Resources informed me that the Registrar of Voters 
eliminated the position because she was appointed and was afraid that I 
would run against her for her position as a younger candidate. I was not 
aware that running for the position was an option at that time. 
At one point, I applied for a Director of Elections position within a 
county office in which I worked at the time. After submitting my applica-
tion and moving to the list of qualified candidates, I was directly approached 
by the then Registration Chief (who served as the Interim Director) and 
questioned about being qualified for the position. She appeared to be 
shocked and chuckled as she told me  what I already knew, that I was 
qualified for the position. While looking for opportunities to advance pro-
fessionally, I also began to pursue election administration specific certifica-
tions.  I was not supported in this endeavor by the Registration Chief 
(Interim Director). I relied on my personal finances and family support to 
complete the majority of the Certified Elections Registration Administrator 
(CERA) certification classes and travel expenses. During this time, I was 
fortunate to have the professional support of the Elections Chief Dwight 
Brower, and when Rick Barron became the new Director of Elections in 
Fulton County, I was provided with financial support to finish my CERA 
courses. Like Cynthia, Dwight and Rick encouraged me to continue pur-
suing my education, learn as much as I could, and continue to apply for 
positions of more responsibility. Following their advice, I applied for a 
position as  an Elections Director in a metro Atlanta county. After my 
interview, not being the selected for the position was yet again explained 
as there being concerns about my age, or being “settled.” The focus was 
not on my experience or my ability to serve in the role of an Election 
Director. As we think about ways to grow the field and support the careers 
of women and young professionals, my recommendation to interview 
panelists and human resources professionals is to place emphasis on the 
professional experience of an applicant not their ability to grow a family.
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Election administration affords public servants an opportunity to serve 
the community. However, there are times when election officials have to 
face the sociopolitical aspects of customer service. For example, during an 
election a 75-year-old white male voter arrived in the office to submit an 
absentee ballot for another voter who did not meet the criteria of submis-
sion. The voter was informed of this and provided the statute from the 
Georgia Election Code. In response, the voter asked if the situation would 
be escalated to the director.
The staff called me to further assist the voter. I approached the voter 
and asked him how I could help him. He responded to me, “You can help 
me by getting the director.” I informed the voter that I was the director 
and would be happy to assist him in this situation. He was given a copy of 
the Georgia Election Code and provided instructions on how to handle 
the ballot properly. The voter became infuriated and responded, “I will be 
glad when Barack Obama is out of office, that way we can get people like 
you out of this office and you will no longer have a job.” The voter 
demanded to speak to the “white man in charge” (Prior to 2003, the role 
of Registrar was filled by a former Probate Judge). After again informing 
the voter that I was the director, he stormed out and screamed obscenities 
about me. Nothing could have prepared me for this experience because I 
realized this was another situation that was not about my ability. My lesson 
to constituents would be to be more open-minded about being assisted by 
someone who does not look like you.
Among my friends and family, I am the only person that serves in elec-
tion administration. When I inform people of my job responsibilities, I 
receive the same question, “What do you do after Election Day?” Others 
feel compelled to further the conversation discussing politics and I feel 
compelled to provide a lesson on elections. Although I have and will con-
tinue to face challenges as an election professional, the connections I have 
made through my international observation missions, my experience 
working under individuals with an extensive knowledge of elections (aver-
aging at least 25 years of elections experience), and formal training and 
networking through the completion of election administration courses 
through the Election Center and Auburn University have positioned me 
to be a better election professional. Additionally, because of this I am also 
able to ensure that those who I supervise are able to learn from the chal-
lenges I have experienced and have access to a network of working profes-
sionals that they can utilize as they navigate the profession.
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Moving forward it is important for those who are interested in the pro-
fession of election administration to continue professional development, 
embrace technology, prepare for high levels of scrutiny as we reach a new 
level of  scholarship in the discipline of election administration, and be 
prepared to be more engaging with a multigenerational and multicultural 
voting age community. It is equally as important to mentor, cross-train 
staff, and strengthen voter education outreach through  a multigenera-
tional paradigm.
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CHAPTER 10
What Is the Role of the Vendor 
in Modern Elections?
Mindy Perkins
Abstract The election official is the voice of integrity in election adminis-
tration. They represent the process when elections go wrong and when 
they go right. Many people and groups help support the process including 
political parties, nonprofit groups, and vendors. This case focuses on the 
vendor’s perspective of the elections process and how integral it is to 
incorporate vendor voices into election administration. Communication 
between vendors and state and local election offices leads to successful 
partnerships and to successful elections. It is essential that the vendor 
community be viewed as a subset of the larger elections community. 
Communication is key for election officials to be able to trust the out-
come, and trust in the outcome inspires confidence in voters and stake-
holders across the process.
Keywords Vendors • Vendors instrumental in elections community 
• Customer focus • Nonpartisan • Integrity
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I have been in elections as a vendor since April of 2001 which means that 
in my 18 years of elections, I have seen many highs and lows. I experi-
enced the aftermath of the 2000 election firsthand while living in 
Tallahassee, Florida. Our capital city downtown was inundated with speed 
bumps made up of cables from the news trucks on roads in front of the 
Florida Supreme Court building. Our small city was overwhelmed with 
media from all over the world. This was before I worked in elections and 
little did I know that nearly three months later, I would begin a career of 
supporting integrity in the elections process.
The election official is the voice of integrity in elections administration. 
Voters trust elections because they trust their local election official. The local 
election official is the voice when something goes wrong but many people and 
groups help support the process from political parties and nonprofit groups to 
vendors. I will share a vendor’s perspective on the elections process and how 
integral it is to incorporate our voice into election administration.
Setting the Stage
Vendors are crucial for the election community. And yet it is challenging 
to be a leader in elections because of the spotlight, which has only increased 
since 2000. We have insights and information that must be heard. 
However, much of the election community is cautious and isn’t interested 
in leading edge technology—it’s too risky and usually costly. Election ven-
dors are concerned that they are only seen as greedy and money-hungry 
rather than doing what is in the best interest of the community. The elec-
tion community is close-knit with a small number of vendors competing 
for business. There are very few secrets in the elections vendor community 
and news spreads when a vendor doesn’t support their customers.
Very few election administrators or vendors went to school for election 
administration—higher education in the field is too new. Our career paths 
have led us here and once elections get into your blood, it is hard to say 
goodbye. Since my start with elections, election administration has become 
much more professionalized both on the administrator side and for the 
vendor community. Administrators are held to a high standard to protect 
the vote, and there is significant scrutiny of whom they partner with. This 
is important and should be encouraged. Jurisdictions are less likely to 
 partner with an unproven vendor. There is too much at risk, and every 




VR Systems (VR) was founded in 1992, more than 25 years ago, to serve 
Florida counties needing an affordable, modern, voter registration system. 
Florida counties weren’t being served by the other voter registration ven-
dors and the systems they had were out-of-date and/or otherwise didn’t 
meet their needs. The founders of VR Systems, Jane and David Watson, 
built a system that met the needs of those underserved counties. As the 
need for more modern systems grew, so did the company.
VR has been shaped and influenced by several historical events. Following 
the 2000 election, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) to 
fund the modernization of elections. Florida was at the forefront of that 
initiative and a leader among states in the transition. At the time, VR offered 
its flagship product, Voter Focus, which is a comprehensive elections man-
agement software system for voter registration. VR expanded rapidly to 
meet the state’s technology needs and was highly successful. Together, in 
just 18 months, founder Jane Watson and I successfully onboarded over 35 
new Voter Focus counties in Florida out of its 67 counties.
VR’s electronic pollbook EViD was later developed in response to pow-
erful Category 4 Hurricane Charley which wiped out precincts in 
Southwest Florida just weeks before a primary election. The 145-mph 
winds and rain caused $6.755 billion in damages in Florida alone.
The devastation across the region was massive and thousands of people 
were displaced. The challenges facing the affected counties were both sig-
nificant and numerous. The following illustrates some of the conditions 
that VR encountered in Charlotte County and Hardee County, and how 
we responded.
In Charlotte County, despite the fact that the homes of many election 
office staff were harmed or destroyed by the hurricane, people reported to 
work because they knew the election couldn’t be delayed. Governor Jeb 
Bush declared an election emergency that gave counties affected by the 
hurricane the administrative operating flexibility they needed to meet the 
needs of residents. That included combining precincts if a building was 
destroyed and the ability to move polling places. Because so many voting 
locations were ravaged by the storm, Charlotte County had to cut its 
 precinct polling places from 80 to 22; within these 22 were 9 consolidated 
“super precincts.” The existing paper pollbooks that listed the voters at 
specific polling places would not meet the needs in this chaotic environ-
ment. The election office needed a tool that would allow voters in Charlotte 
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County to vote at any polling place in the county—not just the precinct to 
which they had been assigned. Some of the consolidated precincts had as 
many as 10,000 voters assigned to them which could have created a night-
mare for poll workers on Election Day. Charlotte County officials expressed 
fears that they would never be able to handle the crowds at the super pre-
cincts with conventional methods.
VR Systems was asked if there was anything we could do to help. We 
have always thought of ourselves as an extension of an election office and 
this time was no different. If there was anything we could do to help, we 
were going to do it. We quickly analyzed what the pollbook system 
requirements were and identified the problems that needed to be solved. 
Most important, the system needed to check-in voters as efficiently and 
accurately as possible. We worked closely with the county and in less than 
a week, we delivered a device that would allow voters to be checked in on 
a laptop rather than the paper pollbooks that were in use at the time.
Two of VR’s lead developers traveled to Charlotte County to set up 
and train staff and poll workers on the voter check-in system that would 
be used during the primary election. The election staff and poll workers 
were trained on the new system in a short period of time. We worked tire-
lessly, along with the entire election office, to help conduct a success-
ful election.
The new system worked well and allowed voters to retain their right to 
vote in the new precinct structure, despite the tragic circumstances that 
surrounded them. And out of this tragedy came innovation. The system 
that VR crafted would become the EViD electronic voter check-in system 
that many counties use today. Following that successful election, the elec-
tronic pollbook EViD was patented and today more than 15,000 EViDs 
are used in major elections across the country.
One of the other counties tragically affected by Hurricane Charley was 
Hardee County which is home to Arcadia, Florida. Hardee County lost 
half of its voting locations and 75% of its county residences. The county 
was left with more than $750 million in damage. In addition to the physi-
cal losses the county suffered, it also suffered the loss of its top election 
official, Dean Cullins, to a heart attack two days after the hurricane. Hardee 
County is a small county with only a few staff members so their needs were 
smaller in scale but no less important. They needed help prepping for the 
election since their tiny office staff size was reduced by one- third. Two of 
our employees drove down to Hardee County to help in any way they 
could. For quite some time the county was without a Supervisor of 
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Elections (the elected county official responsible for election operations) 
and basic functions could not be performed. VR staff were quickly depu-
tized so that they could help run the election. They returned absentee bal-
lots and registered voters, all with no air-conditioning or comforts. Because 
we had so many staff helping in the counties, it left only a few people to 
help all of our other customers in Tallahassee. Despite these and other chal-
lenges, we all pitched in to ensure that the counties ran elections smoothly.
More recently, as CEO I was called to guide VR through a high-profile 
news event that directly impacted the company’s reputation. In 2017, a 
defense contractor employee leaked a confidential document that depicted 
VR as the subject of a Russian phishing attack. VR was not compromised 
as a result of this attack. However, the following weeks, months, and years 
brought tremendous international scrutiny to the company. We worked 
tirelessly directing a crisis response team to communicate information 
concerning the nature of the attempt as accurately and transparently 
as possible.
VR has stepped into the role of an elections cybersecurity leader, serving 
on a US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) executive committee 
and implementing a cybersecurity communications education program to 
share VR’s experience with election officials around the country. In addi-
tion, the company has launched its own internal cybersecurity program, 
recently becoming the first vendor to successfully complete both DHS risk 
and vulnerability assessment (RVA) and Hunt testing which provides assis-
tance to potentially impacted entities, analyzes the potential impact across 
critical infrastructure, investigates those responsible in conjunction with law 
enforcement partners, and coordinates the national response to significant 
cyber incidents (Department of Homeland Security ND).1
impliCationS of Changing teChnology
The promises and limits of technology are very apparent in the election 
community and where the needs and desires of election administrators 
come face-to-face with what is possible in equipment used in conducting 
elections. Election administration is a niche community with custom-built 
technologies. What is true but not easy to see is that, often, technology in 
one sector would not work in another.
1 United States Department of Homeland Security. “Cyber Incident Response,” accessed 
February 27, 2019. https://www.dhs.gov/cisa/cyber-incident-response.
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For example, there has been much focus on online voting which would 
allow the right to vote to be held in every voter’s hands. The implication 
is that since banking can be done online, voting can be done online too. 
And this is appealing; it would be very user friendly if a voter could simply 
vote online—this would eliminate the need for polling sites, poll workers, 
expensive equipment, and so on. But this is a misconception. The primary 
issue I have with this approach is that every vote is private and must be 
tallied. Banks lose money each year because of online attacks. In 2017, 
financial services firms, banks lost $16.8 billion to cybercriminals 
(Mirchandani 2018).2 Are we willing to take that gamble with our right to 
vote? I can’t imagine that any voter would be ok with their vote being the 
one that is lost. Vendors are responsible for delivering solutions that pro-
tect every voter’s right to vote. Technology does not yet exist that can 
ensure that all votes would be tallied in the way the voter intended.
There is also tension between all the different expectations we have 
about voting, and about what we want from voting equipment. There 
must be a balance between a voter-friendly experience, equipment security, 
and costs that are reasonable for taxpayers and politicians. If one of those 
items is out of balance, the system delivers less than expected in some way. 
It is a constant challenge in the vendor community today to maintain 
usability and keep support costs low without compromising on security.
It is also important to note that integrity is more than software or hard-
ware security. Part of voter confidence in the outcomes of elections has to 
do with their belief in the fairness of the process. So, the idea of integrity 
has to include nonpartisan attitudes and practices. Voters may care about 
political parties and which of their candidates won or lost, but vendors 
cannot show preference or favoritism of any kind in the work that we do.
RefleCtionS
No matter the technology requirements and changes, personal relation-
ships are key. Strong relationships between vendors and election offices are 
the cornerstone to successful elections. Communications between vendors 
and offices lead to successful partnerships and to successful elections. 
Communication is key for election officials to be able to trust the out-
2 Mirchandani, Bhakti. “Laughing all the way to the bank: Cybercriminals targeting U.S. 





come, and trust in the outcome inspires confidence in voters and stake-
holders across the process.
It is also essential that the vendor community be viewed as a subset of 
the larger elections community. We are often viewed as outsiders who only 
know very basic information and that we only need to know what we are 
told. Vendors have broad perspectives that are often disregarded because 
of our role in “selling widgets.” I believe that without vendors’ input and 
participation, only part of the story is told. It is critical to hear the wide 
variety of voices and for us to do what we can to better the election com-
munity, and this is only possible with communication and trust. For exam-
ple, election officials often ask us our opinion about the best way to 
perform a task since we glean inputs from a wide variety of customers. As 
another example, the term “voting systems” is widely considered to mean 
vote tabulation systems, but not other types of equipment used in elec-
tions. The voting environment uses many kinds of equipment that are not 
tabulators, and vendors of these other types of equipment have a unique 
perspective that encompasses the broad spectrum of election administration.
As a voter registration and electronic pollbook vendor, VR Systems has 
a unique perspective that encompasses this broad spectrum and I am con-
fident that VR will continue to pursue its work in finding solutions for 
election administrators. We trust that our customer focus demonstrates 
commitment under extremely challenging circumstances, and that our 
commitment to integrity demonstrates our service to our customers and 
to election administrators everywhere.
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Abstract When state legislatures mandate voting by mail and early voting 
in addition to Election Day voting, the cost of conducting an election 
disproportionately increases. Factors contributing to the cost of conve-
nience include staffing, electronics, logistics, and materials. Since any voter 
may choose to vote by any mode at any time, duplicate preparation is 
needed to accommodate peak demand at all early voting sites, precincts, 
and Vote-by-Mail departments. Lawmakers often don’t have the financial 
data they need to consider when making election administration policy, 
and  although there is immense cost involved, data suggests that more 
opportunities to vote do not increase voter participation.
Keywords Mail voting • Early voting • Election convenience 
• Election costs • Election policy
I am the Supervisor of Elections in Polk County, Florida, and have served 
since 2001. Polk County is located in central Florida along the Interstate 4 
corridor between Tampa and Orlando and has a diverse population of 
about 680,000 people. In addition to conducting elections, our office is 
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responsible for all voter registration activities, as well as candidate services. 
As an election official, of course my job is to conduct fair and accurate 
elections. Taxpayers expect this to be done efficiently. As new laws have 
been implemented, I think fairness and accuracy have increased. But poli-
cies designed to offer voter convenience have ballooned the cost of elec-
tions in obvious and many hidden ways. I’m not referring to the natural 
inflation that would occur as the price of goods and labor increase with 
time. This is the result of the cost of expanding the opportunity to vote.
LegaL Landscape
To put the spotlight on Florida, all precincts are open from 7:00 a.m. to 
7:00 p.m. on Election Day. Local supervisors of elections determine the 
number of precincts and their geographical configuration in consultation 
with their local board of county commissioners. Factors contributing to 
the size and boundaries of precincts include a unique combination of dis-
tricts, communities of interest, traffic patterns, and suitable polling places. 
In some areas, the local governing body relies entirely on the Supervisor 
of Elections recommendations. In other areas, county commissioners pre-
fer to be more involved in the mapping of precincts.
For a long time, poll lists, which contain the names of all eligible voters, 
were in a paper format at most Florida precincts. This changed following 
the passage of a law in 2013 that incentivized Supervisors of Elections to 
use electronic pollbooks (EPBs), which contain the voter registration file 
in electronic format. Now, if EPBs are deployed, voters moving from 
county to county may vote a regular ballot instead of a provisional ballot. 
This is much quicker for the voter and easier for poll workers and saves 
election officials hundreds of hours of research and processing provisional 
ballots immediately following the election.
Florida law allows “no excuse” voting by mail. Voters may request a 
ballot for a specific election any time up until 10 days before Election 
Day, or have a standing request for all elections through two general elec-
tion cycles with no requirement to provide a reason such as illness or 
being out of town on the day of the election. Early voting, which occurs 
up to two weeks before Election Day, is also mandatory for all jurisdic-
tions. The law requires at least the same number of early voting centers as 
the jurisdiction had in 2012. Early voting sites must be open 8–12 hours 
a day for at least 8 days but no more than 14 days. The law prescribes 
exactly which buildings may be used to provide early voting, including 
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public libraries,  fairgrounds, courthouses, stadiums, and convention cen-
ters. Public schools, private community clubhouses, or houses of worship 
are not allowed.
diminishing RetuRns
Although there are more options for voting in Florida, we have not seen 
an increase in voter participation. A comparison of Florida turnout for 
presidential elections shows no growth or spike to accompany the provi-
sion of additional modes for voting (Fig. 11.1). When expenses increase 
while participation remains static, the law of diminishing returns is at play. 
The return on investment is decreasing as we strive to be more and more 
accommodating to voters.
To examine this a little closer, here are some examples from Polk 
County, a jurisdiction with 407,647 registered voters in the 2016 presi-
dential election. Polk has held steady at 167 precincts for a dozen years, 
despite a 20% growth in population. There are nine early voting 
sites in Polk.
In the 1950s, fewer than 3% of Polk County’s voters cast ballots by 
mail. These were probably our military and overseas voters. The rest voted 
Fig. 11.1 Turnout in Florida
11 THE COST OF CONVENIENCE 
86
in person at their precinct on Election Day, as there were no provisions for 
early voting. Turnout in the 1952 presidential election was 83%. In 1956, 
it was 74%.
In 2012 and 2016, early voting and Vote-by-Mail were in full swing. 
Turnout in both elections was 71%. In 2012, 51% voted at the precinct on 
Election Day, 27% cast mail ballots, and 22% participated at an early voting 
center. In 2016, 40% voted on Election Day, 28% cast mail ballots, and 
32% voted at an early voting site (Fig. 11.2).
As voters have changed their voting methods, we need more resources 
to accommodate these changes, and have to allocate resources differently.
contRibuting FactoRs
More Polling Locations
When Florida became a state in 1845, voters residing within a defined area 
were to vote at a specific location, usually the county courthouse. Public 
officials or employees took time from their regular duties to facilitate the 
election and total the results. Cost to the government was negligible.
As the population grew and more people became eligible to vote, more 
precincts were created in Florida. Now there are more than 6000 precincts 
Fig. 11.2 Changes in voting methods—Polk County
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in the state, and voters expect to have a polling location that is convenient 
to their home and place of work. Polling locations are expensive and 
involve many costs that are not immediately apparent (Fig. 11.3). Voters 
expect polling locations to be in their neighborhood. Following the 2010 
census and redistricting, a necessary shift in polling locations for some vot-
ers resulted in more than a few calls of complaint from voters who now 
had to travel an extra mile to vote at their precinct.
Vote-by-Mail
Vote-by-Mail, when combined with precinct voting, still can be efficient in 
high turnout elections. Of course, there are costs associated with printing 
two envelopes, privacy sleeve, and instructions for each ballot packet, 
along with the postage which is paid by the county. Staff must be paid to 
Fig. 11.3 Polling locations as a cost center
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issue each ballot and process each ballot for mailing. Then, staff must be 
paid to receive each ballot, verify the signature on the ballot, mark the 
voter as having voted, present the ballot in the envelope to the Canvass 
Board, open the ballot envelope, reconcile the number of ballots, process 
the ballot through the tabulation unit, and replicate any ballot that may be 
unreadable by the tabulation unit.
When a voter requests a ballot in advance and then votes and returns 
that ballot, there is no duplication of effort. Since we know in advance that 
the voter intends to vote by mail, we will not plan on his/her attendance 
at the polling location. We will not purchase a ballot for that voter for their 
polling location, and when we staff their polling location, we subtract the 
mail ballot voters from the likely number of expected voters.
The convenience of voting by mail causes hidden costs when the voter 
does not vote their ballot. If they simply don’t vote, we have incurred the 
costs of printing the ballot and ballot materials, issuing the ballot and 
postage even though the voter did not have interest in or intent to vote. 
Another way that the Vote-by-Mail option can cause additional costs is if 
the voter requests a ballot, the election office prints, prepares, and mails 
the ballot and then the voter decides to vote at an early voting location or 
precinct instead. In this scenario, which occurs thousands of times in Polk 
County during each general election, the voter requires 2 ballots, mail bal-
lot materials, precinct resources, and staff at the precinct and election 
headquarters to cancel the mail ballot before the precinct ballot is provided.
Because of the convenient opportunity to vote by mail or vote at the 
precinct, a method to prevent a voter from casting a ballot both ways 
(voter fraud) is necessary. The most simple and inexpensive way to accom-
plish this is with an election worker on a telephone at the polling location 
speaking with a worker at Election Headquarters. For busy elections, or in 
mid- to large-sized jurisdictions, an automated process is needed, usually 
in the form of electronic poll registers connected to the internet via some 
form of temporary internet access. When poll registers or temporary inter-
net access devices are deployed at each polling location, specialized sup-
port staff is usually needed to guide workers through common problems 
or go to the site to address more puzzling malfunctions.
Early Voting
For early voting, each election office must open short-term temporary 
voting sites staffed and equipped to provide voting to any eligible voter in 
the jurisdiction for 8–12 hours a day for a week or two before an election. 
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Early voting sites incur all of the costs associated with a precinct, plus 
overtime, and often printers and toner.
One of the biggest challenges, and inefficiencies, of early voting is the 
unpredictability. Any voter can show up at any time, at any location. So, 
each location must have every possible ballot style available. All Florida 
counties use either the “pick and pull” method or ballot-on-demand to 
issue the correct ballot style to each voter. With the “pick and pull” 
method, each early voting site is stocked with an inventory of all ballot 
styles and the election worker selects a ballot from that stock for each 
voter. When ballot-on-demand is utilized, printers are deployed at each 
voting site and a ballot is printed for a voter once they check in and verify 
eligibility.
In Polk County, in a statewide primary election, there are at least 501 
distinct ballot styles. The “pick and pull” method, which consists of each 
early voting site keeping an inventory on hand of each ballot style, would 
mean that each of the nine sites would need a supply of each style of 
printed ballot as well as suitable storage. Just 100 ballots of each style at 
each location would mean a ballot order of 450,900 ballots just for early 
voting, which is more than the total number of voters registered in 
the county.
The alternative—ballot-on-demand—means the purchase, mainte-
nance, and storage of at least 40 laser printers and multiple toner car-
tridges for each, as well as the blank ballot stock.
More Resources Than Voters
It’s the unpredictability that drives the cost. Election officials must prepare 
for more than 100% turnout. Below the story is told with ballots, because 
they are easy to count, but the cost of technology, logistics, supplies, and 
staffing grow at a similar pace.
In Polk County in 2016 there were 97,148 mail ballots sent per voters’ 
requests. Of course, we needed to keep on hand at least 50 of each of the 
167 ballot styles in a general election for last-minute ballot replacements 
or walk-ins. That’s another 8350 ballots.
About six weeks before Election Day, ballots must be ordered from the 
printer for polling locations. At that point, new voters are still registering, 
so there’s a moving target for the number of registered voters. Most offi-
cials would agree to expect turnout of 70%–85% for a presidential election. 
In Polk, we have precincts that turned out more than 90% of their voters. 
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It would be safe to order ballots for 65% of our voters to vote at the polls 
for a total of 265,000 ballots.
Early voting ballots are often print-on-demand, which eliminates the 
cost of commercial printing, but the expense of laser printers, toner, and 
paper stock are incurred. In 2016, 92,600 ballots were printed and voted 
at early voting sites. Also, any prudent election official would have a small 
quantity of emergency ballot supply for continuity of operations in case of 
a site evacuation or power failure. One hundred ballots of each style 
equates to 16,700 ballots (Fig. 11.4).
Inconvenience as a Reason Not to Vote
According to a Pew Research Center analysis of new Census Bureau data, 
registered voters who did not vote cited nine reasons more frequently than 
inconvenience. One quarter of the respondents said they didn’t like the 
candidates or issues, 15% said they weren’t interested, or thought their 
vote wouldn’t make a difference, 14% were too busy. Just 2% of registered 
voters who did not vote cited inconvenient hours or polling locations. 
Increased convenience does not result in greater participation, and those 
who do not vote  rarely claim inconvenience is their reason for not 
participating.




Policy decisions to increase convenience are often made by lawmakers who 
may not be aware of the relative financial impacts of the decisions they are 
making. And, while efficiency is a laudable goal for all government func-
tions, it’s not a primary objective when conducting an election. Even if 
they want to cut some financial corners, policymakers usually don’t have 
the data they need. The study of the cost of elections is still in its infancy. 
Election administrators have struggled with the complexities of financial 
data collection in an environment of over 7000 jurisdictions ranging from 
hundreds to millions of voters operating under different laws in each state. 
The information in this case provides an in-depth look at one county in 
one state. Each of these in-depth looks help shape our understanding of 
costs, which will in turn shape a more complete picture of the particular 
cost data that matter, regardless of the differences across states. This 
understanding is particularly important given the popularity of the imple-
mentation of multiple options to enhance voter convenience.
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CHAPTER 12
Ghana’s 2012 General Election: 
Free, Fair, and Flawed?
Kelly Ann Krawczyk
Abstract Ghana has held credible, multi-party elections since 1992, with 
peaceful alternation of power in 2000, 2008, and 2016. Yet despite this 
strong democratic track record, Ghanaian elections are still regularly 
marred by allegations of fraud. This case study details the 2012 general 
election in Ghana, which was contested in the Supreme Court by the main 
opposition party, the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The case study high-
lights the use of mechanisms such as election observation and biometric 
technology in order to increase the credibility of the election and deter 
fraud. It also outlines the challenges stemming from the use of these tools, 
including major malfunction of biometric technology, and relocation of 
fraud to polling places without the presence of observers. An important 
conclusion we can draw from the Ghanaian experience of 2012 is that 
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solutions employed to deter electoral fraud, such as the deployment of 
election observers and the implementation of biometrics, are valuable but 
insufficient solutions. In some cases, political parties still retain the incen-
tive and ability to manipulate the operation of elections.
Keywords Ghana • Election • 2012 • Biometrics • Election observers
IntroductIon
The country of Ghana, West Africa, enjoys elevated status as the “shin-
ing star” of African development (Address to the nation, delivered by 
Ghanaian President John Dramani Mahama, August 15, 2012). Ghana 
was the first colony to gain independence from British rule in 1957, and 
has a history of democratic elections since 1992. While Ghana is con-
sidered one of Africa’s most stable and highly functioning democracies, 
accusations of election fraud still regularly tarnish the democratic process 
(Jockers et al. 2010).
As part of a team of certified international observers from Wayne State 
University in Detroit, Michigan, I conducted short-term election observa-
tion during the 2012 Ghanaian general election. Our team observed eight 
polling stations in various districts in the Greater Accra Region of Ghana, 
in and around the country’s capital, on December 7, 2012. Although this 
was a small, nonrepresentative sample of polling stations, it did allow me to 
observe and experience firsthand the events that unfolded on Election Day.
Ghana’s ElEctoral EnvIronmEnt
Ghana is a constitutional democracy, and grants universal suffrage at 
18 years old. Electoral violence in Ghana is rare, and voter turnout is 
high. The president is elected by majority vote in a single, nationwide 
district and serves one four-year term. The country’s unicameral parlia-
ment is made up of 275 representatives elected by popular vote from 
single- member constituencies every four years. Elections are held 
simultaneously for both parliament and the presidency. In 1992, Ghana 
adopted a new constitution and established the country’s Fourth 
Republic. Since that time, peaceful alternation of the political party 
holding executive power has occurred three times, in 2000, 2008, and 
most recently in 2016.
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Ghana has a competitive, two-party political system. The two major 
parties, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC), are supported by roughly equal numbers of voters, and 
together these two parties claim more than 95% of the vote. The NDC 
and NPP exhibit modest but genuine policy differences, as well as partially 
distinct social bases of support (Golden et al. 2015).
National politics are highly competitive in Ghana. In the 2008 presi-
dential election, the NDC won with a margin of only 40,000 votes out of 
an electorate of 14 million (Golden et al. 2015). Partisan competition is 
not evenly distributed across Ghana’s ten regions, however, each party has 
stronghold areas. The NPP is concentrated in the Ashanti Region, and the 
NDC is concentrated in Volta. These two regions are commonly thought 
of as party strongholds, whereas the other eight regions exhibit greater 
partisan competition (Fridy 2007; Morrison and Hong 2006).
In July 2012, following the death of President John Evans Atta Mills 
five months before the end of his term, Vice President John Dramani 
Mahama took office. Competing for the presidency in Ghana’s general 
election on December 7, 2012, were incumbent president John Dramani 
Mahama of the National Democratic Congress (NDC), his main chal-
lenger Nana Akufo-Addo of the New Patriotic Party (NPP), and six other 
candidates. According to the International Foundation for Election 
Systems (IFES), Ghana had 14,158,890 registered voters during the 2012 
general election. There were 11,246,982 votes cast, and 251,720 invalid 
votes, resulting in a 78% voter turnout. The incumbent National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) candidate, John Dramani Mahama, received 
50.7% of the vote, while the main opposition challenger, Nana Akufo- 
Addo, received 47.7% of the vote. Because the incumbent president John 
Mahama obtained a majority, with 50.7% of votes, there was no run-
off election.
ElEctIon obsErvatIon In Ghana
Ghanaian elections are observed regularly by both domestic and interna-
tional missions. International missions included the African Union, 
National Democratic Institute (NDI), and the Electoral Institute for 
Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). Ghana’s Coalition of Domestic 
Election Observers (CODEO) is perhaps the most well-known and cred-
ible domestic observer group, and has been accredited by the Ghanaian 
Electoral Commission (EC) since 2000. CODEO recruits and trains 
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 professionals, typically school teachers and college students, to observe 
the electoral process. CODEO assigns observers to polling stations in 
their home areas, where observers are likely to be personally known and to 
enjoy community respect due to the nature of their professions. Each 
CODEO observer is assigned a single polling station on Election Day. 
Polling places selected for observation are not identified publicly in 
advance of the election, meaning that officials and voters at every polling 
station must realistically anticipate an observer (Golden et al. 2015).
In 2012, CODEO’s observers were trained to use short message ser-
vice (SMS) to report irregularities and disruptions to a national data 
center. If an incident is serious, CODEO has communication structures in 
place to alert appropriate legal and security officials. CODEO also releases 
press statements throughout Election Day and its election headquarters in 
Accra serves as a hub of public information about the process.
bIomEtrIc ElEctIon tEchnoloGy In Ghana 
durInG thE 2012 GEnEral ElEctIon
Despite nearly two decades of election observation intended to deter 
irregularities, allegations of fraud still occur regularly in Ghanaian elec-
tions, especially during the pre-election phase. This may be because this 
phase of the electoral cycle is observed less frequently. For example, 
implausibly large numbers of names appeared on the voter rolls leading up 
to the 2012 election (Oduro 2012).
To help combat such issues, Ghana now employs perhaps the most 
ambitious application of biometric technology on the African continent, 
using biometrics for both the voter registration process, and also to 
authenticate voter identity at the polls1 on Election Day (Golden et  al. 
2015; Piccolino 2016). During the 2012 election cycle, the Electoral 
Commission of Ghana introduced biometric voter registration in order to 
verify and de-duplicate data, and reduce multiple registrations. The entire 
electorate was reregistered using biometric markers (ten fingerprints) dur-
ing a six-week period in spring 2012. New voter identification cards were 
issued featuring head shots. This reregistration process identified approxi-
mately 8000 double registrations, of which 6000 were judged intentional 
(Darkwa 2013).
1 Biometric verification machines are used to authenticate voters at the polls. However, 
actual voting takes place using a paper ballot.
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After the biometric registration process was complete, biometric verifi-
cation machines were delivered to all 26,000 polling stations in the coun-
try for use on Election Day. The EC also purchased another 7500 backup 
machines for use in the event of equipment failure. Because the equipment 
is battery operated, spare batteries accompanied each machine (Golden 
et  al. 2015). While the combined system of biometric registration and 
verification was presented as a success, in practice there were serious prob-
lems, particularly on Election Day. These issues are discussed in the 
next section.
ElEctIon IssuEs and challEnGEs
The observation undertaken by the Wayne State University team on 
December 7, 2012, only begins to scratch the surface of the challenges 
that presented themselves on Election Day. In the Greater Accra Region, 
we observed polling stations with long lines and crowding in the morning. 
In three polling stations where we observed, these long lines, coupled 
with agitated crowds, caused conflict between voters. In another polling 
station, police were called to settle a dispute over accusations of line- 
cutting. In the remainder of polling places we observed, lines were shorter 
and voters remained orderly. By the late afternoon, none of the polling 
stations we visited in Accra had lines. Although the polls reopened the fol-
lowing day in one northern region of Ghana due to failure of biometric 
voter identification equipment, none of the eight polling stations we vis-
ited in Accra reported any difficulties with biometric voter identification 
equipment (Krawczyk 2013). Yet, it is clear that use of biometric technol-
ogy, particularly on Election Day, was in fact marred by difficulties.
Biometric technology was utilized on Election Day to verify the iden-
tity of voters, by scanning voters’ fingerprints at the polls using biometric 
verification machines. In some cases, however, biometric verification 
devices failed to identify individuals’ thumbprints, and some biometric 
verification machines failed entirely. The Electoral Commission mandated 
that no one would be allowed to vote without their identity being verified 
biometrically. However, approximately 19% of polling stations experi-
enced a breakdown of the verification machine at some point during the 
day (Coalition of Domestic Election Observers (CODEO) 2013). 
Breakdowns appear to be caused by battery overheating and exhaustion, 
and when battery replacement was attempted, the machines froze up, 
sometimes for several hours.
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The biometric verification machine breakdowns delayed voting, and by 
noon on Election Day, Ghana’s President, John Dramani Mahama, 
appealed to the Electoral Commission (EC) to allow individuals with valid 
voter ID cards to vote at polling stations where biometric verification 
machines were not functioning. The EC rejected the proposal, instructing 
their local officials to instead permit voting to continue into a second day 
where necessary (Golden et al. 2015).
In addition to issues with biometric voter authentication, another issue 
of credibility arose—over vote-tallying and recording—which ended up 
distracting attention from the failure of biometric technology. Despite 
serious technological issues, the candidates, election officials, and donors 
who supported the introduction of biometric technology failed to ques-
tion what they considered to be the inherent value of biometric technol-
ogy. Furthermore, despite its clear limitations, the biometric process 
received a positive assessment by the general public. According to a survey 
conducted by CODEO of registered Ghanaian voters, 78% of respondents 
agreed biometric registration represented an improvement over the old 
system, and 87% of respondents considered it a useful tool for promoting 
credible and peaceful elections (Piccolino 2016).
The failure of biometric technology did, however, lead to a complaint 
filed by Nana Akufo-Addo, the presidential candidate of the major opposi-
tion party NPP, his running mate Dr. Mahamadu Bawumia, and the 
Party’s Chairman Jake Obetsebi Lamptey. They petitioned the Supreme 
Court to look into the 2012 elections in light of irregularities. The major 
charge by Addo and the NPP was related to the use of biometric voting 
machines: that the EC permitted voting to take place in many polling sta-
tions across the country without biometric verification, and these votes 
were therefore unlawfully included in the declaration of results by the EC 
in the presidential election. After series of legal battles spanning from April 
16 to August 29, 2013, the Supreme Court gave its final judgment, and 
the NPP’s complaint was dismissed.
EmpIrIcal EvIdEncE on thE Impact of ElEctIon 
obsErvErs and bIomEtrIcs at thE 2012 polls
The assumption is that both the presence of election observers, as well as 
the use of biometric technology, can help reduce electoral fraud and irreg-
ularities. Thus, Ghana employed both observers and biometric technology 
 K. A. KRAWCZYK
99
during the 2012 election. But did it work? And what is the relationship 
between election observers and biometric technology? There is empirical 
evidence from Ghana’s 2012 elections that can help explore these 
questions.
Asunka et  al. (2013) provide promising evidence on the ability of 
observers to deter fraud. Their study, implemented in 2000 polling places2 
during Ghana’s 2012 election, finds that observers significantly reduce 
overvoting and suspicious turnout at polling stations to which they are 
deployed, by up to 60%. Yet the very same study also offers less promising 
results: political parties are able to successfully “relocate” fraud from 
observed to unobserved stations in their historical strongholds, where 
they enjoy social penetration and political competition is low. They are not 
able to do so in politically competitive constituencies.
In 2012, biometric identification machines were used in every polling 
station in Ghana as a way to reduce fraud. Recall, however, that up to 19% 
of these machines failed on voting day. Golden et  al. (2015) randomly 
selected a sample of polling places in four of Ghana’s ten regions, in order 
to study whether election observers impacted biometric machine malfunc-
tion. They also examined the effect of observers on fraud in order to ana-
lyze the complex relationship between observers, machine malfunction, 
and electoral fraud.
Golden et al.’s (2015) main finding is that in polling stations with a 
randomly assigned domestic election observer, biometric identification 
machines were about 50% less likely to break down than in polling stations 
without observers. Second, they found machine breakdown was more 
prevalent in electorally competitive areas. Third, they also found that three 
markers of election irregularity—overvoting, registry rigging, and ballot 
stuffing—were more common in polling stations affected by the break-
down of the biometric identification machines, especially when an election 
observer was not present. This supports the findings of Asunka et  al. 
(2013) and suggests those seeking to manipulate election results may 
actually be successfully relocating fraud to polling places without an 
observer present.
2 The authors of this study partnered with Ghana’s Coalition of Domestic Elections 
Observers (CODEO), and randomly assigned election observers to just over 1000 of 
Ghana’s 26,000 polling places (treatment locations). They also collected data from an addi-
tional randomly selected 1000 polling stations to which observers were not deployed (con-
trol locations).
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conclusIons and lEssons lEarnEd
Election observation has been an increasingly prevalent tool across the 
globe, and especially in Africa, in order to curb election irregularities. 
There has also been a huge increase in the use of biometric technology in 
elections over the last two decades. In Africa, roughly half of all national 
elections now use biometric equipment (Cheeseman et al. 2018). While 
election observation and biometric technology clearly have promise as 
tools to achieve more credible elections, we must also exercise caution. 
For example, despite the widespread deployment of election observers, 
and empirical evidence supporting the contention that observers can help 
reduce electoral irregularities and fraud, there is evidence that indicates 
observers may also “displace” fraud to unobserved polling locations. And 
recent evidence suggests that biometric technology is not infallible: it 
relies on complex procedures that are liable to break down, and may actu-
ally increase suspicion of fraud and encourage complacency toward tradi-
tional forms of election oversight (Cheeseman et al. 2018, p. 1398). Due 
to these limitations, we must carefully consider whether tools such as bio-
metric technology are worth the cost, and whether they can actually 
achieve intended outcomes.
The case of the 2012 Ghanaian election illustrates these concerns. 
Biometrics was introduced in an effort to curb electoral irregularities and 
to produce cleaner elections, yet evidence suggests this may not have hap-
pened to the extent which we hoped. The breakdown of biometric 
machines reduced the ability to authenticate voters, and may have even 
provided an entrée for those trying to manipulate election outcomes. 
Electoral management bodies may try to justify the resources required to 
implement biometrics, but the case of Ghana shows the perils of over-
promising what technology can do—it can’t change political practice 
overnight. And when it comes to deploying election observers, the 2012 
Ghanaian election provides an argument for greater investment in domes-
tic observer programs, especially if fraud is being relocated to polling 
places without observers.
An important conclusion we can draw from the Ghanaian experience of 
2012, evident in the work of both Asunka et al. (2013) and Golden et al. 
(2015), is that solutions employed to deter electoral fraud, such as the 
deployment of election observers and the implementation of biometrics, 
are valuable but insufficient solutions. In some cases, political parties still 
retain the incentive and ability to manipulate the operation of elections.
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Abstract Election administration has and is changing as the process 
becomes more transparent and challenging. This case traces efforts made 
by a core group of individuals to professionalize election administration 
and create a professional curriculum for election administration. Also dis-
cussed is the connection between enhancing professionalism in the field 
and ensuring the necessary resources are provided to insure the integrity 
of elections in the United States.
Keywords Training • Education • Reform • Election • Professionalism
Election administration has changed since 2000, mostly for the good. 
From my vantage point of 35 years in the business of elections, my experi-
ence as a local election official for a large suburban county, and my service 
on national boards and commissions, I have observed some points about 
election administration that are important for those trying to understand 
the field (like members of the media and researchers) and for those work-
ing in it today.
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As a starting point, people looking at elections need to understand that 
the field is detailed, complex and full of interlocking pieces. The inner 
workings of offices are complex, and the system across the country is even 
more so. And our lack of understanding is expensive, and so we should 
learn more. In the administration of elections, it is particularly important 
that the process is very transparent and that all of the stakeholders in the 
election process feel confident that the process is honest, fair and that 
every vote counts. For policy makers and for those involved in financial 
resource allocation, a thorough understanding of the details is required, so 
as to fund elections at an appropriate level to insure that the goals of an 
election are met.
When an election fails, for almost any reason, it is expensive. The cost 
of conducting the election over, taking appropriate actions, and restoring 
voter confidence sometimes requires major and expensive revisions to laws 
and process which  usually exceed, by significant amounts, the cost of 
doing it correctly the first time. Thus, it is important to fund elections at 
an appropriate level.
Often a lack of education is named as the weak link in the voting pro-
cess. Election administrators nationwide recruit and train well over a mil-
lion poll workers for Election Day activities. For that reason alone, election 
administrators themselves need to be well trained.
Election administrator titles, responsibilities and salaries vary widely 
around the United States. Some administrators are only part-time while 
others carry more responsibilities than just administering elections. For 
example, the top election official in Los Angeles County California (a 
jurisdiction with over four million registered voters) is also the County 
Clerk and Recorder. In some jurisdictions the individual in charge of elec-
tions is elected while others are appointed. For those who are appointed, 
there are generally some specific education and/or experience require-
ments. Generally, education and/or experience are not required for those 
who are elected.
I was an appointed election official. I did have some limited election 
administrative knowledge. But “limited” is the key word. I was like a 
sponge trying to soak up knowledge about the responsibilities that I was 
about to perform. If a group of election folks were meeting anywhere in 
the country to discuss election processes, I wanted to be involved. I was 
lucky that I worked for a jurisdiction and for leadership that encouraged 
me to get training wherever I could. But in 1984 there wasn’t much. 
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Election administrators learned from one another, which, by the way, is 
still a major source of education.
In 1984, a group of election professionals and academics met infor-
mally to talk about some sort of formal professional education for election 
administrators. From these conversations, the Election Center was born 
and it is now in its 35th year. We partnered with Auburn University’s 
Master of Public Administration in 1992 to develop formal, profes-
sional education for election administrators. Very specific requirements 
are needed to complete the course of study leading to a certificate in 
election administration called CERA (Certified Elections  Registration 
Administrator). In 2017 the certification program graduated its 1000th 
student. To date, more than 30 courses have been developed and are 
taught through CERA, which is the only national certification program 
for election administrators, voter registrars, and vendors.
As one of the founders of the Election Center and the CERA program, 
I have been asked on numerous occasions to lecture, teach, testify, and 
consult on election administration and voter registration issues. During 
the 2000 presidential election and certification process, I was the Director 
of Elections in Sacramento, California, a jurisdiction at that time of about 
half a million registered voters. We used the now-infamous Votomatic vot-
ing system, which is essentially a punch-card voting machine. At the same 
time, I was the President of NACRC (National Association of Clerks, 
Recorders and Election Officials), then an affiliate of the NAcO (National 
Association of Counties) and the co-chair of a task force purposed to 
reform the nation’s elections. In those roles I was interviewed dozens of 
times on the role of election officials in the conduct of election administra-
tion (98 times by media from outside the Sacramento area).
On one notable occasions, I was asked to summarize these responsibili-
ties at the Carter-Ford (former US Presidents Jimmy Carter and Gerald 
Ford) hearings on election reform. The constraint of this interview was 
that I was to speak for exactly 45 minutes. Not 44 or 46. The hearing was 
being televised live.
First, I wrote a detailed description of my job, which in most parts was 
similar to or exactly what thousands of other election officials were doing 
leading up to Election Day, Election Day itself and following the election. 
I recorded my speech, even video-recorded it and practiced it over and 
over to get to exactly 45 minutes. My wife even timed me over and over 
again to be sure that it was precisely 45 minutes.
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The day before the hearing I flew to Detroit, Michigan, and the morn-
ing of the hearing I drove to the Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan. Because a former President (Ford) was in attendance the Secret 
Service was well represented. As I approached the parking lot I was stopped 
and asked to identify myself. When I gave a Secret Service agent my name 
and purpose for being there I was told to get out of my car and report 
immediately to the hearing organizer. She told me that two Congressional 
members had taken longer than the time they were allocated and that she 
was forced to reduce my time to 20 minutes.
The Library was filled to capacity. The only place I could find to sit and 
reorganize my presentation was in the men’s room. I found a “seat” and 
began the process of removing words, sentences and paragraphs from my 
prepared speech. It was now a jumbled mess!
As I was introduced, I began walking toward the speakers’ table, and 
the organizer whispered to me as I passed by, “eight minutes, you only 
have eight minutes.” Having no time to further reduce my prepared 
remarks, I calmly folded my prepared testimony and put it in my briefcase. 
When I got up to speak, I said: “Mr. President, distinguished guests, ladies 
and gentlemen. My name is Ernest Hawkins, I am the Registrar of Voters 
for Sacramento County California and I’ve been asked to outline for you 
the role of local election official’s responsibilities in the conduct of elec-
tions. Here’s what I do: Candidates and proponents of measures tell me 
that they want to be on the ballot. I gather up all of their requests, print 
up some ballots, secure some polling locations, hire some folks to work at 
the polls, collect the voted ballots, count them and announce the results. 
That’s about it,” I said. I then asked, “How could you possibility make 
this complicated, worse yet, screw it up?”
With that I sat down, followed by uproarious laughter, including that 
of President Ford. From all of the media coverage during the previous 
weeks most everyone in attendance was aware that elections were far more 
complicated than I had just summarized.
Several organizations, including the Carter-Ford Commission, went on 
to write reports suggesting how law and policy needed to change. The 
eventual outcome was Congressional legislation called The Help American 
Vote Act (HAVA), a bill that, among other things, created the Election 
Assistance Commission (EAC). The EAC was charged with the distribu-
tion of billions of dollars in Federal funds to modernize outdated voting 
equipment across the nation. In addition, the EAC was tasked with “help-
ing America vote” by mandating that it help election administrators by 
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providing guidelines, checklists, “tool boxes” and other educational tools 
and aids. Many other provisions of the legislation were designed to help 
voters. In addition to the Federal funds that HAVA provided (the first in 
the history of the United States), the training and educational opportuni-
ties that were supported by those funds were the most significant, in 
my opinion.
In 2019, we see even greater need for more training in all areas of elec-
tions. With millions of individuals working on different parts of election 
operations, it is very important that everyone knows what they are doing. 
Election administrators have always suffered from a general lack of under-
standing among the public and policy makers about their responsibilities. 
Media attention has increased the public’s understanding, although some-
times that places election officials in a negative light. Following the 2000 
presidential election there was extensive media exposure to some of the 
details, particularly the ballot count and certification process. “Chad” 
became a household word. The security of elections has become a com-
mon topic after the 2016 election as well as the hacking of databases, and 
other cyber problems. Training continues to be important because situa-
tions are constantly changing. One bad call by any of these million plus 
individuals can have a catastrophic result by creating widespread doubt 
about the integrity of the election process in America.
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CHAPTER 14
State Support for Local Election Offices
Lori Augino
Abstract Cooperation and coordination between state and local election 
offices is an integral part of election administration. Ensuing that the 
expertise of local government officials is integrated into decision-making 
processes is one of many ways to solidify a strong relationship between the 
state and local governments. Presented are the processes that are used in 
the state of Washington to ensure that the state election office is providing 
support to local election officials and implementing policies that enhance 
the administration of elections and the voter experience in the state.
Keywords Collaboration • Training • Help America Vote Act 
• Equipment • Intergovernmental relationships • Resources
Both Secretary of State Kim Wyman and I are foundationally local election 
officials. I served for 18 years in Pierce County, and Secretary Wyman 
served as Auditor in Thurston County. As a result, we have a deep under-
standing and appreciation for the work that local officials do. From the 
first day we walked in the door of the Office of Secretary of State, we 
wanted to ensure that this office served our local election officials to give 
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them a strong voice in what happens across the state. We worked from the 
beginning to include the perspectives of local officials in building a state- 
level structure to support those local officials. We had experienced seeing 
the state office at odds with the counties, and we wanted to avoid that as 
much as possible.
In my role as Washington’s Director of Elections, I have stressed that 
my office is a resource for local offices. We are not adversarial; we are here 
to help. We respect the boots-on-the-ground experience and abilities of 
the county auditors and local election officials, as well as the deep commit-
ment that they bring to elections across the state.
The Elections Division of the Office of Secretary of State contains three 
divisions—certification and training, voter information services, and elec-
tion law support. In addition, we have open and regular communications 
with the county offices. All of this work is supported by a combination of 
state general funds and federal support from Help America Vote Act 
(HAVA) funds. Our efforts are described below.
CertifiCation and training
The cornerstone of our efforts is certification and training, for which we 
partner with county auditors. We pride ourselves in having a dynamic and 
well-run statewide training program. Our state law requires having at least 
two certified election officers in each county. Certification credentials are 
earned through initial and ongoing training, with a Washington state- 
specific component to ensure that election administrators are well-versed 
in what happens across the state. This builds consistency in how elections 
are conducted throughout Washington. The components of the initial 
training for Certified Elections Administrator are listed below and include 
a combination of class-based training sessions, individual work, and on- 
the- job experience.
Washington Certified eleCtions administrator 
requirements (January 2019)
• Attend a two-day orientation class
• Pass the Administrator Certification exam
• Receive an additional 40 hours of education
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 – 30 of these must be election-specific and offered by approved 
sponsors such as
Washington Association of County Auditors (WSACA)
Office of the Secretary of State (OSOS)
Election Center (www.electioncenter.org)
United State Election Assistance Commission (EAC)
Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP)
Election-related courses approved by the Election Administration 
and Certification Board
Have two years of continuous service in elections
Have a high school diploma or its equivalent
Submit a completed application for Initial Certification
Our process for developing training is interactive. By working with 
counties throughout the year, we at the state level learn which kinds of 
training county officials need. Then we build a training regimen with both 
instruction from state staff and peer-to-peer training.
The certification and training team that does this work within the state 
office includes a manager and four staff members. Two other staffers work 
collaboratively to deliver cyber resiliency reviews and cyber security training 
to ensure we are protected as a community. This group also identifies addi-
tional equipment that may be needed, which we help to provide to counties.
This team is also responsible for conducting county certification 
reviews, which are legally required every five years. This is a collaborative 
process in which the state office reviews procedures, identifies best prac-
tices, and shares information. We give awards based on these findings, and 
share them among all counties so they can learn from each other. This 
process also identifies issues that need to be addressed. Most often, such 
issues are resolved on-site. Anything left unaddressed during the review 
process is identified in the final report. This documentation ensures qual-
ity and consistency in practice. These reviews are taken to heart and are 
used as positive tools.
Finally, this team also serves as policy experts. Team members answer 
questions from localities when problems or confusion arise. They talk 
through situations, identify other counties that are experiencing similar 
challenges, and foster connections to help. This team is the heart and soul 
of policy and procedures, and the team members are seen as trusted part-
ners as opposed to adversaries.
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eleCtion laW support
We have an election law support team that spearheads an ongoing mod-
ernization process for all parts of the election system across the state, 
except tabulation. The modernization began when Secretary Wyman con-
vened a technology summit of county auditors, election managers, and 
election information technology offices to determine the strengths of the 
current system, as well as the issues and challenges the state faces. Our 
voting technology was purchased with the original round of HAVA 
funds in the early 2000s. At that time, counties were given choices about 
equipment; like many places, our systems were not up to date.
We are set to go live with the modernization of our election system in 
April 2019. In every step of our modernization process, Washington’s 
county officials have played meaningful roles. We have put a significant 
proportion of decision-making in the hands of county election administra-
tors to ensure that what we deliver as a state is exactly what local officials 
want and need. We have also put significant procurement decision-making 
authority in the hands of technology experts. They identify business 
requirements, develop requests for proposals (RFPs), and make budget 
presentations.
Within this powerful, multi-year partnership, sometimes counties dis-
agree. As a state office, we provide an open environment for tough, 
consensus- building discussions. This requires a significant investment of 
time and resources by the Office of Secretary of State and county officials, 
but this work pays off in the end.
Voter information serViCes
The Voter Information Services unit is designed to interact directly with 
voters and provides three major services. First, this team works with the 
counties to provide language support as needed. Second, staffers work 
with counties on candidate filings and help manage this process. Third, 
the group produces a statewide voter information pamphlet which is 
mailed to all of our voters to provide information to make ballot choices. 
Our voters love this guide. It reduces the number of calls to county offices 
during each election cycle, saving the counties valuable resources. This 
work is done by a manager and five staff members. Figure 14.1 shows the 
2018 Voter Pamphlet in production.
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other efforts to support loCal eleCtion offiCes
The Elections Division organizes several committees through which coun-
ties advise our services for voters. We have the opportunity to write state 
administrative code and to invite code review before it goes through pub-
lic ratification. Our role is to vet proposals before they are formalized for 
public comment. Before we release proposals, we engage local officials 
through these committees to provide feedback. This gives local officials 
the opportunity to suggest language and provide other input at a critical 
point in the process.
As a local election official, I was inundated with emails from the office 
of the Secretary of State. To address the volume, we developed a regular 
email newsletter, the Washington State Elections Weekly, issued on 
Wednesdays. Through it, we brief local offices on any emerging issues and 
concisely explain in plain language what county election officials need to 
know that week. We also use this to brief people on what is happening in 
Fig. 14.1 2018 Voter pamphlet in production
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the state election system, and to share questions and best practices across 
the state. This cuts down on email conversations and gives a single resource 
for county auditors to consult for information, with back issues available 
from 2013 onward. Fig. 14.2 shows a snapshot of Elections Weekly as it 
appears at the top of the email sent to local election officials.
We also host a weekly call each Thursday at 1 p.m. for live updates on 
the modernization project. I along with other Elections Division leaders 
use this weekly call to address other timely issues, address questions and 
concerns, and talk about whatever the local officials want to address. Local 
offices know that they have this regular opportunity to hear from us 
directly as well as communicate with each other.
adViCe for other state eleCtion offiCes
As the incoming President of the National Association of State Election 
Directors (NASED), I plan to share with other state election directors 
these successes that Washington has had in working with our county part-
ner officials. When I have presented information about Washington at 
meetings in other states, I often hear from local officials asking me to 
discuss our approach with their state election directors about our focus 
on building camaraderie and trust to generate process improvements. 
I deeply appreciate the accomplishments of Washington’s local officials. 
My opportunity with NASED is to help show the other state election 
directors that the time to build partnerships is worthwhile. It’s not easy; 
it is an investment, but there is real benefit to true, meaningful collabora-
tions through which state election directors share authority with county 
election officials.
Fig. 14.2 Snapshot of Elections Weekly
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CHAPTER 15
State Considerations in Understanding 
the Costs of Elections
Virginia Vander Roest
Abstract Effective training is critical for election administrators with lim-
ited resources. The State can be valuable in providing these services. Care 
should be taken to ensure the training and associated materials are avail-
able in a variety of formats and materials as the needs of election adminis-
trators vary across local jurisdictions and counties.
Keywords Training • Online resources • Cost
Unbeknownst to me, I started my career as a college student working 
part-time as a voter registration clerk for a medium-sized city in the State 
of Michigan in 1999. I was working on my Bachelor’s Degree in Public 
Administration and quickly found the work was engaging, interesting, and 
incredibly important. My employer valued education and training and 
allowed me to pursue the Election Center and Auburn University’s 
Professional Education Program certification in voter registration and 
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election administration (Certified Elections Registration  Administrator 
or CERA). I steadily worked my way up through the positions of Election 
Specialist and Election Director over 12 years. Those initial 12 years were 
during times of great change in the field of election administration.
The structure of Michigan elections varies greatly from that of most 
states, which typically operate elections through a county office. Elections 
in Michigan are run at the township and city level with the county playing 
a small role as well. Fun fact—prior to 2005, school district administrators 
and villages were also responsible for conducting their own elections. 
There are 1520 cities and townships in the State of Michigan and 83 
counties equating to just over 1600 entities and individuals tasked with 
election administration for their jurisdiction; 28 jurisdictions have more 
than 40,000 registered voters and 1369 have under 10,000 registered vot-
ers with 857 of those under 2000 registered voters. The average jurisdic-
tion size has 4892 registered voters.
As one can imagine this diversity and decentralization leads to a great 
challenge in ensuring elections are conducted properly across the State. 
Becoming a CERA (only the second in the State of Michigan) and work-
ing on various Election Center task forces provided me with powerful 
knowledge and resources that very few had access to. As I participated in 
education programs around the state, that became more and more appar-
ent. This is not to say that other election administrators in the state were 
not professional and overwhelmingly committed to conducting elections 
correctly. Election administrators had the desire to learn more, but the 
resources are simply not there. Out-of-state travel for small jurisdictions is 
not a budget item and for those with larger budgets, funds allocated for 
training and education are often split among all of the other responsibili-
ties of the local clerk.
In 2011, I began working for the State of Michigan Bureau of Elections 
as an Election Specialist concentrating on the training of local election 
administrators (also known as clerks) and, in 2017, I became the Training 
and Communications Manager. The State of Michigan has 3 employees 
who focus on training of 1600 election administrators and staff (~3400 in 
total) as well as assisting them in properly training their 30,000 election 
inspectors (known as poll workers in many places). The Bureau of Elections 
training staff are not just the primary resource for information—in many 
cases we are the only resource.
Michigan election law has required an initial accreditation training for all 
local clerks for many years. The Bureau of Elections has offered a two- day 
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in-person class to comply with the requirement. This was a good start, but 
an imperfect solution. The majority of clerks attended the two-day class in 
order to comply, but that’s where the effect of the legal requirement ended. 
In theory, someone could complete the initial training and never attend 
another training session even 20 years down the road. In 2012, the 
Michigan legislature mandated continuing education for all clerks.
Training and educating clerks who have very different backgrounds, 
office hours, and levels of professionalism is incredibly difficult. The com-
plexity of election law is one factor. It’s certainly important to ensure that 
everyone understands every aspect of election law but, in many cases, the 
nuances of election law are rarely encountered. What is incredibly relevant 
in one jurisdiction may be a total anomaly in another. Many of the election 
administrators in Michigan work part-time and a large number hold other 
jobs, even full-time jobs. Their access to training can be dependent on 
their other employer allowing them the time off.
In 2013, the Michigan Bureau of Elections launched an online training 
system (Election eLearning Center) to comply with the continuing educa-
tion requirements of the legislature and the reporting requirements of our 
auditors. These administrative requirements also led to benefits of being 
able to more regularly reach our audience and provide supplemental train-
ing at the relevant times.
Having an online training system has allowed us to enhance all of our 
training in different ways. The software to create videos and online courses 
is in house; we aren’t reliant on a third-party vendor to generate our con-
tent. The videos are, of course, used in the online training system but they 
are also used to break up lectures during in-person training. These new 
resources have given every election administrator’s office new tools. We’ve 
found that having videos available allows an election administrator flexibil-
ity. They can use them to reinforce the training they’ve previously attended. 
They can use them to train new staff members that perhaps don’t need the 
full initial accreditation program. They may find a need to show adminis-
trators or poll workers a specific part of the process. It’s hard to measure 
the value as we are still finding new ways in which these new materials are 
being utilized around the state.
However, having an online learning system has not replaced our in- 
person training components and there are no plans to do so in the future. 
Beyond the initial accreditation program, the Michigan Bureau of 
Elections provides several other in-person options. These classes were 
offered before the continuing education requirement and some are now 
required components of continuing education every two years.
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The first required in-person class is for county clerks and clerks of juris-
dictions with more than 10,000 registered voters. Those clerks are respon-
sible for training poll workers. Before the even-numbered year begins, we 
conduct this in-person class to give them an overview of what they should 
focus on in their poll worker training programs and we provide them with 
new tools to help make their training more effective. Every two years, we 
add to our catalog of poll worker training videos and in the last few years, 
we have supplied a new hands-on training activity. The hands-on activities 
are designed so the clerk can easily slide it into their training without cre-
ating it themselves.
The local units of government have faced many budget cuts over the 
last ten years. Most offices are operating with fewer staff members than 
they had ten years ago. This equates to fewer people doing much more 
work and often with reduced resources. Offices may want to create videos 
or hands-on activities for their poll workers but the reality is they just 
don’t have the time or technical staff available for such projects.
The second in-person required class is called Election Cycle Preparation. 
In the late winter/early spring of every even year, we have three trainers 
who visit all 83 counties to provide a 2.5-hour training session on prepar-
ing for even-year elections. It is generally a high-level overview of as many 
topics as we can cover, with highlights relaying the messages of change, 
mistake, or improvement. We use our post-election audit process (perfor-
mance based) to signify areas of deficiency and to identify effects of known 
changes that occurred since the last even-number year election cycle.
This 2.5-hour training session may be the only time we see a local clerk 
in person over a two-year period, and it has tremendous value for all 
involved. Not only do the trainers have the opportunity to clarify topics 
that have been communicated to them, but the trainers learn where the 
sticking points are so that future communications and trainings can focus 
on those items that are most confusing. It’s also beneficial for the trainers 
(who are often times the same people that answer phone calls when back 
in the office) to hear the realities of those who are the front lines of our 
process. The resources available from county to county, jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction vary greatly. A trainer may be in an affluent county in the 
morning and then travel to a struggling neighboring county in the after-
noon. Even though the material that is presented is the same, the conver-
sations at these trainings can be vastly different. Our clerks had concerns 
that the online system would replace our in-person components. Instead, 
the reality is that the online resources have allowed us to make those in- 
person sessions much more effective.
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Our election administrators are overwhelmed with priorities. As I’ve 
traveled around the state (and the country) one thing still remains the 
same—those in these positions want to serve and protect democracy. They 
want to do the best job that they are able to do with the resources they 
have. And they do just that with very little of those resources. The ability 
of the state to provide good, effective, and timely training is critical. Even 
in jurisdictions and counties where there are more resources available, the 
state trainers and their resources serve as one less thing that local offices 
need to develop and deliver. Most importantly, the state training initiative 
provides a consistent message across all jurisdictions.
The training approach in Michigan has expanded and new methods 
have been implemented since I first began in elections. Laws have changed 
as well, and become more complicated. Public and media scrutiny of elec-
tions is very high. Training has become more detailed—there is more to 
know—and the same attention to every detail is still required. These pres-
sures can shift the tone in training from one of assistance and problem 
solving toward a focus on policing and compliance. There is intrinsic value 
in having walked in the shoes of those that you train. It has provided me 
with credibility and trust among the election administrators around the 
state; although their experiences may not be identical to mine, we have a 
common understanding of what is supposed to happen. This advances the 
training conversations and moves everyone closer to addressing training 
issues that improve the process.
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CHAPTER 16
Professional Development and Election 
Administration Advocacy
Lindsey Forson
Abstract Students in public administration and public policy programs 
often find it difficult to choose a substantive area in which to pursue a 
career. These are broad fields, and many different options are available. 
This case study summarizes the experience of choosing a substantive 
area for one graduate student who eventually chose election cybersecu-
rity as her main focus. She provides insight into why she chose this 
policy area and why she has been successful in finding career opportuni-
ties within this space. The case study concludes with advice for students 
of public administration and public policy who are trying to select a 
specific area on which to focus their studies as well as trying to set them-
selves up for finding a great job and getting onto a successful career 
trajectory.
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• Professional association
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During the final months of 2016 and early months of 2017, I was trying 
to narrow in on a specific area of focus for my doctoral studies in public 
administration and public policy. I chose to pursue the degree because I 
wanted to be engaged in research geared toward finding practical solu-
tions to current problems in public administration. I was pursuing my 
doctoral degree through the Department of Political Science at Auburn 
University, a department with a nationally renowned election administra-
tion program. Initially, I did not have any intention of studying election 
administration, but as I was soul searching for a substantive area of focus, 
something else was going on. The security and integrity of the 2016 US 
elections were being called into question by the media, by high-ranking 
government officials, and consequentially by the American public. The 
outgoing presidential administration declared election systems part of the 
“critical infrastructure” of the US in response to intelligence reports that 
foreign actors attempted to interfere with our election. Meanwhile, the 
newly elected US president made claims of massive voter fraud. The 
American people were receiving conflicting information from a variety of 
sources, and many were left wondering whether the results of the 2016 
elections could be trusted. I wanted to study a current problem, and I 
knew I may have my answer. I registered for an election administration 
course, and my career trajectory unfolded before me.
Recently, I joined the team at the National Association of Secretaries of 
State (NASS) as the Cybersecurity Program Manager. My main responsi-
bilities include managing the Association’s relationships and information 
sharing related to cybersecurity for the offices of secretaries of state and the 
state government functions they oversee. My perspective is that of some-
one who has newly reentered the workforce after two years of academic 
pursuits. At the time of writing, I have only been with NASS for a few 
months. Over the past two years, I completed my doctoral coursework at 
Auburn University in the public administration and public policy program 
while also engaging in applied research related to cybersecurity and disas-
ter preparedness in US election administration alongside my professors.
This case begins with an overview of my academic experience. Then, I 
discuss my transition to a professional career which directly relates to my 
areas of study. Next, I review how my academic experiences have prepared 
me for my new position and what challenges I still face. I conclude with 
tips for students who find themselves where I was in December of 2016—
needing to select a substantive area of focus but nervous about making a 




Shortly after the 2016 elections, I took my first election administration- 
specific course. As most graduate courses do, this election administration 
course allowed flexibility regarding specific topics of study. From day one, 
I was interested in the election security issues which dominated the head-
lines of the time. It was exciting to dig into election security issues during 
this class and then in larger applied research projects because they were 
unfolding before our eyes. Although election administrators have been 
focused on security issues throughout their careers, attempts by Russian 
actors to interfere in the 2016 elections launched this issue to the fore-
front of election administration as well as US politics and political dis-
course more broadly. For better or worse, election cybersecurity, as a 
policy area, was growing and changing at a rapid pace.
As a student, this created challenges and opportunities. Information 
was changing, almost daily. Media stories, and even some government 
reports, conflicted each other. The area was fairly new to academics of 
public administration and public policy. Though voting technology has 
been a topic of study for scholars of information security for years, election 
cybersecurity had not been studied from the standpoint of public admin-
istration and public policy. As an inexperienced researcher, trying to figure 
out where to begin when a research foundation does not exist is a daunt-
ing task. Even working with professors who are very experienced scholars, 
we struggled to find a starting point as we embarked on research in this 
area. Alternatively, as a graduate student who was preparing for an applied 
professional career, this put me in a unique position. I could stay at the 
cutting edge of this policy area. I did not have decades or even years of 
policy briefs, government reports, and academic articles to review on the 
topic. Rather, I could keep up with information as it was released. Reports 
and other documents were being released at a rapid pace, but I was fully 
engaged and was able to keep up with the information quite well.
I learned that there are so many aspects to the issue of election cyber-
security, all of which the federal government, state governments, local 
governments, non-governmental organizations, and academics were 
attempting to swiftly address and some of which we were better posi-
tioned to tackle than others. Election cybersecurity is a coordination issue. 
It is a communication issue. It is a training and preparation issue. It is a 
human resource issue. It is a budgeting issue. And, of course, it is a techni-
cal cybersecurity issue. As an election administration community, we face 
challenges and opportunities in each of these areas.
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Through a teaching experience I was able to understand election cyber-
security through one of the most important perspectives—intergovern-
mental relations. I had previously taken a graduate course in 
intergovernmental relations and, during my last semester of doctoral 
coursework, served as the teaching assistant for this course. At this point, 
my studies were fully focused on election security issues. I began to look 
at the election cybersecurity issue through its complex and ever-changing 
intergovernmental perspective. In the US’s federal system of government, 
every single policy and administrative area is intergovernmental in nature. 
This is particularly true for election administration which is a system that 
is decentralized across US states and localities and is heavily reliant on 
private-sector vendors. As the cybersecurity issue progressed during 2017, 
the federal government took on an increased role, increasing the intergov-
ernmental complexity of the issue space and creating both tension between 
the federal government and states and localities and an increased need for 
coordination. This perspective prepared me for my current position which 
essentially requires me to manage intergovernmental relations in this 
policy area.
While I studied this issue in an academic environment, I got the oppor-
tunity to attend several conferences and events, both practitioner-focused 
and academic-focused. I attended the Inclusion and Integrity Election 
Symposium hosted in 2017 by Auburn University and the Election Center 
during which I heard presentations on election security from the perspec-
tives of state and local election administrators, association leaders, and 
election technology vendors. I attended another Election Center confer-
ence where I saw election cybersecurity presentations, related to many 
different aspects of the issue from how to communicate with voters to 
what technical safeguards are necessary, from the Center for Internet 
Security, the Department of Homeland Security, and an election technol-
ogy vendor. I presented my own research on the topic at the NASS sum-
mer conference while also attending other presentations. I also presented 
my research and learned about relevant research from other academics at 
the Building Better Elections workshop, a pre-conference workshop to the 
American Political Science Association’s annual conference, and at the 
Southeastern Conference for Public Administration. Through each of 
these opportunities, I not only learned new information about election 
cybersecurity, I also got to learn about the relevant organizations and even 
individuals working in this space. Further, I was able to make personal 




As I have begun my own career in the election cybersecurity arena, I have 
come to fully realize the value of these experiences. Instead of the flurry of 
new information and new faces that one usually faces when beginning a 
new position, I was already familiar with much of the relevant information; 
I had previous knowledge of the roles of almost every individual I have 
met through my new job; and I have the benefit of having a personal con-
nection with many of my new colleagues. Furthermore, it was the connec-
tions of my academic advisors and connections I made through the 
experiences described above that allowed me the opportunity to be con-
sidered for my current position. These experiences also allowed me to find 
a position that is an ideal fit for me.
As with any new job, I have still faced challenges related to transition-
ing into a new position in this space, and I am bound to face more. 
Election cybersecurity remains a rapidly progressing and changing policy 
area. There are many differing and even conflicting opinions about the 
right steps for safeguarding elections. There have been many bridges built 
across various actors and organizations in the past two years, but, at the 
same time, walls have gone up. No matter how well one understands and 
is prepared to work within complicated intergovernmental politics, it will 
always be a learning experience in a new position and a constant challenge 
in your day-to-day work. One must intimately get to know all of the rel-
evant actors and understand their positions and interests. One must earn 
trust and build relationships in their new work environment. This comes 
down to the simple things—be a hard worker; remain eager to learn; and 
always look for ways to build bridges, not walls.
Tips for sTudenTs
Be Open-Minded
It is okay to go into your public or election administration education with 
ideas about what topics you want to study or even one area you are espe-
cially passionate about, but remain open-minded and open to new oppor-
tunities. These fields are dynamic. Something new can rise to the forefront 
any day. I came into my public administration program not thinking I 
wanted to study election administration, but because I was open, I came 
across an area of fundamental importance to this country that needed 
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capable and hardworking young talent. Being open-minded allowed me to 
get involved in an exciting, important, ever-changing policy space, and it 
opened doors for multiple career opportunities.
But, Be Willing to Commit
On the flip side, be willing to commit once you find the area that’s the 
right fit for you. Find your thing, and then be all in. For me, this was ini-
tially difficult. There are so many important problems to tackle! But I 
eventually committed fully to one substantive area, and this is what has 
allowed me to gain so much knowledge in such a short period of time. I 
spend several hours on the average day studying election security issues 
and keeping up with the latest developments. This is also what has allowed 
me to make so many connections. My professors know the “right” people 
to introduce me to because I have committed to an area of focus, and they 
are willing to make those connections because I have become knowledge-
able enough to have intelligent and productive conversations with anyone 
in the space. I am not suggesting you can never change your mind or fol-
low a new opportunity. But if you can find a topic that you are excited 
enough about to plan your career around, at least for the foreseeable 
future, this will lead to connections and opportunities. Just don’t expect 
to find that perfect topic on your first day of classes, or sometimes even 
during your first year.
Choose Something Current
So, you are trying to find a topic about which you are passionate enough 
to commit. Where do you start? Watch the news. Look at the issues domi-
nating the headlines. Look particularly for issues that are “new,” are 
receiving renewed attention, or are being viewed from a new perspective. 
If you find an issue that is currently unfolding or currently transforming, 
you can position yourself at its cutting edge which will undoubtedly lead 
to career opportunities!
Build Strong Relationships with Your Professors
Building strong relationships with your professors begins with being suc-
cessful in their classes. This, of course, means making good grades. But it 
also means turning in work that will stand out and being highly engaged 
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in class discussions. If you are in graduate school, remember that everyone 
is an above average student. You need to find ways to set yourself apart. 
Also, talk to your professors about their areas of interest. It can help you 
find something you may be interested in. Choosing a topic that aligns with 
a professor’s interests can provide you with a natural mentor and someone 
who can help you make the right kinds of connections. Just be sure you 
have done everything you can to earn that professor’s respect before you 
begin asking them to collaborate or to help you.
Take Advantage of Opportunities
Getting a degree, which usually occurs alongside many other work, family, 
and community responsibilities, makes for a busy life. But you must find 
ways to take advantage of opportunities you are given. Traveling to con-
ferences has not always fit perfectly into my schedule, but I always try to 
make time for them. This has paid off in so many ways. Attending confer-
ences has allowed me to become more knowledgeable and has allowed me 
to meet so many people and make important connections. This led to the 
opportunity to be considered for my current position, has made my transi-
tion into the position smoother, and will undoubtedly make me more 
effective in my new role. Once you earn the respect of your professors, 
they will present you with opportunities. If they tell you something is 
important, trust them. It just might lead you to your dream job!
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CHAPTER 17
How an Election Administration Student 
Evolved into an Election Professional
Blake Evans
Abstract Election administration is an opportunity to serve citizens by 
ensuring they are equipped with the tools needed to express their voices 
through voting. The field of election  administration is rapidly evolv-
ing to require specialty skills from a variety of professionals. An educa-
tional background in election administration can contribute greatly to 
the success of  election administration professionals. This case examines 
the details of a county-level election administrator’s education, and dis-
cusses how election- oriented college experiences can influence early career 
professionals.
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The election administration field is quickly professionalizing. More people 
are entering the field who are specialists in data analysis, information tech-
nology (especially cybersecurity), Geographic Information Systems (GIS), 
and personnel management. I am excited to be part of a new wave of 
students who view election administration as not just a job, but a career 
choice where we can make a difference by preserving one of our nation’s 
most vital democratic practices. This case study will first examine how I 
selected the election administration field as my career choice. Second, it 
will detail how I entered the field after college and the evolution of my 
role in the Escambia County Supervisor of Elections office (the first 
county-level office I worked in). Third, I will discuss my college election 
education, and I will highlight three takeaways that have been significant 
to my career. I believe it is important for me to discuss how my profes-
sional role has evolved before reflecting on my academic career because 
you cannot truly identify the educational benefits until you understand my 
role as an administrator in a county-level elections office. Finally, I will 
conclude with a discussion about applying my election administration 
education as a practitioner, and I will also make recommendations to aca-
demics and students who are interested in the field.
How I Found tHe FIeld oF electIon AdmInIstrAtIon
Since working in election administration, I have talked to many profes-
sionals who have indicated they did not start their careers intending to 
work in elections, but instead they stumbled into their profession. That is 
not how I found the field. I deliberately chose election administration as 
my career path in college because I viewed it as a natural progression for 
me based on past experiences, and I also viewed it as a way I could do valu-
able and fulfilling work. Through reflection, I can tell that my route to 
working in elections was rooted in public service and community engage-
ment values. The remainder of this section will discuss how my experi-
ences as a teenager and college student directed my path toward election 
administration.
I grew up in a small town in central Alabama that my family resided in 
for many generations. We had a strong connection to the citizens living 
there, and my parents always encouraged community engagement. As a 
teenager, I took part in many service projects around my hometown and 
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beyond. Those experiences developed my values because I realized that I 
could make a difference in the lives of others through service.
As a freshman at Auburn University in the fall of 2010, I continued to 
search for ways to get involved in my community. One opportunity that 
was particularly influential was the Living Democracy Initiative, which was 
a living-learning experience that allowed me to live for ten weeks in a rural 
west Alabama town to experience how that community functioned. I 
worked closely with the mayor and others in City Hall on multiple proj-
ects, and I attended civic group meetings that gave me an informed per-
spective on how community leaders and citizens approach public problems.
Living Democracy was the first time I had worked in something similar 
to a public service environment. After graduating Auburn in the spring of 
2013 with a BA in Communication and a Minor in Community and Civic 
Engagement, I continued my education by entering Auburn’s Master of 
Public Administration program. It was during that time that I could select 
one of three course tracks for my masters the supplement the general public 
administration curriculum: (1) Election Administration; (2) Economic 
Development; or (3) Nonprofit Organizations and Community Governance.
My experiences as a teenager and as a student had instilled in me values 
of democracy, community engagement, and public service. Only one track 
made sense for me and the person I had become: Election Administration. 
I viewed the field of elections as a way I could work in a public service 
environment to equip citizens with the tools they need to begin solving 
public problems through voting.
enterIng tHe FIeld oF electIon AdmInIstrAtIon 
AFter college
In August 2015, I began my professional career in election administra-
tion by joining the Escambia County Supervisor of Elections Office in 
Pensacola, Florida. I quickly learned the way elections are managed in 
Florida. Each county has one supervisor of elections, and most supervi-
sors are elected. Additionally, Florida is a closed primary state, and 
there are three ways for citizens to vote: (1) In-person on Election Day; 
(2) In-person Early Voting; and (3) No-excuse Vote-by-Mail.
As of early 2019, Escambia County had about 215,000 registered vot-
ers, 73 polling locations, and 79 precincts and the office consisted of about 
12 full-time staff. During election years, we added 15–25 temporary staff 
members to assist with answering phones, warehouse work, troubleshoot-
ing equipment, processing registrations, and responding to voter requests.
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During my first year with the office, my duties included polling location 
management, election worker training, poll watcher management, data anal-
ysis, and voter registration data entry. When I began work in August 2015, 
the office was preparing for the upcoming 2016 election cycle, which con-
sisted of three elections: (1) Presidential Preference Primary in March; (2) 
State and Local Primary in August; (3) Presidential General in November.
My first few months on the job were dedicated mostly to data entry to 
update voter registration records and polling location management. A sig-
nificant responsibility for me was to ensure locations were committed to 
being polling places, and to ensure they were accessible for all voters by 
conducting site surveys. As the 2016 election cycle approached, my duties 
expanded to include election worker training and poll watcher management.
Before the Primary Election in August, our office had discussions with 
members of the University of West Florida’s (UWF) Haas Center about 
partnering to execute a voter satisfaction survey. I helped develop the sur-
vey by researching similar projects conducted by other jurisdictions to 
determine the types of survey questions that would be most beneficial to 
our office. Additionally, I spoke with academics who study elections, 
Dr. Robert Montjoy of Auburn University and the University of New 
Orleans, and Dr. Charles Stewart, III, of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. Through our partnership with UWF, we conducted the proj-
ect during the Primary and General Elections. We released the results 
from the survey in early 2017, and we touted the project as a successful 
partnership between a county government office and a local university. 
Our office used the data from the survey to measure and improve many of 
our processes, such as our election worker training procedures.
Following the 2016 election cycle, my responsibilities increased to 
include supervising daily warehouse operations and managing our office’s 
GIS duties. A significant portion of my time in 2017 was dedicated to 
improving our voter registration system’s streets database. Prior to this, 
I  did not have any GIS experience. However, after receiving training, 
I coordinated an effort by our office to perform maintenance on and make 
improvements to our streets database. Our goal was to help voters by 
ensuring that each one was registered in his or her correct precinct. We 
also wanted to reduce the risk of data entry errors by ensuring that only 
valid residence addresses were in the registration system. The project was 
very challenging but also very rewarding. As a result of the project, our 
office ensured the accuracy of our voter registration database, and we 
reduced the risk of manual data entry errors.
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How my AcAdemIc experIences HAve 
InFluenced my cAreer
There are many dynamics of administering elections that cannot be pre-
pared for in a classroom setting. For example, it is difficult to simulate all 
of the processes that must occur to train over 500 election workers in a 
five-week span for a Presidential Election. However, there are numerous 
characteristics of an election administration education that are important 
and unique. Through reflection, I have identified three takeaways about 
my election administration education: (1) My education created a holistic, 
well-rounded framework through which I viewed the field when I started 
my career; (2) Many aspects of my education have been helpful and pro-
vide knowledge and skills that directly apply in the field; and (3) My edu-
cation equipped me with skills, both tangible and intangible, that have 
helped me adapt to my job duties and gain more skills later.
First, I appreciate that I entered the field of elections with a holistic 
viewpoint of it. Through a class taught by Dr. Montjoy, I learned about 
the history of elections and the ways that they have been administered 
over many decades. I also learned about concepts such as single- and 
multi-member districts, gerrymandering, redistricting, and many others. 
These concepts, while basic, provided me a database of knowledge with 
which to begin my career.
My holistic viewpoint of election administration was further formu-
lated through the internship I had with the Election Center, which is 
the National Association of Election Officials. While interning, I 
worked on projects where I researched Professional Practice Papers 
(papers that document best practices from the field), I attended mul-
tiple conferences as a presenter, and I assisted in administering Certified 
Elections  Registration Administrator (CERA) classes. Researching 
diverse best practices and networking with many professionals at con-
ferences and CERA classes provided me a wealth of practical knowl-
edge, and it also taught me about the decentralization of the elections 
field. What works best for one jurisdiction might not work as well for 
another because of differences in policy, population, people, location, 
and many other reasons.
Second, many aspects of my education provided knowledge and skills 
that directly apply in the field. One of those aspects was the ability to inter-
pret statutes thoroughly and efficiently. Studying election law and court 
cases provided me with practice that taught me how to interpret statute, 
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a skill that is necessary for any practitioner. Almost all aspects of everyday 
duties are framed by statutory guidelines, regulations, and deadlines that 
must be met.
Also, the ability to understand how public budgeting works and the 
process through which funding occurs is important. Taking a class on 
public-sector budgeting provided me with practical skills that have made 
me a better election practitioner. The class reinforced the importance of 
fiscal responsibility and respecting citizens when trying to allocate tax dol-
lars. Practitioners must often determine how to best utilize limited finan-
cial resources to deliver voter services to citizens, and I rely on knowledge 
gained in my budgeting class to help me make those types of determinations.
Third, my education equipped me with skills, both tangible and intan-
gible, that have helped me adapt to my job duties and gain more skills as 
I have encountered different challenges. My college experiences were 
invaluable in many ways because they trained me how to make progress 
when faced with difficult problems. While I might not have been taught 
tangible skills about working with GIS systems, finding a voter in a voter 
registration database, or even processing a registration application, I was 
trained to think critically, analyze data, and evaluate processes.
I have never once written a policy memo since I started working in elec-
tions; however, classes that dealt with public policy analysis and program/
project evaluation were particularly helpful because they taught me how to 
identify and dissect large problems and find solutions to them. They also 
taught me to set measurable goals and measure data points to determine 
progress. These types of skills proved especially beneficial to me during the 
GIS project that I worked on, as well as the voter satisfaction survey that 
our office conducted.
dIscussIon And recommendAtIons
It takes all kinds of people to coordinate an event as large and important 
as an election. The elections field needs practitioners who specialize in 
community education and engagement, teaching and training,  information 
technology/cybersecurity, GIS, and many other areas. For that reason, I 
recommend that academics look far and wide for students who would be 
good candidates for an election administration education.
Additionally, academics should prepare students for lifelong learning. 
College teaches many skills that will prove useful, but students need to be 
prepared to become part of an elections team by adapting and serving 
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where needed. They need to be team players first and foremost. They also 
need to know that election administration is not glamorous. It is always 
about the fine, nitty-gritty details. Further, students should expect a tran-
sition period as they go from always having studied the big, decentralized 
picture of elections to having a role in an elections office.
Finally, students of election administration have a unique skillset that 
should be utilized appropriately. We care about data analysis and process 
evaluation, and we want to find ways to improve practices. We have a 
holistic, well-rounded mentality that gives us a unique perspective as we 
transition from student to practitioner. I am fortunate to have worked 
with  supervisors and other team members who have been  interested in 
using data and who have always looked for ways to be on the leading edge 
of election practices.
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CHAPTER 18
Observations and Lessons from Election 
Administration in Nigeria
Tyler St. Clair and Shaniqua Williams
Abstract The consolidation of democracy in transitioning governments is 
a topic of interest for established nations around the globe. As Auburn 
University graduate students who have focused on election administration 
in the United States, we found that the opportunity to observe elections 
in a comparative perspective created a unique learning experience. In 
February 2019, Nigeria was preparing to host their sixth democratic elec-
tion since the end of military rule in 1999. Although these elections were 
expected to be the next step in launching the country forward as an exem-
plar of democracy, they were instead delayed at the last minute due to 
logistical issues. The response from the electorate was immediate: institu-
tions and the electoral process were questioned and officials were criti-
cized. Our in-country observations illustrate the true costs of postponing 
the presidential election and the impact that the decision to postpone the 
election had on the democratic process in Nigeria.
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As graduate students in the Master of Public Administration (MPA) pro-
gram and doctoral program in Public Administration and Policy in the 
Political Science department at Auburn University, we have become inti-
mately involved in studying election administration. As Auburn is home to 
the largest election administration faculty in the nation, it is only natural 
for students to be encouraged to pursue studies in this area. Up until this 
point in our work, we had focused solely on elections in the context of the 
United States and had not studied elections in the international context.
The offering of a comparative elections course in the spring of 2019 
was an interesting change in the scope of our research. When we were 
offered the opportunity to travel to Abuja, Nigeria, as election observers, 
we saw the opportunity to gain a new comparative perspective to use when 
considering our course assignments and readings. This trip allowed us to 
compare our knowledge of the electoral process in an established democ-
racy with the electoral process in a country that is experiencing democratic 
consolidation. What challenges does this present to us as students, espe-
cially when we consider Nigeria and its history, and the implications of this 
election cycle? Comparing our conventional knowledge with a transition-
ing democracy serves as the basis of our case study.
Unlike in the United States, the voting and registration process in 
Nigeria is centralized. The agency responsible for voter registration and 
voting is the Independent Nigerian Electoral Commission (INEC). INEC 
comprises 13 officials who are appointed by the President.
In order to be accredited as election observers, we partnered with 
Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth and Advancement (YIAGA), a 
Nigerian-based non-governmental organization. YIAGA has chapters 
across Africa and mobilizes citizens in the form of a data-gathering cam-
paign to observe polling place practices. We worked closely under Samson 
Itodo, Executive Director, and Cynthia Mbamalu, Program Manager. 
YIAGA utilizes the Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) methodology to 
observe and gather data from election day observations. This method con-
sists of a detailed text message code that deployed observers use to report 
back to the data center in real time. While we were able to participate in a 
pre-election data simulation exercise and visit several INEC offices in the 
local government areas surrounding the Federal Central Territory in Abuja 
for pre-election observation, we were not able to experience the PVT pro-
cess in practice due to the decision made by the INEC to postpone the 
election by a week. Although we did not observe on Election Day, we were 
able to better understand election administration in Nigeria by attending 
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the YIAGA and Situation Room press conference, the International 
Briefing for Accredited Observers (Domestic and Foreign) for the 2019 
General Election, and by witnessing current president Muhammadu 
Buhari and former vice president Atiku Abubakar sign the National Peace 
Accord in which both candidates agreed to ensure that their followers will 
respect the peaceful transition of power. Over the course of our week in 
Abuja we experienced and observed a number of events designed to pro-
vide observers with critical information for the upcoming elections. 
However, it was not until the final day of our trip that we began to truly 
understand the administrative environment in which the elections in 
Nigeria were being conducted.
To begin, we should start at the end. Once it was announced in the 
early morning hours of Saturday, February 16, Election Day, that the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was postponing the 
election, we had a meeting with Samson Itodo, Executive Director of 
YIAGA, as well as members of his team for a final debriefing. As we went 
around the room discussing what we found most interesting, Samson 
made the comment that “Nigeria [through its election administration 
processes and procedures] is paying the price for the cost of corruption.”
How do we define the administrative cost or burden of corruption? 
First, Nigeria still relies on fingerprinting ballots and manually counting 
them one by one. Second, only one voter is permitted in the polling unit 
at any given time during Election Day. According to INEC, the average 
time for a voter to cast their ballot lies somewhere between two and five 
minutes. Nigeria has over 84 million registered voters.1 If a polling unit 
has 500 registered voters at 2 minutes each, that would take roughly 1000 
minutes, upwards of 16 hours for all voters to participate. In a day where 
voting only occurs between 8 AM and 2 PM, the time allotted is not 
adequate to address the time needed. In this process which is designed to 
promote security, time becomes a significant cost for the average voter, 
whether it be in travel or time spent waiting to cast a ballot.
From our conversations with stakeholders, we learned that Nigerian 
governance has a long history of corruption and intimidation, and 
Nigerians are uniquely sensitive to the impact that unseen forces can have 
on the political direction of their country. Past corruption breeds future 
suspicion and the lack of transparency from the Independent National 
Electoral Commission leading up to the postponement of the February 
1 Independent National Electoral Commission. 2019. https://www.inecnigeria.org.
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16th presidential election led to unsurprising backlash from Nigerian citi-
zens. What was supposed to be seen, and could still be seen, as the next 
major step forward for Nigeria in establishing itself as an exemplar of 
democracy in Africa has, for the moment, sown distrust and anger among 
the electorate.
While INEC operated under the guise of efficiency, they over-estimated 
their capacity to address the logistics of administering the election.
Nigeria has the largest population on the continent, which presents a 
number of challenges—how do officials access remote areas where paved 
roads do not exist? Can they airlift materials, or will they be transported by 
truck? As Nigeria does not have absentee voting, many citizens must travel 
back to their home state to vote—for many in Nigeria, this is no small task 
and requires a significant investment of time and resources to accomplish. 
Nigeria’s population consists of 190 million individuals. There were 72 
presidential candidates alone in the election cycle, the most ever for presi-
dential election in Nigeria. There were thousands of security forces being 
deployed on Election Day—4030 non-security personnel and 8000 spe-
cial protection personnel.2 The total estimated cost of the election itself 
hovers around 198 billion US dollars, which equates to 6.5 US dollars 
per voter.3
With such a large population, the number of places to vote must also be 
large. In Nigeria, there are 119,973 polling units across the country; in 
areas where the population exceeds the maximum number of voters per 
unit (voting units should have no more than 750 registered voters), there 
are multiple voting points, 57,073.4 These are spread between urban and 
rural areas, with varying degrees of difficulty in access. Transportation of 
materials, both sensitive and non-sensitive, can be difficult.5 For example, 
in remote areas that do not have quality infrastructure, airlifting materials 
in for election day is an optimal means of transportation.6
2 Mohammed Adamu. Inspector General of Police. INEC briefing. February 12, 2019.
3 Antonia Okoosi-Simbine. National Commission. INEC budget, INEC briefing. February 
12, 2019.
4 INEC briefing. February 12, 2019.
5 INEC distinguishes between sensitive and non-sensitive election materials. Sensitive 
materials include ballot papers, smart card readers, and results sheets, while non-sensitive 
materials include everything else.
6 According to INEC this was not feasible, and materials were instead loaded on to trucks 
for transportation, delaying delivery and further slowing the process.
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As in many African countries, security concerns remain a constant prob-
lem. In Kano State, ballot papers were intercepted and taken; a state gover-
nor’s convoy was attacked by a faction of Boko Haram.7 INEC offices were 
firebombed and the materials inside destroyed. In Anambra State two con-
tainers of sensitive materials including smart card readers were also destroyed.8
Even after numerous INEC offices were attacked and materials burned, 
smart card readers destroyed, and so on, INEC continued to reinforce the 
message that they were prepared to conduct the election.
When discussing the election, the overarching concern regarding the 
Nigerian election was safety and security. Nigerian officials from the gov-
ernment and political parties both called for peace and calm during the 
process. Foreign dignitaries seemed intent on reinforcing the message that 
Nigerians should take this election as an opportunity to show the world 
that they too were capable of conducting an election unmarred by vio-
lence and intimidation, one that would give each citizen the chance to cast 
their ballot without interference. At a YIAGA press briefing the day before 
election day, US Ambassador Symington stated, “We have for weeks talked 
about free, transparent, and now let’s stress peaceful elections. For that is 
the essential task … The peace and security of the vote tomorrow is the 
job of every Nigerian. Every single one.” This sentiment was echoed by 
fellow ambassadors and leaders of International Non-Governmental 
Organizations ( INGOs) throughout the briefing.
What we failed to see, and what ultimately seemed to be of greatest 
consequence, was not the security of the election but instead the ability to 
actually administer the process to Nigerian voters around the country. 
While security concerns were warranted, they were not believed to be of 
greatest impact in the decision to postpone the election by INEC. Their 
decision to postpone due to logistical concerns related to the delivery of 
sensitive and non-sensitive election materials suggests a different calcula-
tion of cost for the 2019 presidential election.
The true costs lie somewhere between the tangible inputs and lack of 
an outcome satisfactory to the citizenry at large. INGOs and civil society 
organizations poured time, money, and manpower into mobilizing 
7 Ruth Maclean and Eromo Egbejule. “Nigeria postpones election just hours before polls 
due to open.” The Guardian. February 15 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2019/feb/16/nigeria-postpones-election-just-hours-before-polls-due-to-open.
8 Akoh Godday. “INEC confirms destruction of smart card readers.” Naija News. February 
12, 2019. https://www.naijanews.com/2019/02/12/inec-confirms-destruction-of-smart- 
card-readers-as-fire-guts-office/.
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 citizens, promoting transparency, and encouraging every Nigerian to get 
out and vote. The Youth Corp was mobilized to polling units and points 
around the country as part of their civic duty to their nation.9 Materials 
were transported to various INEC offices with the intent of being used. 
The lack of outcome came when, despite the multitude of inputs utilized 
in preparing for Election Day, the Nigerian electorate were unable to exer-
cise their right to the democratic process and cast their ballot for the leader 
of their choosing. The ultimate cost is the loss of confidence Nigerians 
place in their government institutions that exist to protect their ability to 
participate in self-government and construct a future that is uniquely and 
genuinely Nigerian.
One of the themes noticed throughout the week was that, while 
Nigerians were optimistic for a successful election this cycle, they were 
cautiously so. Democracy doesn’t develop overnight, and even the most 
developed of countries has administrative growing pains from time to 
time. Nigeria is a relatively young independent country, and because of 
their youth the progress they have made should be commended. However, 
Nigeria must continue to move forward with each election, inch by inch, 
to assume the leading role in Africa that many believe they can fill. As was 
said by many foreign observers and diplomats, where Nigeria goes, so 
goes the rest of Africa—and while Nigeria may still be paying for its past, 
it is certainly making strides toward a brighter future.10
9 The National Youth Service Corp in Nigeria is a national service program geared to pro-
mote pride of country and service to their fellow Nigerians. http://www.nysc.gov.ng/
aboutscheme.html.
10 The Nigerian election took place on Saturday, February 23, 2019, one week after the 
original scheduled election date.
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CHAPTER 19
The Role of Professional Associations 
in Supporting Election Administration
Tim Mattice
Abstract The creation of professional education programs for election 
administrators requires not only a thorough understanding of the varying 
structures and administrative responsibilities for election administration 
across the United States but also an understanding of approaches for adult 
education. As many election officials come to the field with limited, if any, 
formal education in election administration, providing opportunities not 
only for education but also for networking is essential to creating a more 
professional cohort of administrators. This case focuses on the creation of 
the first professional association and education program for election 
administrators in the United States.
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In choosing a case study topic to contribute, I decided to look at the 
past 20-plus years and explore the timeline, from my perspective, of adult 
education and the role it has played in the professionalization of election 
administrators.
In the 1980s it was not unusual that election administrators remained 
in their jobs for 20- or 30-plus years. Working in elections became their 
career path despite their admission that the elections field was not neces-
sarily their first profession of choice. However, once found in this role, 
elections got in their blood and despite challenges in pay, lack of public 
affirmation, and availability of resources, they endured. Election officials 
at that time were focused on their own jurisdictions maintaining voting 
systems, recruiting poll workers, securing poll sites, and acquiring the 
resources needed to prepare for the next election. Federal and state legisla-
tion on occasion required election officials to institute changes in their 
operations but, for the most part, the administration of elections was busi-
ness per usual according to state rules and regulations and change was 
minimal from election to election.
Some election officials, like county clerks, not only wore voter registra-
tion and election administration hats but were responsible for other duties 
which could include filing vital records, or important documents related 
to a specific county’s population, including birth, death, and marriage 
certificates. The county clerk, depending on the state, may also have to file 
and process residents’ passport applications and property deeds, adminis-
tering department of motor vehicle programs, issue county IDs, give and 
file licenses for local doctors and business owners. Some county clerks also 
confirm and license notary publics and sometimes officiate wedding 
ceremonies.
Public perception dictated to a certain degree that election officials 
worked just two days out of the year, the primary and the general election. 
The election official’s job was to register people to vote, maintain the 
voter registration files, and locate sites in their communities for voters to 
come on Election Day to cast their votes. Election officials were viewed as 
public servants but the election official wasn’t viewed through the same 
professional lens as other health and human service-related professions 
such as a nurse, physician, pharmacist, social worker, teacher, lawyer, or 
engineer. Public perception prevailed that election officials only worked 
two days per year—so how challenging could their jobs really be?
In the late 1980s election officials began to communicate issues between 
states, including election systems, organizational configurations, and 
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operational methodology. The Election Center, also known as the National 
Association of Election Officials, at the time was instrumental in jump- 
starting the National Association of State Election Officials (NASED). At 
the time, a handful of state election directors including Tom Wilkey (New 
York), Tom Harris (Texas), and Chris Thomas (Michigan) among others 
worked to create an association where state election directors would have 
a forum to discuss and share information related to important issues like 
voting technology certification and a formal network to communicate 
election issues between states and provide a vehicle to impart critical oper-
ational impacts to Congress when new legislation was being introduced. 
Ultimately, during the 1980s, NASED developed and maintained the first 
voting system certification program in the United States. NASED’s mem-
bership included the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 5 of the US 
territories, and there was no central office to manage the association’s 
operations. At the organization’s inception, the Council of State 
Governments became the administrative arm for the association until 
2005, when the Election Center was asked by NASED leadership to take 
over the fiscal and administrative responsibilities for the organization. At 
this time, the Executive Director of the Election Center also took on the 
added role of NASED’s first Executive Director. The Election Center con-
tinued in the role of NASED Secretariat for over a decade; it was respon-
sible for coordinating biannual NASED conferences, maintaining the 
membership database and collection of dues, and creating and maintain-
ing NASED’s first website. As Secretariat, the Election Center also created 
NASED’s first electronic registration system for biannual conferences and 
payment of dues including management of all of the finances for the orga-
nization. The Election Center also conducted surveys for NASED. The 
surveys were requested by state directors, developed via an online tool, 
and sent out to state directors and their staffs. Results were then compiled 
and disseminated to the association membership. Creating agendas for 
NASED events, recruiting federal, state, election services partners and 
other professionals with knowledge in election and voter registration 
issues as speakers for NASED conferences, and providing the opportunity 
for state directors and their staffs to fulfill mandatory Continuing Legal 
Education obligations at certain conferences were some of the responsi-
bilities that the Election Center assumed in managing the NASED organi-
zation through the Secretariat.
Prior to 1989, there were no professional associations exclusively for 
election administrators. Many attended the National Association of 
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Secretaries of State (NASS) meetings to learn about developments in elec-
tion administration. The National Association of Secretaries of States has 
been in existence since 1904, the nation’s oldest, nonpartisan professional 
organization for public officials. NASS served as a medium for the 
exchange of information between states and fostered cooperation in the 
development of public policy. The association had key initiatives in the 
areas of elections and voting, state business services, and state heritage/
archives but election administration was just a piece of their purview.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a small group of election officials 
began a conversation about what could and would professionalize the 
election officials’ job, and would recognize the proficiency level needed 
for election officials to carry out the responsibilities which were more than 
providing the means to register eligible voters, maintaining voter rolls, 
securing, storing, testing and setting up and maintaining voting equip-
ment, recruiting and training poll workers, counting the vote and officiat-
ing the results. Other professions had licensing requirements, specific 
academic requirements that defined who they were as professionals, what 
they did, and how they did it. These professions included codes of con-
duct and standards and principles that held the professional accountable in 
order to maintain his/her status in their profession.
So the conversation ensued and the question was asked, why not 
develop academic requirements, standards and principles, and codes of 
conduct for election officials? The academic connection was key in creat-
ing a program that substantiated the role of the election official to county, 
state, and federal leaders as a profession necessitating a complex skill set 
for those who truly were the gatekeepers of democracy. Election officials 
needed to know the history of voting to put their current profession into 
a historical perspective. They needed to know the fundamentals of ethics, 
how to communicate effectively with the public, the media, candidates, 
and with state and federal officials. They needed to know how systems 
worked and how to implement new programs. They needed to have an 
understanding of federal laws and planning and operating budgets, and so 
on. All these ingredients were included in courses that would be recog-
nized within higher education, in a range of topics that melded election 
administration with principles of public administration and concepts to 
create a national certification program for election administrators.
The Election Center or National Association of Election Officials has 
been offering conferences and workshops for election officials since the 
mid-1980s. Partnering with Auburn University, an accredited academic 
 T. MATTICE
153
institution, they began to collaborate and develop a series of classes that 
would set the stage for the first established certification program available 
for election administrators in the country. By the early 1990s, initial 
courses were developed and offered to election officials at Election Center 
venues across the country, with the goal of completing a specified level of 
content included in a set number of courses. Completion of the series of 
classes would culminate in a professional certification through the Election 
Center and continuing education units at Auburn University that could 
later be applied to further an election official’s post-secondary education.
The Election Center and Auburn University’s professional education 
program was the first and remains the only opportunity for election offi-
cials to achieve a level of professional certification within the elections 
profession. In 1995, the first group of election officials graduated as 
Certified Elections Registration Administrators (CERA).
The need for a certification program became even more apparent after 
the presidential election in 2000 and the adoption of the Help America 
Vote Act (HAVA). This legislation changed the role of the election admin-
istrator and set them on a path that necessitated an advanced degree of 
professional education to survive in the increasingly complex field of elec-
tion administration. Seemingly overnight election officials were propelled 
into the public arena amid new expectations, heightened transparency, 
intensified accountability, creation of state voter databases and new vot-
ing systems. All facets of election administration were shifting to meet 
the mandates resulting from HAVA. The need for election official pro-
fessionalization and education was no longer an extracurricular goal but 
a necessity. New requirements placed on election officials demanded a 
higher degree of skill that resulted in many veteran election officials retir-
ing and a wave of new, younger, inexperienced election officials enter-
ing the field. To respond to these changes, Auburn University’s Election 
Administration Initiative created a Graduate Certificate in Election 
Administration. The Graduate Certificate in Election Administration is a 
15-credit-hour program that can be earned within the Auburn University 
Master of Public Administration (MPA) Program or as a separate certifi-
cate. As approved by Auburn, CERA certification qualifies for 3 graduate 
credit hours toward the graduate certificate.
As the Election Center programs expanded and evolved to meet the 
needs of the new era of election administrator, the professional education 
program was expanded to include election vendors. Those companies that 
served election offices with voting systems and variety of election services 
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and products were now presented with an opportunity to learn the depth 
and details of the election administrators’ job to better serve their needs 
and also to attain their professional certification as a Certified Registrations 
Election Vendor.
I have witnessed throughout my 34 years of training adults that the 
added value in face-to-face instructor-led training is invaluable for many 
reasons. Electronic training (E-training) has a place and can be an effective 
way of delivering a message to a lot of people without the cost and time of 
travel. However, when you are captive in a room with a group of your 
peers, you are more focused on the learning and distractions are mini-
mized. For 26 years, since the first professional education classes were 
offered, it’s been stated repeatedly by election officials class after class, year 
after year, that the opportunity to work together with other election offi-
cials from around the country and learn how they do things differently in 
their states is as valuable an aspect of the professional education program 
as the course content. The degree of focus resulting from a distraction- 
free environment (a classroom) creates a robust opportunity for students 
to be physically and mentally present and to be committed to the outcome 
of the experience. This sense of presence and focus is taken one step fur-
ther with the work done in small groups. As one example, a public admin-
istration concept, process, or model is introduced to the classroom of 
students, who then break into small groups with an assignment. Working 
together in the small groups, they then report their findings back to the 
larger group, ultimately enhancing their skill base and sharing ideas and 
best practices which often can be applied in their workplaces. These are 
just a few of the comments made by students as a result of working in the 
face-to-face classroom environment:
“The opportunity to collaborate and learn from election officials from all 
around the country is invaluable.”
“Sharing stories and experiences with these officials has had a tremen-
dous effect on how I run my local elections office.”
“The Professional Education Program has taught me that we are in it 
together no matter the state or county.”
“It’s a great resource to brainstorm with other election officials through-
out the country that normally your paths would not cross.”
Face-to-face instruction also offers instructor adaptability in the deliv-
ery of course content when, for example, the ratio of less experienced 
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election officials is higher than the more experienced officials in a partic-
ular class.
A classroom environment also provides a safety zone for the election 
officials among peers who understand what their colleagues experience 
and this camaraderie encourages the election officials to share within the 
confines of the group and know that what is said in the classroom stays in 
the classroom. Building personal relationships with face-to-face instruc-
tion is paramount in trust and confidence building and has resulted in 
election officials not only participating in the course content leading to 
their certification but also volunteering to be members of task forces, spe-
cial project steering committees, and other committee opportunities 
offered by the Election Center and Auburn University that involve a vari-
ety of jurisdictions from small, medium, and large election operations. 
This results in election officials coming away with their own personal net-
work of experts to call upon after the training is complete. Many of the 
election officials who go through the program form bonds and profes-
sional friendships that last for many years after they attain their initial 
certification.
Over the past three decades, election officials in the United States have 
had to adapt to an escalating cadre of demands and an ever-increasing level 
of knowledge required to get from point A (providing the vehicle for reg-
istering a person to vote) to point B (providing a safe and accessible voting 
environment) to point C (canvassing the votes and declaring the winners). 
Given the intricacies of today’s elections and understanding the number of 
organizations and individuals that election operations impact in some way, 
success hinges on the election administrator having the knowledge, tools, 
and resources to implement their duties. Providing a professional educa-
tion program that adapts and changes to meet the expanding demands of 
the profession has become an institutional necessity, a vehicle to foster and 
ensure that success. That success relies in part on professional education 
continually restructuring and providing opportunities for election admin-
istrators to come together, learn public administration concepts and ide-
ologies, and apply those concepts in real time by sharing and learning with 
and from their peers. As Benjamin Franklin reminds us: Tell me and I forget. 
Teach me and I remember. Involve me and I learn.
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CHAPTER 20
The Road to Election Administration 
Professionalization: Follow the Bottom Line
Doug Chapin
Abstract There is a growing recognition in the field that professional-
ization of election administration is a vital need for the entire election 
community. And yet, despite ever-increasing numbers of educational 
programs and opportunities—not to mention evidence that such pro-
grams lead to better outcomes for voters—states have been slow to 
require professional training for their election officials. One reason 
may be the lack of a connection between professionalization and states’ 
bottom lines: that is, a linkage between an increase in training and 
cost-related election outcomes like reducing errors, more effective 
spending, and increased cost efficiency. Accordingly, the field needs to 
find a way to gather information on election costs and link it to the 
presence or absence of professional election administration training. 
Quite simply, professionalization advocates need to help policymakers 
“follow the money.”
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One of the most encouraging aspects of America’s growing focus on the 
field of election administration has been the recognition that better train-
ing and education for election professionals is a vital component of the 
long-term health of the nation’s democracy.
Indeed, the 2014 report of the Presidential Commission on Election 
Administration included this passage regarding professionalization:
[T]he Commission found general agreement that election administration 
is public administration. That means that in every respect possible, the 
responsible department or agency in every state should have on staff indi-
viduals who are chosen and serve solely on the basis of their experience 
and expertise. The Commission notes that this is often the case in depart-
ments across the country, and it is a model to which all jurisdictions 
should aspire.
Elected officials are well-served having professional support, and it would 
also bolster the voting public’s confidence in the voting process. 
Professionalism in administration assumes particular importance in a field 
characterized by scarcity of resources and increased public demand for a 
high quality of administration with keen political sensitivities.
It is evident to the Commission that the core competencies required of 
today’s election administrator are different from those in the past. The last 
decade’s heightened demand for more professional administration of elec-
tions and modernization of the process demonstrates that there is an increas-
ing need for technology acumen, public relations skills, and data savvy.
Indeed, the Commission would go further and urge the integration of 
election administration in university curriculums of public administration. 
For the most part, election officials now migrate into their positions from 
other areas of government or political party service. Once there, certifica-
tion and training programs run by Secretaries of State, state associations of 
clerks, or national organizations, such as the Election Center and  the 
[International Association of Government Officials], become the forums for 
professional development. It is time that election administration is also 
counted among those fields for which graduate training in a professional 
school can constitute preparation for a career (Presidential Commission on 
Election Administration 2014, 18–19).
Fortunately, those existing training programs are supplemented now by 





the University of Minnesota.2 The national accrediting body for graduate 
education in public service, the National Association of Schools of Public 
Administration and Affairs (NASPAA), has initiated efforts to pool com-
mon resources from these programs to make them available for graduate 
education at other institutional members that focus on public administra-
tion, public affairs, and/or public policy.3 These efforts are reaching an 
ever-increasing number of students and election officials at every level of 
experience and in every community.
To be sure, the growing supply of educational opportunities is a huge 
plus for the field, and as such appears to be associated not only with a 
strong uptick in state training programs but also with overall improve-
ments in both voter participation and the quality of service.4
While this Field of Dreams approach (“build it, and they will come”) is 
necessary, it is insufficient to ensure long-term professionalization of elec-
tion administration. Rather, as I’ll discuss below, the better approach is to 
follow the advice of “Deep Throat” in All the President’s Men: “follow 
the money.”
Many of the challenges facing professionalization—indeed, all of elec-
tion administration—are tied to scarcity of resources. Despite some injec-
tions of federal dollars via the Help America Vote Act5 and the recent 
election cybersecurity funds in the FY2019 federal omnibus,6 states (and 
more often localities) are left on their own to fund voting technology pur-
chases and other aspects of election administration.
Because of this, current professionalization efforts are driven by avail-
ability of resources in specific communities or at different levels of experi-
ence in the field. In other words, current spending and investment in 
professional education and training tends to come from jurisdictions with 
larger budgets—and thus more disposable funds—or more from senior 
administrators who view the courses as a capstone for years of experience 
as opposed to a gateway into, or ladder up, the field.
One key reason for the lack of greater public-sector investment in pro-





5 PL 105–272 (2002).
6 PL 115–141 see also Chapin, http://editions.lib.umn.edu/electionacademy/2018/03/22/
omnibus-budget-to-include-380m-for-election-security/.
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incentive for governments to fund it—or for administrators to enroll. For 
the most part, election administration is unlike other disciplines in the 
public administration field, in which professionals either obtain additional 
credentials for additional pay/status or are required to do so as a condi-
tion of keeping their jobs.7 Louisiana is an outlier in that it offers a finan-
cial incentive for election officials to obtain and maintain professional 
certification through the national certification program developed and 
offered by the Election Center in partnership with Auburn University.
Consequently, states and localities and their election officials end up in 
a “chicken and egg” situation regarding professional training. Governments 
do not want to fund professional training in election administration unless 
they can see benefits in the conduct of elections. In addition, election 
officials do not want to enroll unless they get some kind of benefit for 
participating.
For this reason, the next step toward widespread professionalization of 
the field—which I define as nationwide state and/or local training require-
ments supported by salary and promotion benefits for administrators—is 
to demonstrate the fiscal benefits that accrue in addition to the civic ben-
efits of better training and education of election professionals. In the long 
run, that probably means demonstrating the positive effect of professional 
education on most if not all of the following: (1) money spent (in aggre-
gate and per voter) on election administration—both overall (“cost of 
elections”) and for individual elections (“costs of an election”); (2) more 
efficient and cost-effective technology investments, including optimal bal-
ance of in-house and outsourced work; (3) decreases in “fix-it” costs like 
change orders, temporary labor, and the like; and (4) reduction in post- 
election litigation and other challenges to election outcomes.
By linking these outcomes to increased salaries, promotion, and train-
ing for election administration, policymakers can be assured that educa-
tion and training is adding value to the election process—and is thus worth 
committing taxpayer dollars to support. While initially this link may only 
trigger investments by jurisdictions with the funds to cover the costs, over 
time the growing evidence base—and the decrease in per-student costs as 
enrollments increase—should attract new communities into the fold.
But in order to make this work, the field needs better data on what it 
costs to run elections in this country. Election costs are the “white whale” 
of election administration—incredibly valuable information that would 
7 See, for example, https://coopercenter.org/services/government-training.
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help make sense of so many different aspects of the nation’s election sys-
tem, but elusive because of the decentralized nature of the nation’s elec-
tion system. I often joke that the nation has a uniform election system in 
that everybody does things their own way that is intensified in the costs 
sphere, where state-, local-, and community-level variation in funding and 
accounting for election spending result in wildly divergent systems of 
tracking and reporting.
Fortunately, we are starting to make headway in thinking through—
and even collecting!—cost data from election officials nationwide. A 
recent paper by Mohr, Kropf, Pope, Shepherd, and Esterle (2018) illumi-
nates a new way to categorize and analyze election cost data.
[W]e discuss the measurement and conceptualization of the costs involved 
in elections, and the ways that this cost can be operationalized. By this, we 
mean not just the direct costs of one particular election, but also the costs 
for personnel, voter registration work, other “between election” costs. 
Although cost data can come from various sources — including budgets, 
audited financial statements, and cost accounting — we ultimately focused 
our research and discussion of election costs on the financial data provided 
by [annual financial report] expenditures (Mohr et al. 2018, p. 1).
By identifying distinctions between the cost of individual elections and an 
overall cost of elections, this approach suggests a way to capture the effect 
of greater professionalization on total costs as well as track it from election 
to election.
For this reason, I believe it is incumbent upon election officials nation-
wide—and perhaps more importantly, in their best interest—to cooperate 
with efforts to improve election cost reporting as the best possible way to 
bring greater professionalization to the field. By improving cost reporting, 
we can see what the greatest cost drivers are in elections and make mean-
ingful comparisons between and across jurisdictions. Armed with this 
information, election organizations and universities can collaborate on 
designing and fielding courses aimed at improving performance in these 
high-leverage areas as well as overall. Researchers can assess the influence 
that training has on election costs. State and local governments can use 
these data to create financial and job incentives for election officials to take 
the training. Well-trained professional election officials can further improve 
output and outcome data. Lather, rinse, repeat.
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Obtaining these data can happen in a number of different ways, but the 
two most promising are for election jurisdictions to (a) be more forthcom-
ing with financial data on elections when solicited by researchers, and (b) 
adopt and use a standard “chart of accounts” for election spending. This 
latter approach may grow in popularity as the push to create and imple-
ment common data standards gains traction in the election administra-
tion field.8
In conclusion, then, I believe the way forward for greater professional-
ization of election administration is to continue to maintain the emphasis 
on its civic benefits—higher turnout, greater confidence, and so on—while 
layering on a new focus on fiscal benefits derived from both better cost 
accounting and an increasingly evidence-based focus on the impact of 
training on election outcomes other than election returns.
Just as campaigns have discovered the power of personalizing political 
messages—“here’s how this election affects YOU”—so must the election 
profession (and the academics who love them) make the case to policy-
makers that better education and training are worth paying for because 
they not only improve the experience but benefit the bottom line.
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CHAPTER 21
A Voter-Centered, Voter-First Approach 
to Elections
Amber McReynolds
Abstract Identifying new and innovative approaches to enhance voter expe-
rience and process transparency is an important component of election 
administration. This case presents the professional experience of one election 
administrator and provides recommendations for election administrators, 
elected officials, and voters to ensure that our election systems are secure.
Keywords Data visualization • Communication • Voters • Elected 
officials • Election security
Background—Why denver Is denver Today
When I started at the elections office in Denver over 13 years ago, as an 
energetic and passionate 26-year-old, I was excited for the opportunity to 
serve. I quickly found a culture that devastated me. I asked questions and 
tried to learn and found very little to help me. I found very little 
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 commitment to serving customers, an extraordinary disinterest in contin-
uous improvement, and inefficiency across the board. The motto of the 
day was ‘we have always done things this way and we will continue doing 
things this way.’ I thought that maybe these responses were found only in 
this office, but I found this same sentiment almost everywhere I went in 
the election administration industry.
So, after many frustrating first days, I decided that I would learn as 
much as I could, build systems and processes (that did not exist) for the 
area that I was responsible for, and, some day, if I had a chance, I would 
lead change.
The turmoil in management and executive leadership continued. There 
were leaders in positions that were not qualified or had very little interest 
in serving the public. It was a difficult, trying, and disappointing place to 
work. Then, in 2006, as a result of these leadership issues, complete tech-
nology failure, and lack of planning, there was a bad election that impacted 
thousands of voters across the city. My little area for absentee ballots for 
the most part worked well but we were closed down by the technology 
failures that I and a few of us had tried to bring attention to before 
the election.
After that, Denver voters voted to change the governance structure and 
opted for an elected clerk and recorder instead of the commission that 
existed before. The first clerk and recorder started to meet with all the 
staff. At that time, I actually had a job offer to go to the State Elections 
Office. After all the turmoil at the Denver office, I thought it would be the 
right decision. Then I met with Clerk O’Malley, who to this day is a men-
tor and friend to me. I was nervous for my meeting but optimistic to make 
things better after a painful two years. We had a wonderful meeting and at 
the end, she said, do you want to be a part of the change here? I didn’t 
hesitate at all and said yes. I was promoted to be a manager and started to 
make changes within the areas for which I had responsibility. We had new 
leadership and a sense of urgency. The organization needed to be restruc-
tured and we knew that had to happen first. Further, we desperately 
needed more resources. In the transition, more than half of the previous 
staff left and we started to hire new staff. After a few months, I applied for 
the Deputy Director position, but they hired someone that had come in 
second for the Director job. That was ok for me and I continued to do all 
that I could to improve the office. Things didn’t go well with the Deputy. 
He was never there and frankly just gave me most of his work including 
hiring staff. I’ll never forget the day, he came to my desk as he was leaving 
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for a five-day weekend, and handed me a pile of probably 300 pages of 
resumes and applications that had been in his desk for over a month. He 
said, we need to hire an Administration Manager and I haven’t had time 
to look at these, can you find someone. I started to look through the 
applications and found that they were more than two months old so I 
decided to stay that night and go through them so that I could invite them 
in for interviews. I read them and marked five to send emails to which I 
did promptly that night. One was for an applicant named Lisa.
I emailed Lisa and asked her for an interview. She responded quickly 
and said that she was surprised to receive the email since it had been four 
months since she applied, which for me flagged another inefficiency in the 
city’s process for hiring! We interviewed Lisa (along with other applicants) 
and I hired her.
Today, Lisa is part of the senior management team and serving as 
Administration Deputy Director for the Denver Elections Office. To this 
day, she is a star, a dedicated public servant, and, behind the scenes, a 
vibrant part of the culture of the Denver Elections Office. Since that time, 
we have hired some of the most talented and committed individuals in this 
industry, many of whom I believe will be stars in the election world but 
more broadly in public service.
This story demonstrates the change that needed to happen. We had to 
change and we had to do it quickly, perhaps even too quickly. I never 
wanted to see voters go through a painful process to vote, wait in line, or 
experience deficient customer service. We had to create a culture that 
included values of service, commitment, excellence, and innovation. To 
attract the best, we had to offer a culture of excellence and be a top elec-
tion office. So that’s what we set out to do.
denver elecTIons Today
I had the honor of serving the City and County of Denver, Colorado, as 
the Director of Elections for 7 years and administrator for over 13 years. 
Today, Denver is committed to ensuring that its citizens have an outstand-
ing voting experience. The elections team is extraordinarily committed to 
serving voters and facilitating this fundamental democratic process. During 
my tenure in local government administration, I learned very quickly that 
all elections are essential — from presidential elections to local school board 
elections — and it is important for election officials and local government 
institutions to support voters throughout the process.
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As a dynamic, highly complex, and decentralized ecosystem, the elec-
tion administration field involves commitment by federal, state, and local 
election officials but also technologists, stakeholders, advocacy groups, 
and above all — voters. Let me say that again. Voters are the key and mak-
ing their experience meaningful, accessible, and secure is the ultimate 
goal. We as a community must continue to improve our service delivery to 
voters, respond to their needs, and facilitate a fair and accessible process. I 
believe this process must be free from partisan politics and must be cen-
tered around doing what’s right for all voters, regardless of political 
persuasion.
Thus, to solve critical issues, including ensuring that our election sys-
tems are secure, I would offer the following as a call to action.
To election administrators — Support your voters, connect with them, 
and listen to them. You can do this specifically by collecting and analyzing 
customer service-related data. The winning formula is as follows: stream-
line the voting experience + advocate for voter-centric changes = improve 
internal operations, gain efficiency, and improve service. Election admin-
istration is a local phenomenon and it is local election officials who deliver 
a direct service to voters. Federal and state officials provide support to the 
local election offices with rules and regulations that provide consistent 
practice, training, voter registration systems, and other secondary support.
Action steps for election officials:
 1. Develop and cultivate a culture of commitment, excellence, service, 
creativity, curiosity, innovation, and learning. A great book that 
I believe is essential is ‘What’s Right, not Who’s Right’ by 
Robert Tipton1
 2. Embrace process improvement strategies and techniques. Elections are 
about people and process. Streamlining the process and identifying 
waste will improve service delivery. Denver offers a training program 
to other jurisdictions.2
 3. Tell the story—collect and analyze data to improve service delivery and 
enhance the voting experience. Share and publish your data and your 
successes. Measurement is key to continuous improvement. Show 
what you have accomplished, and why it matters. Figure 21.1 shows 
1 Robert Tipton, What’s Right Not Who’s Right: A Simple Shift to End the World’s Madness 




some examples of the visual displays of data that we have used in the 
Denver office that summarize the impact of process improvement.3
 4. Continue to improve. Conduct post-election debriefs and look for 
opportunities to improve. This step is extremely important to review 
and celebrate success while identifying opportunities for the future.
To elected officials — Listen to your local election administrators, respect 
voters, and give voters a chance. Once your election is over, you represent 
all voters, not just those who cast a vote for you or donated to your cam-
paign. Regardless of your party affiliation, you should advocate for fair, 
accessible, secure, transparent, and efficient election processes. Barriers 
and burdens in the election process such as restrictive voter registration 
deadlines, overly prescriptive residency requirements, and lack of options 
to vote outside of a specific time are not productive for voters and not at 
all efficient in terms of the procurement and funding of voting systems, 
and thus are woefully unfair to taxpayers.
Colorado modernized its voting model in 2013 (HB13-13034) and 
now is a leading state in terms of policy innovation, election  administration, 
3 From Denver Elections 2016 Summary Report Available at www.DenverVotes.org.
4 Colorado House Bill 13-1303 Final Bill: http://www.colorado.gov/clics/clics2013a/
commsumm.nsf/b4a3962433b52fa787256e5f00670a71/8cecafdefa56797987257b57007
cbb54?OpenDocument.
Fig. 21.1 Example of visualized data that summarizes the impact of process 
improvement at Denver Elections
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and civic engagement. At that time, there was opposition by some, but our 
coalition of election officials, many of the county clerks, and advocacy 
groups was able to advocate for and pass the most comprehensive election 
reform package in Colorado’s history. Now, there is documented evi-
dence5 of the positive impact this reform has had to improve the voting 
experience, increase civic engagement, reduce costs, and above all — more 
effectively serve voters.6
To voters — Tell us what you want and set high expectations. You deserve 
a voting process that is efficient, accessible, secure, and reliable—one that 
respects you and your right to vote and to participate.
The Denver Elections Office listens to voters by analyzing the customer 
service data and then builds systems that provide the information proac-
tively; as an example, Ballot TRACE was created as a result of voter 
calls  (Fig. 21.2).7 Ballot TRACE is a first-in-the-nation Ballot Tracking 
Reporting and Communications Engine. It provides visibility and account-
ability for ballots that are mailed out to voters either automatically or by 
request. Ballot TRACE is an effective communication tool that provides 
customer service information to voters. Further, it is important to put 
 voters’ needs at the center of the decision-making process by analyzing 
data and metrics, utilizing creative design thinking, and continuing to 





8 Visit www.DenverVotes.org for data visualizations and historical analysis.




Election administration starts at the local level but is extremely complex 
and requires coordination with state and federal entities, especially with 
regard to security. Ensuring that our elections are fair, accurate, accessible, 
secure, and transparent requires commitment, collaboration, coordina-
tion, and communication across all levels of government. And it should be 
free from partisan politics, with a focus on who votes not who wins, and it 
is my sincere hope that a solution-orientated approach is the ultimate path 
forward. As election officials, we must do what’s right for voters to make 
their experience meaningful. By focusing our election administration pro-
cesses and problem-solving efforts on the voter, from start to finish in all 
our processes, we can develop solutions that accomplish that goal.
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CHAPTER 22
Implementing Wait Time Innovation 
in Election Administration: The Case 
of the EVWait Times App
Tim Tsujii
Abstract This case study looks into the evolution of a web-based tool for 
tracking wait times during an election. Drawing inspiration from the wait 
time tracking system at Walt Disney World, the Forsyth County Board of 
Elections implemented a wait time tracking application, called EVWait 
Times, for early voting in the 2016 general election. Using an ESRI (ArcGIS 
software platform) tool, the free web app provided (1) hours and location of 
early voting sites, (2) the wait times at the early voting sites, (3) information 
on finding the closest voting site, and (4) driving directions to the sites, 
which were all posted on a map display on the Forsyth County Board of 
Elections website. While the wait time tracking tool is primarily intended for 
quickly disseminating wait time information to voters, the secondary benefit 
is to use the information that was collected during this time to analyze the 
early voting traffic and determine which sites received more early voters than 
others. This information will allow our staff to make any improvements for 
future elections to better manage the voter turnout at the early voting sites.
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My professional career in election administration began in 2005 as the 
Early Voting Director for the Guilford County (NC) Board of Elections; 
I was later promoted to Deputy Director of Elections. In 2016, I was 
appointed as the Director of Elections to the Forsyth County Board of 
Elections. Forsyth County (Winston-Salem) is North Carolina’s 4th 
 largest county, with 101 precincts and serving approximately 250,000 
registered voters. I’ve spent 14 years in elections and I’ve loved every min-
ute of it—no two elections are alike. It is a thrill for me to serve the voters 
of my county.
We have a slogan in our office, “Voter Service > Customer Service.” As 
part of that mantra we are always looking for technological improvements 
so that we can provide greater voter service. Automation is an integral part 
that can make the elections process more effective and efficient. The com-
bination of technology and human processes is a melding of two pieces 
that can make the process work better and also helps eliminate human 
error. The early voting wait time tracking application, or EVWait Times, is 
an illustration of how that combination can work in a local election office.
Early Voting Wait timE tracking app
I drew inspiration for the wait time tracking app from a family trip to Walt 
Disney World back in 2014. They have wait time monitors at the entrances 
to every attraction and you can also track the wait times on the Disney 
World app through any mobile device. I recall as we entered the queue for 
the Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs Mine Train ride, a Disney cast 
member handed me a red RF-activated (radio frequency) card to hold on 
to in the queue. When each guest gets through the line to the turnstile, 
they hand this card back to the Disney cast member who then scans the 
card to calculate the wait time for that guest and updates the monitors and 
the Disney World app. The cast members repeat this process throughout 
the day as guests go through the lines of the various attractions at the 
theme park.
As I was standing in line I started thinking about the card and won-
dered how we could apply this concept to election lines and the wait times 
at polling places. Previously, we would have to take a slip of paper, write 
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the start time on it, hand it to the voter in the back of the line, instruct 
them to give the slip of paper to the poll worker at the registration table, 
record the end time, and call it in to the elections office. I wanted to find 
a way to track and disseminate the wait times in a more efficient manner 
that was paperless, digital, automated, calculator-free, and simple, just like 
the model used in Disney World.
When I returned home, I began researching tools that already existed 
and I found a mobile timesheet app that applied the same principles as the 
Disney tool. It was free, and so I downloaded it onto iPads and we created 
red cards similar to what they hand out at Disney World, and piloted it. 
The pilot went well, but we decided there were ways to improve on 
the process.
In Forsyth County, the 2016 general election was projected to have 
high-volume voter turnout for early voting. The Forsyth County Board of 
Elections wanted to be able to provide information to the public in regard 
to early voting sites along with wait times. In collaboration with the county 
information technology department and geographic information office, 
we developed the EVWait Times application using an ESRI (ArcGIS soft-
ware platform) web-based tool to provide the following information: (1) 
hours and location of early voting sites, (2) the wait times at the early vot-
ing sites, (3) the closest voting site, and (4) driving directions to the sites.
One reason the EVWait Times application works so well is because of 
its simplicity. Poll workers hand out a lanyard with an instruction card 
(Fig. 22.1) to the voter at the end of the line. Then the poll workers 
press a Start/Stop button on a tablet device. The voter returns the lan-
yard to a poll worker when they arrive at a registration table and the 
Start/Stop button is pressed to stop the timer. The process is repeated 
continuously throughout the day to update the wait times. This Start/
Stop (Figs.  22.2 and 22.3) website is linked to an SQL server. The 
times captured in the SQL server database are linked directly to the 
EVWait Times via a Web View; so as times are updated the application 
is also updated in real time.
Figure 22.4 is a screenshot from EVWait Times. The map shows the 
locations of the early voting sites along with the wait time. The wait time 
is represented by graduated circles using a gradient color scheme. This 
allows individuals using the application to quickly identify locations with 
shorter wait times (small green circles) versus the longer wait times (larger 
red circles).
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Once an individual finds a site he/she might be interested in they can 
tap on the circle and an information window opens (Fig. 22.5), giving 
them more information about the voting site such as hours of operations, 
address, and the exact wait time.
EVWait also provides individuals a way to get driving directions to the 
voting site they have chosen (Fig. 22.6). The driving directions are step- 
by- step directions with an estimated arrival time, similar to Google Maps.
Fig. 22.1 Lanyard with instructions
Fig. 22.2 Start button
Fig. 22.3 Stop button
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Fig. 22.4 Screenshot of EVWait Times
Fig. 22.5 Screenshot of EVWait Times with information pop-up
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Another feature built into the EVWait Times is the ability to locate voting 
sites near your location (Fig. 22.7). An individual can either input their 
address or use the Locate Me button. Once the individual is located, the 
application drops a pin and displays a radius of 5 miles, returning a list 
of all early polling sites within the 5-mile radius. The users can adjust 
the radius distance manually using the slider bar.
The Early Voting Wait Time Application (EVWait Times) was used 
during the early voting period of October 20, 2016, through November 
5, 2016. Citizens, poll workers, and elected officials used the application 
for information purpose about wait times and polling locations. The appli-
cation had a daily average of 3908 views per day with 62,530 views during 
the entire early voting period (Fig. 22.8), which is approximately 59% of 
the 105,334 total voters that cast their ballot during early voting. 
Figure 22.9 provides a snapshot of the daily average and total views during 
the 2018 general election.
In each iteration of the app we experienced limitations in WiFi connec-
tivity. In 2016, there were several sites where the voting line extended 
beyond the voting enclosure. We were using mobile hotspots at those 
locations and the line manager had to take the iPad outside of the WiFi 
boundaries. We had to devise a plan during early voting to establish the 
Fig. 22.6 Screenshot of EVWait driving directions
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boundaries so that connectivity was constant. Poll workers were using the 
iPads for both line management and voter lookup to expedite any 
 paperwork before the voters arrived at the registration table. Their off-
the-cuff plan was to know where the boundary was and then position 
themselves in that spot so they could connect with the voter at that point. 
Fig. 22.7 Screenshot of EVWait Times locate nearest location feature
Fig. 22.8 AGOL screenshot of EVWait Times number of users during 
10/20/2016-11/05/2016
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With the wait time app, they pushed the button inside the WiFi area and 
then took the card to where the voter was outside the line. We learned a 
great lesson about WiFi capability and improved on that.
The second challenge that we encountered was that some poll workers 
forgot to stop the stopwatch at the end of the day to reset the wait time 
on the website so it would show “less than 5 minutes.” This meant that if 
a voter checked the wait time first thing in the morning, it would reflect 
the last wait time from the night before. The data uploaded into the data-
base would be incorrect, which meant that we had to manually refresh the 
wait times. We also encountered challenges with resetting the wait times 
during the slow periods of each day. Through improved training we were 
able to resolve this for our last election.
The great thing about our tool is that it can be easily replicated. Several 
jurisdictions outside North Carolina have contacted me for the code and 
instructions to set it up for use in their jurisdictions. One jurisdiction in 
Colorado ran a pilot alongside us with our first iteration, and they found 
that it did not serve the wait time purposes for their county. However, it 
did provide information that helped them track poll worker hours in their 
county as they didn’t have a mechanism to track poll worker hours during 
their early voting. Not only can it be easily replicated for free but the only 
cost would be for any WiFi-enabled devices, the cost of printing the cards, 
and the license for the ESRI tool.




Ultimately, our goal was to find a way to quickly disseminate the wait 
time information to voters. The secondary benefit is to use the information 
that was collected during this time to analyze the early voting traffic and 
determine which sites received more early voters than others. This infor-
mation will allow our staff to make any improvements for future elections 
to better manage the voter turnout at the early voting sites. Feedback from 
poll workers, voters, and the media has been very positive. Numerous 
news stories appeared in local and regional print and TV media that high-
lighted the app and its development.
othEr tEchnology DEVElopmEnts
We are currently looking into virtual reality, or augmented reality, poll 
worker training. We are taking the concept of the Pokeman-Go aug-
mented reality application and applying it to poll worker training. We 
believe that hands-on training is the best way to teach adults, but we can-
not always do this. A tool like this will give us a readily available training 
tool that can be accessed on our website. A poll worker can click on the 
tool and see the voting machine and receive instructions about how to set 
it up, how to open and close the polls, how to sign in a voter, and so on. 
They can do this hands-on in a virtual polling place setting. I’ve purchased 
virtual reality glasses and we are testing different ways to use this. We hope 
to get this off the ground for use in the 2020 presidential elections.
There are always constant changes and new advances in technology. We 
are trying to keep up with this to benefit poll workers and voters for our 
county. We are also embracing them. These new apps have reinforced our 
belief in what technology can offer our election office and by extension 
our voters.
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CHAPTER 23
Election Security and Large Counties
Noah Praetz
Abstract State election officials do a tremendous service overseeing and 
regulating elections in America. But when it comes to defending against 
cyber threats the work falls to the local election officials—over 8000 
nationwide—who mostly control, secure, and run elections. They are on 
the front lines of this new battlefield. And they are the entities most in 
need of support and attention from state and federal, public and private 
partners.
Keywords Elections • Security • Cybersecurity • Local election official 
• Support
IntroductIon
From my office window I can see The Picasso, a large iron structure, 
thought to be a woman, by the named sculptor. I would often contem-
plate problems while watching children and skateboarders play on this 
centerpiece of Chicago’s Daley Plaza. This was the case in June of 2016 
when I noticed several emails pop in succession from staff announcing that 
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Illinois’ statewide voter database was inaccessible. No big deal—it’s just 
maintenance—I thought then. Seemingly, it was an inconsequential occur-
rence in our state because in Illinois each local election authority has its 
own voter registration system that shares data “up” to the statewide data-
base. Nearly a month later it was clear that our statewide system had been 
breached by hackers. Two years later it’s been attributed to several Russians 
working for the Internet Research Agency at the direction of the Kremlin.
Little did I know then that I was a witness to history—at the bleeding 
edge of an inflection point in the field of election administration. Over the 
past two years state and local election officials have undergone a tremen-
dous forced maturation process and now the cybersecurity of election sys-
tems is the top issue in our field.
And yet, we have significant gaps. Elections are run locally, by county 
and city bureaucrats dedicated to a free and fair count. They are greatly 
outmatched against a persistent foreign threat—and the full strength of 
state and federal resources has yet to reach them. The challenge then, as 
local election officials, is to quickly understand the fundamental require-
ments of election security in this era and to pull ourselves up by the boot-
straps to meet them.
Elections are the fundamental institution in our country. And, with 
effort and support, elections will remain strong and resilient, as impervi-
ous to external forces as The Picasso outside my window.
Summary
Election officials have been securing our nation’s votes and voter records 
for a very long time. They have been securing digital infrastructure for 
decades. But the changed environment and the expectation of continued 
sophisticated attacks force them to up their game.
Spurred by the need to defend against foreign enemies, federal and 
state officials have been working successfully to find a good balance of 
federal involvement in elections, without trampling on authority that the 
states zealously guard. Good progress is being made.
State election officials, who protect statewide voter lists everywhere and 
more systems in some states, and who are often the spokespersons defend-
ing our institution, deserve great credit. They provided lead blocking for 
their locals in the run-up to 2016. And then they provided leadership 
leading into 2018, first by universally accepting the premise that we are a 
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target and we are vulnerable, and then by increasingly focusing on 
 supporting locals where most of the risks lie. The Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) charged with providing direct sup-
port in this area has also successfully met the continuing demand for infor-
mation and for services. And the vendors, each of whom are deeply 
embedded strategic partners to locals, seem to understand the need to be 
their absolute best.
However, by and large, local election officials are the ones who control, 
secure, and run elections. Locals—108 offices in Illinois and over 8000 
nationwide—are on the front lines of this new battlefield. They control 
almost the entire election infrastructure. And they are the entities most in 
need of support and attention. They need help to fortify themselves 
against the high-probability threat actors they’ve been warned about.
In Cook County, we studied and undertook significant efforts at secur-
ing the infrastructure and helping raise awareness within the ecosystem. 
We concluded that to decrease the likelihood of successful attack on digital 
services, each election official must have access to an election infrastruc-
ture security officer. Most locals don’t have that capacity today.
Local election officials cannot master this problem without direct sup-
port of skilled experts. We suggested this be handled by a brigade of digi-
tal defenders, or what the United States Department of Homeland 
Security’s (DHS) Government Coordinating Council (GCC) called 
“cyber navigators,” supporting local election officials into the future.
These “navigators” should adopt the mantra of Defend, Detect, Recover. 
They need to accomplish these three vital goals. They can help improve 
defenses within election offices, following the specific recommendations of 
the  Center for Internet Security or Defending Digital Democracy—we 
believe they can quickly bring up the floor of the elections security ecosys-
tem. They’ll also establish breach detection techniques. And they’ll develop 
recovery plans for when attackers penetrate the first and second line.
To accomplish this, the “navigators” will secure free support offered by 
public and private organizations, like DHS, state governments, and com-
panies like Google, Microsoft, and Cloudflare. They will also work with 
outside vendors who provide much of the election system infrastructure 
and support to local officials. Not least, they will build a culture of security 
that can adapt to evolving threats through training and constant 
reassessment.
And though election officials appreciate that there was no known suc-
cessful attack against our infrastructure in 2018, the entire community 
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remains committed to the security effort because the absence of a success-
ful attack happens to be more a function of our adversaries not engaging 
than a function of our significant efforts over the last two years.
Voters should feel confident that election officials have resilient sys-
tems, with paper ballots and good audits almost everywhere. But voters 
should also understand that, without continued investment in people and 
products, the possibility of a successful attack increases as does the likeli-
hood that campaigns may cultivate cynicism about the integrity of our 
elections for their own purposes. Democracy is not perfect. As Churchill 
said, “It is the worst form of government except for all the others.” We 
need to protect it. We will regret it if our democracy is damaged because 
we looked away at a critical moment.
ElEctIon SEcurIty PoSt 2016
When election administrators certify results, they are an essential part of 
the process that bestows not just power, but legitimacy. And that legiti-
macy arises because of the essential American belief that our elections 
reflect a trusted and true accounting of each election. We protect the legit-
imacy of elections by protecting two virtues, truth and trust, along two 
fronts, infrastructure and information. By and large, truth can be pro-
tected with policies and tools that can ensure a fair and accurate count. We 
protect trust by continuing to deliver election services as expected by 
our voters.
Since 2000 the Cook County Election Division has tried to lead on 
technology and security—using applied forensics in elections, creating 
widely circulated cybersecurity checklists in advance of the 2016 elections, 
and publishing the first White Paper written by election officials in the 
wake of the 2016 attacks. In 2017 Cook County helped the Center for 
Internet Security (CIS) adapt their digital security expertise to the unique 
context of elections and spent some time talking to the Defending Digital 
Democracy (DDD) program at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs. I was chosen as co-chair of the Government 
Coordinating Council that the Department of Homeland Security created 
to help address election security. In that effort we worked with federal, 
state, and local leaders in elections, technology, intelligence, and law 
enforcement.
There are two truths that need to dominate the narrative:
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• The threats to election infrastructure are real.
• Elections are largely run and secured locally, so security efforts and 
investments need to be concentrated locally; but those efforts need 
to be supported by the federal government and led by the states.
As election officials, we had to accept the conclusion of the intelligence 
community—our elections were attacked. And while enemy efforts using 
social media, news, and influence systems were more successful in 2016 
than those directed at election infrastructure, we expect the attacks will 
evolve. It is important to recognize that attacks in the information sphere 
are important and do affect trust in the institution, and election officials 
have little control in that space. Instead, election administrators must 
defend their section of the line where they have almost complete con-
trol—by securing all elements of our voting infrastructure.
cybErSEcurIty—onE morE Sword to JugglE
Prior to 2000, election administrators served mostly as wedding planners, 
making sure the right list of people came together in the right place with 
the right stuff. After Bush v. Gore, the 2002 Help America Vote Act 
(HAVA) heralded in a new era of voting technology, and we became legal 
compliance and IT managers. We’ve been working to protect an expand-
ing digital technology footprint since then. But the 2016 election showed 
irrefutably that sophisticated attacks are to be expected and that we must 
also be cybersecurity managers.
Foreign governments, foreign non-state actors, and domestic trou-
blemakers have the capacity and desire to corrode the essential public 
belief that our election outcomes are true and reliable. To very different 
degrees, this threat applies to both preliminary results announced on 
election night and official, final results. Beyond corrupting election 
results, the threat also reaches the large variety of systems used to run 
seamless elections.
Therefore, the new security mantra, or security framework, for local 
election officials must be “defend, detect, recover.”
Security isn’t just about defense. Perfect defense is difficult or even 
impossible. Our best resourced companies like Uber, Equifax, HBO, and 
Sony and government entities like the Federal Office of Personnel 
Management and the Illinois State Board of Elections have been breached 
despite significant defensive investments. Instead, the challenge of security 
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is to ensure that no successful attack exceeds our resilience—our ability to 
detect and recover, whether that requires restoring lost data or even 
recounting ballots—to establish election results that are trusted and true.
Because state laws vary, local election officials confront a different secu-
rity matrix in each state, which affects their ability to defend, detect, and/
or recover. States with great audit processes (detection) and paper ballots 
(recovery) are much more resilient by definition; and the burden of defend-
ing their voting system perfectly is consequently much lower. On the other 
hand, states without great audits and without paper ballots place the unen-
viable burden of perfect defense on their local election administrators.
In 2017, Cook County Clerk David Orr and I published a White Paper 
called “2020 Vision: Election Security in the Age of Committed Foreign 
Threats.” We published it to help guide policy makers and election offi-
cials in their actions post 2016. Our key recommendations are included at 
the end of the chapter.
ElEctIonS arE SEcurEd locally
State election officials deserve respect for their responsibilities and efforts. 
They are often the mouthpiece of our institution and responsible for man-
aging the regulatory framework. For the past 16 years, many have also 
managed their state’s voter registration systems. In some states they take a 
far more active role in protecting other parts of the infrastructure. And in 
2016, states rather than local jurisdictions were the named targets. But let 
there be no mistake—local election officials are on the front lines of this 
new battle field. So, by and large, local election offices secure the nation’s 
election infrastructure. Locals install, store, monitor, test, deploy, run, and 
audit the voting machines and software. Locals install, store, monitor, test, 
deploy, run, and audit the electronic pollbooks. It is locals who manage 
warehouses, informational websites, voter databases, polling places, GIS 
systems, results reporting systems, military voting systems, command cen-
ters, and the myriad digital services we rely upon in modern American 
elections. It is a local job to defend these systems, to institute controls that 
would detect breach, and to deploy mitigation strategies that can guaran-
tee election processes and results that are trusted and true. It is their job 
to ensure recovery.
Most are county officers, and are facing down powerful, shadowy 
adversaries, much like Andy of Mayberry sent to repel an invading army. 
They need advice, support, and resources—first, for better technology and 
 N. PRAETZ
191
routine hand-counted audits which can give additional confidence that 
digital results are accurate. Second, and most critically, there is a pressing 
need for top-notch personnel with the skills to navigate the current cyber 
battlefield. Our country’s local election officials need direct human sup-
port as they work to defend the institution against the onslaught of digital 
threats they’ve been warned about.
cook county EffortS
Since the summer of 2016, in Cook County we stepped up our efforts to 
protect ourselves and to protect the broader ecosystem.
We introduced additional hand-counted audits to our state-mandated 
5 percent machine retabulation. And we pushed state legislation to add 
additional audits to election results—in the form of risk limiting audits.
We did a comprehensive mapping of all our systems and conducted a 
point and line analysis of potential vulnerabilities. We documented all 
defensive measures employed and created a list of those we hoped to 
employ going forward. We also documented all methods of detecting 
breach, as well as those we hoped to employ in the future. Finally, we 
developed our recovery plans for any breach at any point on any system. 
And in 2018 and 2019 the office will practice every recovery method.
We procured new election equipment that will be easier to defend and 
will make detection and recovery significantly easier.
We introduced state legislation to help local election officials bring in 
more expertise and cyber monitoring capability.
We worked to create a communication structure in Illinois with federal, 
state, and local cyber experts, technology experts, law enforcement offi-
cials, and election officials.
We teamed with our neighbors at the Chicago Board of Elections to 
hire an election infrastructure and information security officer.
We worked with MS-ISAC (the Multi-State Information Sharing and 
Analysis Center) to get rapid intelligence on vulnerabilities and specific 
threat information to our networks. And we have pushed our colleagues 
around the state to join it and the elections ISAC. Additionally, we have 
gotten threat briefings from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
We worked with DHS to conduct cyber scans of our websites and to 
run a full risk and vulnerability assessment. And let me say that I am glad 
the folks working for Homeland Security are on our team. I firmly believe 
if every election official, state or local, undertook a similar effort, there 
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would be a deafening roar from my colleagues for more resources to pro-
cure modern technology and more talented people to institute mod-
ern controls.
We worked with the folks at DEF CON® on some of their activities 
related to training election officials on the defense of networks. DEF 
CON®, held annually in Las Vegas, Nevada, is one of the world’s largest 
hacker conventions. Primary attendees include computer security profes-
sionals, security researchers, and other hackers with a general interest in 
security. Government employees, corporate professionals, and journalists 
are often in attendance
I co-chaired the newly created Government Coordinating Council set 
up with DHS to help drive federal policy and resource allocation. On the 
GCC, I sit alongside the Chairman of the Election Assistance Commission 
(EAC), the President of the National Association of Secretaries of State 
(NASS), the President of the National Association of State Election 
Directors (NASED), and from the  DHS Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
Infrastructure Protection, National Protection and Programs Directorate 
(NPPD). As one of nine designated representatives of local election offi-
cials, I tried to continually push for the advancement of the concerns of 
local officials.
And in all these efforts we have learned that coordinating efforts is criti-
cal to our individual and ecosystem success.
coordInatEd EffortS
There has been a tremendous amount of attention on the states, and their 
relationship to the federal government and it’s been good to see that rela-
tionship mending and great information starting to be shared between the 
two groups. On the GCC we worked hard to refine a plan for securing our 
sector as well as protocols for sharing information throughout the ecosys-
tem. We worked with the private sector vendor community to ensure we 
had a common approach to protecting the sector.
DHS  now knows how to communicate with the state-level election 
professionals and vice versa. What remains unfulfilled is the assurance that 
the information can get all the way down to the local level and that the 
locals are prepared to digest the information and take necessary action.
It is time to ensure that the successful effort to normalize relations with 
state officials be duplicated with local election officials. Like an iceberg, 
the mass, and indeed most of the risks to the nation’s election infrastruc-
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ture, lies below the surface. And its security lies in the hands of women 
and men who run elections at the local level.
Given our federalist system, the path for successfully fortifying local 
election officials is through state government and state election officials. 
But it’s important that they envision their job as helping ensure locals are 
resourced appropriately and meeting important security metrics. I have no 
doubt that our state officials are up for the challenge and I look forward 
to assisting our industry mature in this direction quickly.
IncrEaSEd StablE InvEStmEnt and Short-tErm 
SPEndIng
Locals look to state and federal funders and regulators to fortify them on 
this battlefield. Given the costs of regular technology refreshes and sup-
port for human resources with cyber capacity, the needed investment is 
very large, perhaps on the order of HAVA 2.0.1 And state and local elec-
tion officials need a signal that they can invest now for security and not 
have to squirrel away recent money for some future episode.
Nevertheless, the 2018 investment was greatly appreciated. Congress 
released $380 million to combat the election cybersecurity threat. And 
that is an important start. It may be necessary to invest that much annu-
ally. Meanwhile, Americans justifiably concerned about the costs need 
confidence that this money will be spent well.
In my mind there are two top priorities. First, a handful of states and 
counties still have paperless voting systems. These must be replaced as soon 
as possible. Second, everywhere, we must improve the security capacities of 
local election offices. Most are run by just a handful of incredibly dedicated 
and hardworking heroes. But a handful of people making critical security 
decisions are outmatched against the threats we’ve been warned about.
In 2018 in a Chicago newspaper former Cook County Clerk David Orr 
and I called for a brigade of digital defenders to be deployed to serve election 
offices around Illinois and the nation, working through the 2020 presidential 
election and beyond. Later that year, the GCC, comprising the leadership of 
America’s election organizations, suggested a similar construct, suggesting 
that states employ “cyber navigators” to help fortify local election officials.
1 HAVA 2.0 refers to the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018 which included $380 
million in grants, made available to states to improve the administration of elections for federal 
office, including to enhance technology and make certain election security improvements. The 
grants are often referred to as HAVA 2.0 or the 2018 HAVA Election Security Fund.
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IllInoIS aPProach
The Illinois approach illustrates the value of collaboration and how time- 
intensive this process will be. In Illinois we formulated a loose security 
group consisting of representatives of DHS, FBI, the Illinois State Police 
and their Cyber Team, Illinois Information Security Office, the leadership 
of the local election official associations, and the State Board of Elections. 
Originally some local officials and the State Board of Elections had desired 
to pass through the HAVA funds to the local election officials based largely 
upon voting age population. But as our group and state legislators digested 
the cybersecurity problem, we recognized that such a distribution would 
not be effective enough in fortifying most of the locals. First, regardless of 
the number of voters served, all 108 election officials had nearly identical 
cyber footprints, in that they had the same number of networked-attached 
digitally exposed systems, websites, voting systems, e-pollbooks, com-
mand centers, voter registration systems, and so on. Second, the larger 
offices already had some capacity to tackle this problem—whereas the 
smaller offices were squeezed so tightly they could barely comply with the 
current requirements, let alone secure the entire elections threat 
surface area.
After the GCC issued guidance suggesting “cyber navigators,” the state 
legislature mandated that at least one-half of the 2018 HAVA funds just 
released be expended on a “cyber navigator” program to be administered 
by the State Board of Elections. The State Board is getting help fulfilling 
this mandate from other organizations with cyber expertise. By and large, 
local election officials supported the bill. And our State Board is eminently 
capable of fulfilling the mandate.
These “navigators” need to accomplish three vital goals. First, they 
should work to institute the election security framework—defend, detect, 
recover. They can help improve defenses within election offices, following 
the specific recommendations of CIS. They’ll quickly bring up the floor of 
the election security ecosystem. Appropriately supported, we can see mas-
sive improvement very quickly. There is low-hanging fruit, but even low- 
hanging fruit needs to be plucked. They’ll also work to support locals’ 
efforts at instituting detection techniques and recovery plans. Second, the 
“navigators” will do the work necessary to secure the free support being 
offered by public and private organizations, like DHS, state resources, 
Microsoft, Google, and Cloudflare, or the Elections Infrastructure 
Information Sharing & Analysis Center (EI-ISAC); they will also work 
with the outside vendors who provide much of the election infrastructure 
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and support to local officials. More importantly, they will help build a 
culture of security that adapts to the evolving threats we face through 
training and constant assessment efforts. Illinois’ 108 local election offices 
will mature quickly with this reinforcement. As specific mitigations and 
upgrades are identified by navigators, the State Board should be posi-
tioned to quickly provide that investment.
The State Board of Elections will take some portion of the remainder 
of the HAVA funds to support their own infrastructure, naturally, since 
they manage and maintain the statewide voter database. Some portion of 
the remainder is and will be distributed to the local election officials to 
invest as they see fit, subject to the guidelines. The state legislature sought 
to compel participation in the navigator program by making receipt of 
future grants contingent upon local official participation.
In Illinois, we recognized that this is inherently a local problem. But we 
also recognize that locals cannot solve this problem themselves. This coor-
dinated, managed approach assures appropriate assessment and remedia-
tion efforts can be efficiently implemented. Officials are utilizing existing 
expertise from other areas of federal, state, and local government as force 
multipliers.
This massive reinforcement effort can be accomplished nationwide. 
And it can be done now. It will require the states to cut through the red 
tape that can delay action. This may mean relying on existing contracts, or 
even emergency procurements. But states should do whatever they need 
to do to get the army of “navigators” on the ground as quickly as possible. 
After all, the danger is not hypothetical. Election officials are bracing 
against the renewed attacks they’ve been told to expect.
SuPPortIng a rESIlIEnt PublIc
One job of an election administrator is to conduct elections properly so 
that losing candidates accept the fact that they lost fairly. Anything that 
hinders their ability to do that decreases confidence in the system, and 
undermines their ability to bestow legitimacy—not just victory.
Election officials deploy a variety of networked connected digital ser-
vices, such as voter registration systems, and unofficial election results dis-
plays. Each of these is a ripe target for our adversaries. A successful attack 
against those services may not change a single vote, but could still damage 
public confidence. This is particularly true in a time of great public 
 suspicion, exacerbated by a disappointing proliferation of gracelessness 
and grandstanding.
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Our public confidence is already weaker than it should be. Vacillating 
voting rights rules, no matter how marginal the effect, are disconcerting 
to many people, naturally suspect given our history. Additionally, some 
media, activist groups, and politicians have acted in ways that ultimately 
prey on Americans’ insecurities about their most cherished institution, 
either through wildly outlandish claims of fraud or through claims of sup-
pression that are sometimes exaggerated. Such actions do hinder election 
officials’ ability to bestow not just victory, but legitimacy. We must be very 
careful to calculate not just the relative effects on power that election rule 
changes can have, but also the relative effects on legitimacy. Or put another 
way—will losers be more or less likely to accept that they lost fairly.
Some losing candidates are already apt to call their defeats into doubt. 
A new digital breach—no matter how far removed from the vote counting 
system—could turn sore losers to cynicism, disbelief, even revolt. That’s 
the reaction the enemies of the United States want.
In fact, in the face of direct targeting of a state or local election office it 
is very possible that there will be some service disruptions—most likely to 
the network connected digital services like election results websites.
The bottom line is we can’t eliminate every chance of breach, but we 
can make sure that successful attacks are rare. And we can provide assur-
ances that we are prepared to recover quickly when they happen. We can 
do this with support at the local level.
As Americans, we get to choose how we want to respond to potential 
disruptions. The damage of a foreign attack on our elections infrastructure 
will be greatly diminished if the targeted institution is also being sup-
ported internally with respect.




Increase the defensive capacity of local and state election officials by:
 1. Supporting a digital network for all local election officials that will 
facilitate rapid sharing of threats and incidents, as well as supporting 
increased training and resiliency;
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 2. Financing an Election Infrastructure and Information Security 
Officer (EIISO) (or consultant) servicing every local and state elec-
tion official in the country;
 3. Ensuring that threat and incident information known to Government 
is shared appropriately throughout the election ecosystem.
 Detect
Increase the catastrophic breach detection capacity by incentivizing:
 1. The use of modern public audits of all elections;
 2. The use of modern voting technology that captures a digital image of 
each ballot that can be tied to the original ballot and the cast bal-
lot record;
 3. The use of monitoring sensors on the networks of all willing election 
officials.
 Recover
Eliminate even the most remote possibility of an undetectable catastrophic 
breach by replacing all paperless voting systems that currently serve nearly 
20 percent of the country.
Release election officials from their burden of being perfect every 
single time!
Potential Approach for Election Officials and Their Election 
Infrastructure and Information Security Officer:
 Defend
• Get experts into the office. Engage outside cybersecurity resources 
and professionals. No election offices can handle this problem on 
their own. Inside most elections offices, there simply is not the com-
plete capacity to accept the threat, assess the vulnerability, digest rec-
ommendations, manage mitigations, and perfect recovery.
 – Utilize as many free local, state, and federal (DHS, CIS, and MS- 
ISAC) tools as possible,
If government resources are unavailable, or underwhelming, hire 
private firms or partner with academic institutions.
 – Collaborate with the local, state, and federal government because 
we are not alone in facing this type of threat include the fusion 
centers.
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 – Bring in outside resources to partner with information technology 
and information security teams, with a focus solely on election 
security.
The reality is that most election officials share their internal infor-
mation technology and security resources with every other 
county office engaged in critical activities, such as health and 
public safety. It can be nearly impossible to get the attention 
necessary for election security unless it is the primary focus of 
those resources.
• Understand and limit the threat surface area; or all possible points of 
vulnerability for malicious attack.
 – Inventory all election related systems  including the: voting 
machine and vote counting system; e-pollbook system; voter reg-
istration/election management system; mail ballot delivery and 
processing system; and online systems such as voter registration, 
mail ballot request tools, voter information lookup;
 – Map how systems work and data flows, and mark every single 
point of vulnerability;
 – Limit the threat surface area by making policy decisions that 
reduce points of vulnerability wherever possible (this is about 
managing risk, not eliminating it).
• Employ defense tactics and policies for each system—online or not:
 – Implement the Center for Internet Security’s top 20 cyber con-
trols. Do the top five first. These include:
 1 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices
 2 Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software
 3 Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software
 4 Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
 5 Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
 6 Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Audit Logs
 7 Email and Web Browser Protections
 8 Malware Defenses
 9 Limitation and Control of Network Ports
 10 Data Recovery Capability
 11 Secure Configurations for Network Devices
 12 Boundary Defense
 13 Data Protection
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 14 Controlled Access Based on the Need to Know
 15 Wireless Access Control
 16 Account Monitoring and Control
 17 Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps
 18 Application Software Security
 19 Incident Response and Management
 20 Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises
• Employ election system-specific defense and detection tactics across 
specific systems:
• These can include all the hardening options that systems may have, 
such as locks, seals, chain of custody, advanced authentication, 
and so on.
 Detect
• Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized DevicesFor each vulner-
ability point identified in the mapping process, consider a method of 
detecting whether something anomalous has happened; or brain-
storm the first place such an intrusion might be detectable.
• Validate everything; every available log should be checked including 
seals, time sheets, cameras, swipe cards, login data, registration statis-
tics, and so on.
 – Behavioral analysis tools and procedures can and will point out 
what is going on. For example, voter registration follows a natural 
pattern year over year. Identifying the pattern and watching for 
anomalous behavior works.
• Use forensics when possible.
 – A forensics analysis of the software system employed can offer a 
high level of confidence that it is operating as certified. This is 
particularly true in the voting system environment. Comparing 
snapshots of deployed software with a clean reference copy during 
a live election is a powerful verification technique.
• Conduct public audits of the election results that allow for a visual 
comparison of the cast ballot record with the ballot itself.
 – Be transparent and brace for public scrutiny.
 – Crowdsourcing the election brings the greatest confidence, but 
also the greatest public scrutiny. “Sausage making” will be on full 
display. Consider publishing ballot images scrubbed of identifying 
marks. In the short run this can create volatility, and people may 
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scrutinize the office and the software used, but ultimately the con-
fidence levels will be increased.
 – Work to investigate audit styles that bring the highest level of con-
fidence to the most stakeholders. Consider the use of sophisti-
cated yet efficient testing algorithms, such as risk limiting audits.
 Recover
• For each vulnerability point, assume a successful breach and determine 
how to recover.
• Where possible, make policy decisions and investments that yield the 
clearest path to recovery.
 – For example, on electronic voting machines: after removing paper-
less systems consider that ballot marking devices are better than 
machines with paper audit trails. Digital scanning devices that cre-
ate images of ballots are better than scanning devices that don’t.
• Build in redundancy that doesn’t rely on technology.
 – For example, paper pollbooks back up electronic pollbooks. 
Emergency paper ballots back up corrupted (or just malfunction-
ing) touch-screen or ballot marking devices.
• Practice recovery with professional staff, advisors, and vendors by 
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CHAPTER 24
Technology Procurement in Election Systems
David A. Bennett
Abstract Election administrators have a variety of responsibilities that 
extend beyond the management of election day. They are also responsible 
for the procurement of the voting systems that will be used by the public. 
There are a variety of approaches that can be utilized to make this process 
more efficient. Focusing on Florida, the author discusses the process that 
was utilized to innovate technology procurement and provides recom-
mendations for the profession to close the information gap that exists 
between procurement experts, election officials, and vendors.
Keywords Technology • Procurement • Vendors • Coordination 
• Collaboration
I am the financial officer and corporate treasurer for VR Systems, Inc., an 
employee-owned company in the election business that sells electronic 
pollbooks and voter registration software. This software generates and 
holds voter registration data for use by local and state election officials 
during the voting process. In my role as financial officer and treasurer, I 
am responsible for financial forecasting, accounting, human resources, and 
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other related functions. I am also involved in negotiating contracts for the 
acquisition and use of VR Systems technology and services, and other 
related relationships with local governments and other vendors in the elec-
tion policy space.
My experience with technology procurement comes from more than 
17 years of service in Florida state government with an emphasis on gov-
ernment procurement and contracting. There, I was responsible for over-
seeing large-scale projects involving the acquisition and deployment of 
information technology, hardware, and software across multiple govern-
ment agencies. The end users were government agencies and, through 
those agencies, the general public.
IllustratIon of technology Procurement
As one example, I worked for approximately three years on an intergov-
ernmental contract for a statewide services portal for the State of Florida, 
now known as MyFlorida. This encompassed creating and implementing 
one of the first (if not the first) electronic government procurement sys-
tems in the nation. The purpose of MyFlorida was to create a seamless 
electronic experience for the general public when accessing Florida gov-
ernment agencies for state and local transactions, and to create a central-
ized electronic state purchasing process through the portal called 
MyFloridaMarketplace. An easy example of the part of this portal that 
faces the general public is the tag line “MyFlorida.Gov” that you see today 
on Florida license plates.
The MyFloridaMarketplace experience illustrates several points that can 
help election administrators in their purchasing process, particularly 
related to technology. The scale of this project was quite large and the 
concept was innovative at the time. Those of us involved were working on 
what we called the “bleeding edge.” The procurement and installation of 
the technology necessary to bring about MyFloridaMarketplace required 
cross-functional teams that included representatives from every agency 
and in a range of specialties. For this process we pulled together experts in 
accounting, procurement, IT, and other subject matter experts (SMEs).
All the particulars were negotiated around the state’s standard account-
ing system, called Florida Accounting  Information Resource (FLAIR). 
The MyFloridaMarketplace steering committee involved political repre-
sentatives from both houses of the Florida legislature and the governor’s 
budget office, among others.
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When implementation began, what we learned was that every state 
agency operated their own “homegrown” accounting system, and built 
their accounting system around their processes and missions. In practical 
terms, what this meant was that although FLAIR seemed to be a uniform 
state accounting system, it was supported by data coming in from a host 
of state agency systems, each of which operated differently. In even more 
practical terms, change orders started coming in almost immediately after 
the state contract was signed, and increased the cost of the project by 
approximately 40% over three years. From this, we learned the importance 
of involving cross-functional teams more extensively and earlier in the pro-
cess so that when the final contract was executed, it reflected the realities 
on the ground.
A procurement process like MyFloridaMarketplace (MFMP or 
MyFlorida) follows a general set of principles. The process is controlled by 
state procurement or purchasing rules and regulations. These rules are 
different in every state but the approach is fundamentally similar every-
where. The rules are intended to provide a process for public officials to 
buy the goods and services that they need in order to do the things that 
public officials are asked to do; the process is intended to be fair and pro-
vide the best value in a way that is transparent to the general public. Fair 
means that the government does not show favoritism to any particular 
provider. Typically, government contracts are put out for bid in a public 
process that allows anyone to participate and demonstrate that their prod-
uct or service meets government needs. Best value is a selection criterion 
that looks at price (or cost) but also looks at other characteristics of the 
companies that could be awarded the contract. Among those could be 
such things as past successful performance of the same sort of work for a 
different government entity (either in the same jurisdiction or another), 
past successful performance of different work for the government agency 
going out to bid on the current project, and the ability (and willingness) 
to service the contract. Each state has specific rules and regulations about 
the criteria for the contract award. Best value is used in some places instead 
of, or in addition to, lowest price. Finally, transparency means that the 
process is public. Requests for information and all the subsequent steps are 
advertised to the general public and award decisions are made in an open 
public forum.
The procurement process also proceeds generally in stages. As the first 
stage, a government office issues a request for information (RFI) about 
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how to address a particular problem or how to implement a particular 
aspect of its work. The RFI is used to collect information from potential 
vendors about what is possible in the field. In this stage, a SME can play a 
key role in providing information about different options and solutions 
and in interpreting the information that vendors provide. Some jurisdic-
tions and agencies put this preliminary information out into the field as a 
request for letters of interest or intent (LOI). The LOI are statements 
from interested vendors that present their particular methods for investi-
gating an issue and developing a solution. The information gathered 
through the RFI and/or LOI is used to determine the scope of the proj-
ect, the work that is expected, and the deadlines. The scope and specifica-
tions of the project refer to the jurisdiction and parameters of the work. 
Specifications define how the work is to be done, including designation of 
required and optional components and processes. The work that is 
expected includes delivery and installation of purchased items and services 
and other activities including training, support when problems occur, and 
planning documents such as timelines of plans to design, implement, and 
test the items that are being acquired. Deadlines include not only final 
deadlines for delivery, installation, or implementation but also interim 
deadlines including deadlines for testing critical features and critical stages 
of a process.
When the scope, general parameters, and deadlines have been deter-
mined, the information is presented to the public in the form of a request 
for proposals (RFP). The RFP is advertised to the general public, or may 
be presented only to a limited group of vendors who have been deter-
mined to be qualified to provide the goods or services. Sometimes these 
qualifications are determined through a request for qualifications (RFQ). 
Through these processes, potential vendors demonstrate their qualifica-
tions to meet the requirements of the proposal. An invitation to negotiate 
(ITN) or an invitation to bid may be extended to all interested firms, or to 
only a select group of vendors determined to be qualified.
Vendors are then recommended, perhaps in some sort of order by low-
est price or best value, and perhaps an additional demonstration of perfor-
mance ability is required. Selection is typically through a funding authority 
such as county commissioners or the state controlling board. Contracts 
are drawn up and implementation begins. Through my work on MyFlorida 
and other similar projects I gained experience with all of these aspects, and 
can share a few observations that can be useful for election officials.
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lessons about Procurement for electIon offIcIals
Election officials are involved with contracts for all sorts of hardware and 
software for voting systems and related products and services. And elec-
tion officials know the end results that they want to achieve, the commu-
nications that they need in real time and otherwise between local and state 
offices, and the time frames that matter to their voters and their other 
stakeholders.
That said, gaps remain between what election officials need and what 
the procurement process generally provides. The technology of elec-
tions has changed significantly since the first wave of electronic voting 
systems were designed and implemented across the country after the 
Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002, and election officials today 
may not feel prepared to buy new equipment, software, or related sup-
port services. Election officials are also familiar with the cost of changing 
technology, particularly software; as with all technology, the software 
that is used—whether for voter registration, casting ballots, or tabulation 
and reporting—has been frequently updated.
Election technology procurement also requires an orientation to a cli-
mate of constant change. Change over time is (and has been) inevitable in 
election technology. Hardware and software specifications change as new 
products are developed. As contracts are implemented, unexpected events 
occur and new needs are identified that may require additions (or change 
orders) to a contract. Election offices may also need to acquire technology 
in phases, due to limited funding overall, or due to limitations imposed by 
their local funding authorities. Over time, election officials and policy 
makers also adopt new methods of conducting elections that may also be 
linked to new technologies—or may be linked to technologies that are not 
linked to the policy change. All of these factors can result in a change in 
scope for an existing project or the need for a new project.
What this means is that more often than not, the process that I described 
will encompass change orders that increase the overall cost of the project. 
For example, a state may contract for a voter registration system that allows 
the registrar of voters to classify voter registrants as ineligible for a variety 
of reasons. But changes in state law may require that voter registrants be 
reclassified in a way that is not in the initial software. Or an ePollbook 
system may be designed, purchased, and implemented just before a state 
passes a law requiring voter identification, necessitating the addition of 
both software and hardware to allow for swiping  government- issued IDs 
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at sign-in. To further complicate matters, a state legislature could mandate 
a new method of voting or registration, such as early voting or same-day 
registration, and also not adopt a requirement that local jurisdictions use 
related technology (such as signature recognition). What this means is that 
the problems and solutions are not aligned, and the opportunities to pro-
cure solutions are also not aligned—and what seems to be the most com-
plete or comprehensive solution may not actually be authorized by state 
law. And as with all government processes, the time needed for acquisition 
expands dramatically where approvals are needed from multiple boards or 
commissions, and from state offices.
Some changes are inevitable, of course, and are part of all government 
contracting. Regardless of the reason, changes are also expensive. The cost 
of change orders is more than simply the monetary increase in the overall 
amount of a contract. Change orders involve the time of vendor staff and 
this cost is passed along with the changes. Change orders also require 
public time and attention through implementation and administration.
MyFloridaMarketplace illustrates an extensive effort and coordination 
that will be true for other state-level procurements. The challenge for gov-
ernment officials is to design front-end acquisition requests and later 
decision- making processes that are fully informed to minimize these 
change orders. Change orders necessitated by changes in law are necessary 
evils, but change orders driven by lack of expertise on the part of govern-
ment officials are another problem altogether. There is an information gap 
between procurement experts, election officials, and vendors about the 
content and operation of various election systems and their components.
This gap occurs for multiple reasons, and these reasons may overlap. It 
could be the case that incorrect or insufficient assumptions were made at 
the outset about what was needed or what could be provided, or both. 
Incorrect or insufficient information in an RFI or RFQ is then reinforced 
in the RFP; this gap is magnified with each subsequent step of the procure-
ment process. Any gaps on the front end are also magnified after a contract 
has been signed, during the implementation phase. This information gap 
generates change orders, cost increases, and inefficiencies that should be 
avoided—and can result in a product or service that is not fully useful.
Subject Matter Experts
One way to address this issue is to rely more extensively on SMEs in the 
procurement process. This can be done by hiring staff or by hiring tempo-
rary SME assistance to help write proposals and responses throughout the 
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procurement process. SMEs can also be called on to draft implementation 
plans for technology acquisitions. In short, SMEs are valuable all through-
out the process including RFP solicitation and contract negotiation.
This can be done for the whole of a project or only for the most techni-
cal aspects. This may be too expensive for smaller local offices, but this 
could be a support that state offices provide. In thinking about the SME, 
it is important for election officials to consider how to develop an interac-
tive and enduring relationship between the public office and the SMEs, 
and with the selected vendor(s).
Another effective method of gathering SME expertise is to contact 
national and state professional associations. In MyFlorida, we reached out 
to national associations such as the National Institute of Government 
Purchasing (NIGP) and the Florida Association of Public Procurement 
Officers (FAPPO), which is our state professional association for the field. 
What that helped us understand was how unique our project was; in other 
projects, these organizations had been a tremendous source of informa-
tion. Here, however, we learned that other states had no best practice, no 
road map, and no lessons learned, and that was important in and of itself. 
These organizations offer training, information exchange, and certifica-
tion such as Certified Public Procurement Officer (CPPO) and Certified 
Professional Public Buyer (CPPB). Even if hiring dedicated purchasing 
staff is not possible, these trainings and certifications and similar programs 
could be a cost-effective method of enhancing existing office capacity.
Election Administrators with Special Expertise
Another approach is to hire election administrators with more IT expertise 
or procurement expertise. IT in government is not as lucrative as in the 
private sector, and so this option may be more viable within state offices. By 
comparison, procurement expertise may be more affordable. Procurement 
expertise may also be valuable in developing both a realistic estimate of cost 
and a timeline for understanding the procurement process, which can 
involve many steps and feedback loops. A procurement specialist can assist 
in constructing contract provisions that will maintain strong relationships 
between the public office and its technology vendors.
Interactive Vendor Relationships
Vendor relationships are essential. Election officials at all levels should seek 
contract provisions that reinforce enduring relationships with technology 
24 TECHNOLOGY PROCUREMENT IN ELECTION SYSTEMS 
210
vendors. The changing environment shows us that the information gap 
will only increase over time; vendors will always know about their technol-
ogy and election officials will always know about the problems that they 
want to address. What the technology procurement system needs are ways 
to develop enduring relationships that share information while needs are 
identified, while vendors are selected, and after the contract has been signed.
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CHAPTER 25
Using GIS to Improve Accuracy 
and Efficiency in Election Administration
Kim Brace
Abstract In addition to managing voter registration and voting, election 
administrators in many local jurisdictions are responsible for dividing vot-
ers into precincts. This process requires election administrators to often 
use data from the Census and sophisticated Geographic Information 
Systems software for mapping. The process of redistricting presents a vari-
ety of challenges ranging from the technical use of the software to consid-
ering the different political boundaries that voters must be incorporated 
into. Discussed are the challenges of redistricting and a potential strategy 
to address the challenges and limitations.
Keywords Redistricting • Precincting • Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) • Street files • Boundaries
My work in the election administration field began decades back, when I 
was the late Dick Smolka’s student at American University, and he helped 
me focus on county and local election officials and why they do what they 
do. Dick is perhaps best known by younger election officials for his 
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founding and operation of Election Administration Reports, the first and 
still key newsletter for the field. I was his associate editor for a time. Then, 
and later through my work as a journalist, I started to understand the dif-
ferences between localities in election practices, where people are coming 
from, and how to interpret in common terms what local election officials 
are doing. How to interpret information in common (ordinary) terms was 
particularly important. And as a journalist, helping people to understand 
what is happening through a story is also important.
Pictures are a particularly powerful way to tell stories, or parts of sto-
ries. In the “old days” we had paper maps of political jurisdictions, state 
and Congressional districts, and precincts. Now we have more modern 
tools. Geographic Information Systems (GIS) is the newest tool that we 
can use to do this—to tell a story. GIS is computer based, and so helping 
election officials understand that GIS is not scary, but simply a modern, 
and more efficient, tool is an important part of what I do.
The SimpliciTy of USing giS for “precincTing”
In talking with election officials about precincting, I start with the con-
cepts of points, lines, and polygons. This is what election officials deal with 
all the time in the process of precincting, which is assigning voters’ home 
addresses (the points) through their street (the lines) and how it relates to 
a particular precinct (the polygon). Once they understand these basic 
building blocks, they can see how GIS can be of use to them. They also see 
how to use this tool to help them as we move toward an era in which we 
are engaging in more frequent redistricting; they can be prepared for the 
changes about to take place.
This approach to precincting includes many different components and 
stakeholders. To accomplish it, we combine information from the US 
Census and other available resources. We usually include data from the 
county auditor or other entity which keeps track of the location and 
dimensions of land parcels (with their address, of course). This provides 
election officials with a ready data set that they can use as a resource. 
Today the Census has a wealth of data including geographic land features 
as well as political lines and man-made infrastructure such as roads; now 
we can overlay all of these on top of aerial photographs, so election offi-
cials can see these data together with GIS to help them more quickly and 
accurately define precincts.
Election officials can use GIS to identify and map “points” such as 
addresses, where people live, street intersections, and particular locations 
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such as polling sites. Election officials can also see “lines” such as streets, 
rivers, and railroads, and invisible lines such as county or city boundaries. 
They can count up voters (points) who live within line boundaries drawn 
as “polygons,” like their precincts. When their legislature says, “Here is 
our new redistricting bill,” the election official can take the different pieces 
of information and more easily see where the new districts lie. Shapefiles 
from the state government of new districts that contain this information 
make reprecincting much easier if election officials have access to GIS and 
know how to use it. If they have their registered voters properly “geo-
coded” (placed as a point on the map), they can easily see where precincts 
have been split by the new districts and the sizes of each piece. The GIS 
system can then help them redraw their precincts and constantly report 
back how many registered voters are affected in and by the new precinct(s), 
thereby allowing them to stay within their state’s election law limits on the 
size of precincts. The GIS and aerial photographs can assist them in deter-
mining where best to place their polling place also. Figures 25.1, 25.2, 
Fig. 25.1 GIS points as addresses, voters, intersections, polling places
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25.3, and 25.4 illustrate these various GIS layers and how they all 
come together.
It is this overlay of a multitude of different districts (Congressional, 
State Senate, State House, local districts, taxing districts) that creates 
problems for election officials. This interaction creates different ballot 
styles, which increases the cost of conducting elections (more different 
ballots have to be printed) as well as leads to voter confusion for those who 
don’t understand these different layers.
pracTical limiTaTionS
Many times the people at the state level who do redistricting do not reach 
down to local election officials for information; however, they should. 
One of the things I try to encourage local officials to do is to testify to 
state legislative bodies to remind them of (and identify for them) the 
impact of legislative decisions in terms of precincts and how voters interact 
with the elections process. Election officials can spot decisions that are 
Fig. 25.2 GIS lines as streets, rivers, railroads, and invisible boundaries
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made at the state level that will cause voter confusion, and thus also cause 
problems for local officials.
I also encourage legislators to review the various district boundaries 
they create with an eye on what happens when they overlay their plans on 
top of each other. Because state representatives tend to draw their own 
chamber’s districts (State House members draw the State House Districts, 
while State Senators draw the State Senate Districts) they seldom look to 
see how one chamber’s districts might impact the other chamber’s plan. 
Failure to do so will lead to small pockets of people who have their own 
unique ballot style, even when there is just a handful of voters in that cir-
cumstance. Taking an extra day to check plans against each other can 
Fig. 25.3 GIS polygons as parcels, precincts, districts, city boundaries
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greatly eliminate the headaches experienced by election administrators, 
who have to deal with all the variations possibly seen for the first time.
Legislatures draw district lines in ways that, generally, distribute popu-
lation. But they don’t take into account the details of the voter registration 
systems that local election officials use to manage voters and their precinct 
lines, and this creates confusion for local election officials when they try to 
Fig. 25.4 GIS map illustration with multiple layer effect
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implement the new district changes. The heart of most voter registration 
systems is a file called the “Street File.” This is a listing of all streets in the 
jurisdiction, many of which are broken apart at a particular address num-
ber when the precinct, district, city, or special taxing district changes. In 
addition, the street file may contain an indication of whether the precincts, 
districts, and so on, apply to either the “even” or the “odd” side of the 
street (when the boundary line goes down the middle of the street) or 
“both” (when the street is encompassed by an area). These street files can 
run thousands or tens of thousands of records, depending on the size of 
the jurisdiction. When redistricting occurs these street records need to be 
either reassigned and possibly reconstructed to a new district area or bifur-
cated with new address range breaks.
It’s not as though the various legislative bodies all use “Main Avenue” 
or some other obvious thoroughfare in a straightforward way. Instead, 
when the various boundary lines are laid on top of each other, one ends up 
creating “sawtooths” or district lines that are jagged and that run back and 
forth across a street. The voter registration system’s “street files” are 
immensely complicated to break apart and reconstruct to accommodate 
newly mandated sawtooth borders; ultimately, this can result in errors and 
potentially confusion for voters.
Another cause of significant voter assignment error deals with cul-de- 
sacs. A cul-de-sac is a single record entry in that 10,000-record street file. 
Election officials know they need to check and adjust the multiple records 
for “Main Street” or other streets with address breaks. But they miss that 
single record for the cul-de-sac and those voters tend to retain their old 
precinct assignment (maybe needing to go 5 miles to the polling place), 
despite the fact that all other voters in the area have been reassigned to the 
school two blocks away. The voters in the cul-de-sac probably talk with 
each other and they all know they need to vote the next day 5 miles away. 
If they would only talk with their neighbors over their back fence, they 
would discover that polling place two blocks away.
giS and relaTionShip BUilding aS a SolUTion
This entire process can be made much easier if GIS is used. The first step 
is to “geocode” the voter registration records and then compare their 
existing precinct assignment information (retained in the voter record) 
against the precinct number in that new precinct polygon. Where this 
information is different there is an error someplace and it needs to be 
investigated.
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We have to increase the capacity of local election offices to use GIS to 
solve these problems. Because building permits and new street creation 
are typically initiated and maintained at the local level, it is usually better 
that research start at the local level than at the state level. Local officials 
have a better understanding of where new construction is taking place in 
their town, which means they have better information than state officials 
will. But, unfortunately, the resources to use GIS for redistricting and 
precincting at the local level are thin, and election officials are not neces-
sarily trained to do this.
In addition to providing local offices with better tools, we need to 
encourage local election officials to rethink their basic approach. Local 
election officials are often focused on recreating or readjusting the street 
file records within the election office, but better information is often 
housed in another local office. One part of the solution is fairly straight-
forward. The local tax assessor is certainly aware of what is going on with 
new construction because new developments are revenue sources; they 
could be a valuable resource. Election officials, however, tend to recreate 
this wheel. They shouldn’t. They need to talk to other county officials—
such as the tax assessor—to identify the information that is already avail-
able to help with the precincting process.
BarrierS To SUcceSS
Politics
Registrars and other election officials who engage in precincting must 
keep their focus on the technical parts of their work. They must also stay 
away from the political fights involved in this process. Election officials 
should be hesitant to get involved in political fights, but they should get 
involved in legislative practice that influences their work. There is a differ-
ence between appointed and elected officials in this process. The elected 
officials have a political hat on, but they need to remember they are elected 
for a particular county and by the people in that county.
Advanced Planning
Another barrier for election officials is not getting out in front of precinct-
ing when redistricting is happening and being prepared for the results. 
Election officials know the neighborhoods in their counties. The legisla-
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tors from those counties know them too, and the legislators need to be 
reminded about how those voters will understand the results of the pro-
cess and the results of different options. Election officials should remind 
legislators about which things to be cognizant of as they draw districts. 
This can be done regardless of whether an election official is elected or 
appointed.
Small Districts at County Lines
Legislators also need to be reminded not to “go into” other counties to 
capture a small group of people. Local election officials have to deal with 
this by creating tiny unique ballot areas. These tiny districts mean that dif-
ferent ballots and ballot styles have to be prepared for a small number of 
voters. This translates into a waste of county and state money as well as 
local resources. Legislatures need to build in additional time for local offi-
cials to overlay these maps to look for those small pockets and figure out 
how to eliminate them, because these pockets cause problems for local 
election officials and cost money.
Preparing Boundary Changes
New and better technology also means that election officials and other 
county or local officials need to be prepared to rethink existing political- 
geographic lines. For example, New England comprises many small town-
ships. As the technical accuracy of Census files have been improved, we 
have cases in which the national understanding of the town boundaries is 
different than what local officials believe to be the case. When the Census 
drew their original township lines in the 1970s, the technology and ability 
to observe and record granular details was significantly less sophisticated 
than it is today. As technology has improved and our subsequent under-
standing of where these boundaries are has changed, discrepancies arise 
and the process of fixing these discrepancies is ongoing. The process has 
implications for election officials and for voters as well who need to be able 
to understand the results of these decisions and act on them.
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CHAPTER 26
Common Physical Barriers That Limit 
Access for Voters with Disabilities 
and Options to Solve Them
Jim Terry, Kaylan Dunlap, Steve Flickinger, 
and Dan Woosley
Abstract Successfully conducting an election requires that election 
administrators consider the diverse needs of their constituents and provide 
polling locations that allow those with disabilities to access the polling 
location and cast a ballot without encountering barriers. Having a work-
ing knowledge of the terminology and standards used to assess polling 
location accessibility can ensure that election administrators and poll 
workers are creating an environment that allows all voters to cast a 
ballot.
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By the morning of an Election Day, a lot of hard work has gone into the 
preparation and set up of polling places. Ramps and platforms have been 
installed, signs have been hung, and steps have been taken to assure that 
every voter, regardless of disability, is able to easily and safely access their 
assigned voting areas. The problem is that things change during the busy 
voting day. Chairs and other obstacles are accidentally moved into the 
accessible routes, voting equipment gets bumped out of place, and signs 
are flipped around by the wind or blown down. Most of this happens 
unintentionally, but the fact remains that throughout the day, these 
changes lead to many polling places becoming inaccessible for some vot-
ers. In order to help visualize areas of concern, try to see the polling place 
as a voter with a disability might experience it. Try to anticipate what 
issues they might experience so that common problems can be identified 




The first concept to be understood is the “accessible route.” The accessi-
ble route is a continuous unobstructed path connecting all accessible ele-
ments and spaces at the polling place. It is the easiest and safest route for 
people with mobility disabilities who use wheelchairs, scooters, or walkers 
to get around to everywhere they need to go in order to vote. Exterior 
accessible routes always include the sidewalks and walkways leading to the 
accessible entrance and may include parking access aisles, curb ramps, 
ramps, and sometimes an exterior lift.
Interior accessible routes include corridors or hallways and doorways 
plus certain aisles and clear floor spaces within the voting area. They may 
also include ramps, elevators, and platform lifts. One can imagine the 
accessible route as a “red carpet” that begins where a voter arrives and that 
allows them to get to every place they need to go so that they can vote. Of 
course, it is not visibly shown on the floor, but it could be.
The accessible route includes the route leading from the sidewalks and 
accessible parking to the accessible entrance. From there, visualize the acces-
sible route going down the corridors and into the voting area. Once inside 
the voting area, the accessible route leads to all the various stops in the vot-
ing process. From the site entrance to any voter information and translators’ 
tables (if provided), to the voter registration check in tables, on to the ballot 
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marking device (if employed), and the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) 
accessible privacy booth, then to the scanners, and back out to the exit. This 
“red carpet” accessible route has to be free from obstructions such as steps, 
overgrown landscaping, trash cans, furniture, boxes, and anything else that 
might block someone who is trying to follow the accessible route. The 
accessible route does not have to be physically marked in any way, but it has 
to be provided and it has to be kept clear at all times.
Although 4 or 5 feet of clear width is preferred, accessible routes must 
always be at least 36 inches wide, with one exception. The route can nar-
row to as little as 32 inches for no more than 24 inches (2 feet) in distance 
at a time. An example might be a doorway that is 32 inches wide or a place 
where a column narrows the route. This minimum width will allow some-
one using a wheelchair the opportunity to push themselves through the 
narrow space without hitting their hands or elbows. But again, it can only 
be as narrow as 32 inches and can continue for no more than 24 inches 
(2 feet) at a time. If something moveable narrows the width for more than 
that 24-inch segment, move the obstruction to provide the full 36 inches 
of width along that part of the accessible route. While you are checking 
the corridors, also check to make sure that all of the doorways on the 
accessible route are propped open with nothing blocking access or reduc-
ing the clear width to less than 32 inches. For example, make sure that no 
one props a door open with a trash can, cone, brick, or large stone. A 
propped door may be helpful, but if it is done with an object that narrows 
the clear width, the object itself becomes an obstacle.
While this accessible route will have been set up at the beginning of the 
day, a poll worker should be assigned the task of walking the accessible 
route at least every two hours using the Department of Justice ADA 
Checklist for Polling Places to make sure accessibility is maintained through-
out the day and to make sure that these clearances are still provided.1 If 
you find anything obstructing the accessible route, move it immediately 
(Figs. 26.1 and 26.2).
Circulation Path
Like voters with mobility disabilities who use the accessible route, voters 
who are blind or with low vision will use what is called the “circulation 
path.” The circulation path includes the accessible route but is much 
1 Accessible at https://www.ada.gov/votingck.htm.
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 bigger than that. Usually, the circulation path includes all of the areas 
where voters can walk. It also includes the headroom above the walking 
surface up to the height of 80 inches. Many polling places have protruding 
objects that are more than 27 inches above the floor, and less than 80 
inches above the floor where they’re above the voters’ heads. If these 
objects are within this zone between 27 and 80 inches above the floor and 
they hang off of the wall more than 4 inches into the circulation path, they 
can be a problem  because these objects will not be cane-detectable by 
someone who is blind or who has low vision.
Places where headroom is less than 80 inches above the floor can 
also create similar problems for voters who have vision loss. Features that 
can be detected with a white cane can be placed below these hazards. 
Fixed objects or items such as orange cones that are provided by the Board 
Fig. 26.1 Accessible polling location
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of Elections can be placed below protruding objects to prevent accidental 
injury to voters who are blind or have low vision.
Imagine a voter who is blind walking with a cane who encounters a 
large coat rack or a protruding bookshelf that is hung high on the wall. 
That coat rack or shelf would not be cane-detectable and could injure that 
voter. Some of the worst problems identified during accessibility surveys 
of polling places include big wall-mounted fire extinguishers, air condi-
tioners hanging over entrance walkways or ramps, stairways with open 
undersides, equipment brackets and controls in school gymnasiums, and 
pipes hanging too low in unexpected places. Sometimes temporary scaf-
folding has large open areas near the ground that are not cane-detectable 
and that are situated along the accessible route or circulation path. Those 
open areas will need low horizontal straps or orange cones so that people 
using canes don’t mistake those openings for a walkway.
If placing a cane-detectable element like an orange cone under a pro-
truding object would narrow the required accessible route to less than 36 
or 32 inches wide and there is no other solution to protect voters who are 
blind or have low vision, a poll worker, sometimes referred to as an acces-
sibility clerk, should be stationed there to warn people to watch their 
Fig. 26.2 Accessible routes
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heads. As maintenance rounds are conducted every two hours, the moni-
tor should make sure these features have not been moved and are still 
correctly protecting the voters from these head and arm bangers. For what 
it is worth, the cones will also help voters who are looking down at their 
smartphones or just not paying enough attention to where they are walking.
Once the accessible route is clear from any obstruction and areas with 
low headroom and protruding objects are protected, a search for floor 
obstructions will be necessary to ensure that any electrical cords in voter 
areas are not tripping hazards. When the voting area is crowded, extension 
cords that cross voter areas may be hard to see, so they should always be 
covered with a thick mat or securely taped down wherever the voters will 
walk across them. It is also best practice to run any power cables outside 
of the 5 foot by 5 foot clear floor areas on the voter sides of accessible vot-
ing equipment to make turning around in those areas easier for everyone, 
including walker, scooter, manual wheelchair, and power chair users.
By paying close attention to these important details, these kinds of 
issues can and will be identified and corrected before they become major 
problems during the day. Then everyone will be able to vote on Election 
Day without encountering these common barriers to accessibility.
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Abstract When trying to provide the most optimal voting experience for 
voters, it is important to understand who they are and how they see them-
selves. This is especially true of voters with disabilities. The way individuals 
identify their disability as a part of their life and how they adapt or adjust 
to address challenges associated with disability will not always be the same. 
When serving the public and working with voters, it is important to under-
stand that there are diverse orientations toward diversity and to not assume 
what type of resources a voter may need to ensure that information is 
communicated effectively.
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When one is planning to travel abroad, researching the etiquette and 
appropriate ways to communicate in the destination country is both advis-
able and helpful. Just as in international travel, this approach to interacting 
with the people you meet may be helpful in major cities where different 
cultures dominate certain communities. Understanding others and how to 
treat them appropriately is always the key to proper etiquette and effective 
communication regardless of the differences that may exist.
Throughout the Election Day you will probably find yourself around 
people who are unlike you in various ways, culturally and physically. Every 
person you meet has something that is different from you. One may won-
der how we can communicate or help others in our work if everyone needs 
different things. The answers can be found by understanding our differ-
ences and responding based on that knowledge. Such is the case with poll 
site etiquette and effective communication with voters with different 
disabilities.
Understanding appropriate poll site etiquette and communication are 
two of the topics covered in a series of online training videos produced by 
Evan Terry Associates (ETA) for poll workers in New York City.1 Serving 
voters who have mobility-related disabilities, such as those who use wheel-
chairs, scooters, walkers, and canes, will certainly differ from the ways you 
respond to the needs of voters who are blind, deaf, or have speech-related 
or cognitive disabilities. To ensure the best results, ETA worked with doz-
ens of voters with disabilities to create poll worker training videos that 
focus solely on proper etiquette and effective communication with voters 
with disabilities.
When it comes to exercising their right to vote, people with disabilities 
are no different from anyone else. Yet historically, the voting rates of peo-
ple with disabilities nationwide have been significantly lower than that of 
others. One of ETA’s objectives in producing these poll worker training 
videos was to help reverse that trend. Well-trained poll workers can actu-
ally help to make sure that each and every person with a disability has an 
opportunity to vote in an integrated environment that is both dignified 
and convenient. We’ve found that video instruction helps poll workers 
understand the challenges associated with voting by people with disabili-
ties and how they can help to eliminate or minimize those problems. The 
videos demonstrate the most common barriers to access that poll workers 
are most likely to encounter on Election Day and that they can correct.
1 Training videos are accessible at www.boevideos.com.
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So, what is appropriate etiquette and how can poll workers communicate effec-
tively with voters with disabilities?
Some voters may consider themselves people with disabilities; some 
may consider themselves simply as people who live their lives differently. 
Each person has different strengths and skills. Some people use wheel-
chairs, crutches, hearing aids, a white cane, or other devices to live inde-
pendently. To some people, an automobile could almost be considered a 
mobility device to get them to their poll site because those people would 
tire if they had to walk a long distance.
As with anything new or unfamiliar, it’s not uncommon to be unsure 
how to best interact with someone who is a bit different from you. You 
may fear saying something inappropriate or offensive if you’ve not been 
around someone with that disability. To help alleviate those fears, the vid-
eos give poll workers confidence in how to best interact comfortably with 
people with a wide variety of disabilities. The key lesson conveyed is to 
communicate directly with the person and ask them if they’d like any assis-
tance and, if so, how you can best help them.
Some disabilities are obvious while many others are not. This can create 
a challenge. Just because someone has a visible disability doesn’t necessar-
ily mean that they are in need of assistance. That’s why help should only 
be provided when it’s requested. If anyone asks for help and it’s a simple 
request, most poll workers can simply provide it. If it’s a complicated 
request, or if it will take much time or otherwise distract one from their 
assigned election role, you’ll need to have a policy about what individual 
poll workers should do. It may require stopping and helping immediately, 
referring the voter to a specially trained poll worker, or referring them to 
the person in charge of the poll site.
There is a good chance that poll workers will come in contact with vot-
ers who have limited mobility during Election Day. They might use a 
wheelchair, a scooter, a walker, or a cane, or they might not have any vis-
ible signs of their mobility disability. Take care to respect each person’s 
space. Don’t hover over them. Avoid touching them or any equipment 
they might be using. For most people, that equipment is part of their per-
sonal space and should be respected. Most people do not like to be 
touched by strangers. People with disabilities are usually no different in 
that. Also, be sure not to ever push someone’s wheelchair unless asked. 
It’s their chair and they will want to keep control over it whenever they 
can. So don’t just push them where you want them to go.
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Another group of people with disabilities is those who have 
communication- related disabilities; many are deaf or hard of hearing. 
These disabilities are not always easy to spot so be alert and think about 
how to communicate most effectively.
The videos also instill an important part of communicating effectively—
the poll workers’ attitude. Poll workers are reminded to think about the 
volume and their tone of voice when dealing with voters, especially those 
who are deaf or hard of hearing.
It’s important not to make any voter feel as if they are an inconvenience. 
Each poll worker is there to assist and to serve, so let everyone know that’s 
your purpose. Don’t be patronizing or talk to anyone like they are a child. 
If they’re voters, they’re adults, so treat them that way. Following these 
key points not only will help make the voting experience more pleasant, 
but voters will be even more likely to participate in future elections.
Being a good listener is one of the best ways to be an effective poll 
worker. No voter likes communicating with someone who only cares 
about putting in the minimum effort and time and does not take the time 
to listen to them. This is especially applicable with voters who have cogni-
tive, intellectual, mental, or developmental disabilities that affect their 
processes of perception, memory, judgment, or reasoning. These are usu-
ally invisible disabilities. A few examples are dyslexia, attention deficit 
disorder (ADD), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), post-
traumatic stress disorder, autism, Down syndrome, and dementia.
Be patient, flexible, and supportive when assisting anyone who seems to 
be having difficulty in the poll site. They may have trouble coping with the 
crowd, confusion, or noise. They may have difficulty understanding or 
interacting with you, or even just reading instructions or their ballot. Take 
time to understand each voter and make sure that they understand you. Be 
attentive to what they’re saying. Listen to them, and don’t try to finish 
their sentences. That might feel like you’d be helping, but in reality you’d 
just be just cutting them off.
When assisting people with cognitive disabilities, try to limit distrac-
tions and keep things simple. Just take everything one step at a time. You 
may provide assistance in order to help them understand the written 
instructions but be careful not to tell them for whom to vote. Give them 
as much time as they need for understanding instructions and making 
decisions. Your patience and care for these voters will help them feel at 
ease as they cast their vote.
There are many people who use service animals for reasons that may 
not be visible or apparent. If a voter says a dog is a service animal, then it 
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is permitted in the poll site. A service animal is neither required to “wear” 
identification such as a vest or bandana nor is the voter required to provide 
documentation that the dog is “certified.” If a dog is not under control, 
you can have it removed, but that is seldom a problem with trained service 
dogs. Finally, service dogs are not pets. When service dogs are in a poll 
site, they are working. That means you should never touch or interact with 
the animal. These dogs have a special job to do and petting a dog can 
distract it.
Eye contact is also important for all voters. Looking each person in the 
eye is a good way to demonstrate that you are focused on them. Speak 
directly to the voter, especially when communicating with voters who may 
be accompanied by an interpreter, personal assistant, or family member. 
The poll worker might need the help of the assistant to communicate with 
the voter, but keep in mind that it’s the voter you are helping, not their 
assistant. So make sure the voter is the focus of your attention.
Speak clearly and use short, simple sentences. Don’t pretend to under-
stand if you don’t; it’s okay to ask them to repeat themselves. If they’re 
having a hard time understanding you, don’t shout. Most of the time 
volume is not the problem, but rather background noises or the tone or 
clarity of the speaker’s voice. That’s why it is important to keep your hands 
and other objects away from your mouth and not to chew gum. This will 
make the task of reading your lips much easier for the voters who read lips. 
If the voter doesn’t understand something you’ve said, try saying your 
question or comment differently. If they didn’t understand you the first 
time, chances are that simply repeating it again won’t help. Sometimes 
different words are heard and understood better than others. So try again, 
but in a way that is simple and clear. Finally, if verbal communication isn’t 
possible, or, if the voter prefers, have a pad of paper and pen handy for 
written communication.
Some voters will have speech-related disabilities. Just like when you’re 
working with a voter who is deaf or hard of hearing, if you don’t under-
stand something the voter said, don’t pretend that you did. Ask the voter 
to repeat what they said and then repeat it back to them to be sure you 
understood them correctly.
As children we were taught to treat others the same way we would want 
to be treated. That is the perfect mindset for poll workers to have as they 
serve every voter—treat everyone with respect and dignity. It might seem 
obvious but it’s easy to forget, especially when choosing your words and 
actions. That’s why it’s important to focus on the person and not their 
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disability. Put the person first and the disability second, even in choosing 
your word order. For example, a voter who uses a wheelchair is a person 
with a disability, not a disabled person. Don’t use words like “crippled,” 
“handicapped,” or “special needs voter.” Those words can be offensive or 
demeaning to many people.
Voters with disabilities will be more open to communicating their ques-
tions and concerns with a poll worker if that worker displays patience and 
respect for them, their disability, and their thoughts. Simple actions like 
using a person’s name, making eye contact, and actively and patiently lis-
tening when a person speaks will make the voter feel appreciated and 
respected. Actively practicing patience is critical.
Poll workers play a very important role in providing each and every 
eligible citizen the opportunity to vote without regard to ability or dis-
ability. It is important for election officials to direct the hard work and 
attention of poll workers to the details of communication that provide 
voters with disabilities with these opportunities. These communication 
tools are important to use with all voters, and help protect the civil rights 
of voters with disabilities as well.
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CHAPTER 28
Operational Solutions That Help Voting 
Work for Everyone
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Abstract This case study presents the election monitoring best practices 
that Evan Terry Associates (ETA) has observed and developed to be shared 
with polling locations across the country. There are numerous details to 
observe and many distractions that can divert Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) monitors and poll workers during an actual election, especially 
relating to little or lesser known issues of accessibility for voters with dis-
abilities. The best practices presented can help to consolidate, expedite, 
and focus accessibility monitors throughout the country as it relates to 
barriers to accessibility issues at polling places.
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Without question, the key player on Election Day is the poll site coordina-
tor, a role that can have many different names. Each polling place is 
assigned a leader (or leaders) who have full authority to conduct polling 
efforts at that site during an election event. The role of poll site coordina-
tor is to serve as captain of the ship, so to speak. This individual takes on 
the daunting duty and responsibility to make sure that voting is a positive 
experience for voters and poll workers alike and it requires the individual 
to undertake a considerable amount of training to acquire all of the requi-
site knowledge and skills to perform during a grueling 12- to 15-hour 
Election Day.
Although the poll site coordinator’s individual duties and responsibili-
ties are numerous, varied, and can certainly be intimidating, Evan Terry 
Associates (ETA) has observed that, in many election districts, the area of 
least focus has been a thorough understanding across the election office of 
the accessibility needs of those voters with disabilities. ADA (Americans 
with Disabilities Act) requirements can seem to be overwhelming in quan-
tity and scope. Historically, poll site coordinators have been ill-equipped 
to address in any meaningful way a physical barrier to accessibility at a 
polling place because they have no actual authority outside of the immedi-
ate voting process and procedure.
In order to ensure that no citizen is denied any protected right due to 
a disability, ETA has determined from its observations and experience that 
there are three key areas on which every board of elections should focus as 
it relates to physical accessibility at polling places. These key areas center 
on (1) practical ADA-related poll site coordinator training, (2) ensuring 
better ADA training for polling staff, and (3) providing knowledgeable 
on-site ADA expertise and/or assistance. Many boards of elections have 
vigorously and productively addressed all three of these key issues during 
the past several years, which have greatly improved access throughout 
their jurisdictions.
One important question revolves around whether the results of poll-
ing place accessibility surveys are tied to the poll workers’ training. In 
other words, how do poll workers know what barriers to accessibility 
exist at their site. The absence of that knowledge is a formula for failure 
to provide an accessible polling place. Poll worker training courses are 
rife with policies, procedures, and laws pertaining to the actual ballots 
and voting, and rightly so. The structure of the training is generally very 
well thought out, organized, managed, and very inclusive in everything 
related to polling policies and procedures during an election period, 
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including voter registration and election administration. Accessibility is 
one more very important topic that must be covered in that training. 
ETA’s experience indicates that the most effective approach to accessibil-
ity training is the positive approach that the jurisdiction wants to make 
the voting experience easy for everybody, including people with disabili-
ties. While it is certainly reasonable to mention the fact that access to 
voting is a civil rights requirement, it may be best not just to focus on the 
ever-increasing number of ADA lawsuits that require it. The term “dis-
ability friendly” is a great one to put the concept into a proper perspective.
Training sessions are generally taught by highly qualified trainers—typi-
cally those who have served in various poll worker roles for several years. 
Unfortunately, often there is little to no content that includes a practical 
and nuanced focus on disability awareness, including the state of accessi-
bility at the very site to which they are assigned. Of course, this limitation 
begs the question: what efforts have been exercised to provide a full acces-
sibility survey of the facilities in the election district, including transition 
and action plans to ameliorate whatever is required to make the site fully 
accessible? If it hasn’t been done, it should be.
A frequent observation by ETA during poll worker training, especially 
when attempts are made to share accessibility theories and requirements, 
is that demonstrations and explanations can be entirely wrong or mislead-
ing. Complex standards such as door maneuvering clearances, turning 
spaces, and protruding objects have been incorrectly demonstrated by the 
trainers of accessibility requirements due to their lack of knowledge of the 
ADA standards. These examples, which are critically important to voter 
entry, access, and exit, are just a few of several nuanced topics of the ADA 
requirements that are sometimes discussed during training sessions. 
Because they are little known by the consuming public, including the 
teachers of the polling process, confusion often ensues.
One of the ongoing efforts by ETA architectural accessibility specialists 
has been to review election cycle documents, which include existing train-
ing materials, resulting in composing and editing accessibility dialogue into 
the various poll worker training manuals, such as those provided for General 
Poll Workers, Accessibility Clerks, Interpreters, Ballot Marking Device 
Operators, and Poll Site Coordinators. The contents of training presenta-
tions, guides, videos, and tests for each of the specific roles also need to be 
coordinated with the manuals so policies and procedures are consistent. 
Election officials are encouraged to have ADA specialists perform this 
function annually, or whenever the content of training materials change.
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One specific topic that is sometimes absent from these documents is the 
lack of discussion of the legal requirements of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act—the ADA. Existing documents usually feature the 2002 
Help America Vote Act (HAVA) which mandates that all voters be pro-
vided the opportunity to vote privately and independently. However, there 
is usually little or no discussion of the civil rights law—the ADA—that 
prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all areas of 
public life, including access to all public and private places that are open to 
the general public, including those used as polling places.
It is important to include the ADA’s intent in any “Legal Notice” sec-
tion of every training manual. Likewise, including a segment on disability 
awareness will benefit poll workers, and possibly an “ADA/Accessibility 
Supplement” to accompany the various manuals and materials. The addi-
tion of content to enhance and explain the meaning and understanding of 
various accessibility terms and concepts, explanations of how each acces-
sibility feature at the polling place is supposed to work, descriptions of 
how to maintain the accessible features, and explanations of how to com-
municate effectively with people with a variety of disabilities will serve to 
improve poll worker performance during the course of the election day.
One of the results of ETA’s polling place surveys for the City of 
New York was the development of poll worker training videos that are 
used in training poll workers and others associated with polling place setup 
and operation. This type of visual instruction is beneficial to poll workers’ 
understanding of the challenges associated with voting by people with dis-
abilities and how they can help to eliminate or minimize those problems. 
The videos demonstrate the most common barriers to accessibility that 
poll workers are most likely to encounter on election day and specifically 
the types of barriers that they can correct. Most of these training videos 
each focus on the particular poll worker positions used in the City, and 
include the following topics:1
CommuniCations and EtiquEttE (Parts 1 and 2)
[For all poll workers] Describes how to ensure that each and every person 
with a disability has an opportunity to vote in an integrated environment 
that is both dignified and convenient; demonstrates communication with 
real people with a broad variety of disabilities that affect communications; 
1 These videos can be readily viewed at www.boevideos.com.
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describes etiquette for working with people with disabilities; demonstrates 
scenarios that might occur on election day and how they can be resolved.
aCCEssibility ClErk rEsPonsibilitiEs
[For the Accessibility Clerk] Accessibility Clerks are poll workers on the 
front lines who interact with voters and ensure that every voter has the 
physical opportunity to cast their vote at a polling place in an environment 
that is safe, dignified, and convenient. This video features the duties of the 
Accessibility Clerk, which include posting signage, staffing entrance and 
interior doors and elevators, and providing other assistance to all voters.
VErifying Voting EquiPmEnt sEtuP
[For the Site Coordinator and Accessibility Clerk] This video shows how to 
inspect and measure polling places to verify that required door maneuver-
ing clearances, accessible routes, and clear floor spaces at equipment are 
being maintained. It describes to Site Coordinators what to look for when 
verifying the voting equipment setup and how to correct any problems 
that are found, including making certain that all the tables and voting 
equipment will properly fit into the voting area. It describes how to use 
their drawings that show exactly where everything needs to be placed with 
dimensions, and it describes how to read and interpret those drawings.
signagE
[For the Site Coordinator and Accessibility Clerk] This video describes the 
use and placement of various accessibility notification, directional, and 
location signs used on election day, and it describes where and how to 
secure signs and the requirement to periodically check them.
ballot marking dEViCE (bmd) aCCEssiblE fEaturEs 
and oPEration
[For the Site Coordinator and Ballot Marking Device Inspector/Operator] 
This video describes how to set up and verify that all additional accessories 
are on hand and it demonstrates how to use each of the accessible features 
of the Ballot Marking Device for people who have various types of 
disabilities.
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Produced for viewing in training classes and for review by individual 
poll workers whenever they like on their cell phones, election day moni-
toring has shown dramatic improvements in accessibility for voters with 
disabilities after poll workers have watched these videos. The use of acces-
sibility specialists as Election Day ADA monitors or observers can also be 
very beneficial. The intended purpose of such monitoring is to help the 
Board of Elections meet its ADA compliance obligations by verifying the 
ongoing compliance of temporary equipment (portable ramps, curb 
ramps, cones, directional signage, the use of mats), interior configurations 
of polling equipment, clear floor spaces, and accessible routes. Monitors 
can also help poll site workers to better understand the requirements of 
the Department of Justice ADA Checklist for Polling Places as it applies to 
existing barriers observed in that jurisdiction’s poll sites; and how to facili-
tate effective program access in existing polling places.2
Election officials can improve Election Day ADA compliance by focus-
ing on training for poll site leaders that includes the practical conditions of 
the ADA requirements for the sites in the jurisdiction. They can also focus 
on training that emphasizes a message of service to all voters, rather than 
focusing on lawsuits. Last, election officials can seek out ways to ensure 
better ADA training for polling staff and providing knowledgeable on-site 
ADA expertise and/or assistance.
2 For ADA checklist see https://www.ada.gov/votingck.htm.
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CHAPTER 29
The Value of the Election Administration 
and Voting Survey
Sean Greene
Abstract This case study examines the implementation of the Election 
Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS). EAVS is  the only national 
survey to capture data related to the voting and elections process in every 
state and generates a phenomenal amount of data. Of course, the numbers 
most people care about are the results—how many votes the candidate 
they support receives. But beyond the results is a wealth of data related to 
how elections are run, from how many citizens are registered to vote to 
how many people cast ballots during early voting, to the number of provi-
sional ballots cast, counted, and rejected. The EAVS captures this data and 
tells the story of the nuts and bolts of the voting process for both the vot-
ers and the election officials charged with administering elections. The 
importance of this type of data collection, what goes into administering a 
survey of this scope, the challenges in collecting this vast amount of data, 
and the potential for improvement will be discussed.
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Elections generate a phenomenal amount of data. Of course, the numbers 
most people care about are the results—how many votes the candidate 
they support receives. But beyond the results is a wealth of data related to 
how elections are run, from how many citizens are registered to vote to 
how many people cast ballots during early voting, to the number of provi-
sional ballots cast, counted, and rejected. These data tell the story of the 
nuts and bolts of the voting process for both the voters and the election 
officials charged with administering elections.
From June 2016 to June 2018 as an elections specialist and director of 
research at the US Election Assistance Commission (EAC) I managed the 
only national survey to capture this type of information for all states, the 
Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS). In this case study I 
will discuss the importance of this type of data collection, what goes into 
administering a survey of this scope, the challenges in collecting this vast 
amount of data, and the potential for improvement.
What Is the eaVs and Why Is It Important?
The EAVS is a biennial survey which collects, analyzes, and reports on 
state-by-state data related to the administration of federal elections. It has 
been administered since 2004 and includes data about voter registration, 
military and overseas voters, mail and absentee voting, poll workers and 
polling places, provisional ballots, and voting technology. An additional 
survey initially called the Statutory Overview (now called the Policy 
Survey), first administered in 2008, provides information about state law 
and practices to inform and provide context to data reported in the EAVS.
Why is this important? This data and analysis can provide voters, elected 
officials, and the media a deeper understanding of how elections are run as 
well as identify trends and emerging challenges. For election officials, it 
can provide information not only about their own jurisdiction, but about 
neighboring jurisdictions and insight into best practices they or other 
jurisdictions may be using. Using and applying lessons from data analysis 
can lead to new and innovative ways to manage elections.
the nuts and Bolts of analyzIng the nuts 
and Bolts
The EAVS is an enormous endeavor, both for those administering it and 
for those responding to it. It asks hundreds of questions and generates 
hundreds of thousands of data points based on local jurisdiction-level data 
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from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, 
Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands.
In this section I will provide a picture, albeit incomplete, of some of 
what goes into implementing the EAVS. I will focus on five areas:
• Survey approval and public comment;
• Who administers the EAVS;
• Technical assistance;
• Who responds to the EAVS; and
• Completing the survey and validating the data.
Survey Approval
Through the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) the federal government 
requires that information collections like the EAVS be approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget. This is to ensure that undue burdens 
are not placed on the public—in the case of the EAVS the states—in 
responding to these types of requests from the federal government.
Although there is a touch of irony that the PRA involves completing 
some paperwork (electronically at least), it is an important reminder that 
asking states to respond to a complex and time-consuming survey is not to 
be undertaken lightly. Additionally, during this review process which can 
take four to six months, there are two mandated and incredibly helpful 
public comment periods. The survey questions are published and in 2016 
the EAC received dozens of comments from concerned individuals, advo-
cacy groups, as well as election officials.
Who Administers EAVS
The EAC administers the EAVS through a contractor hired via a competi-
tive bid process. This has been the case for every EAVS since its inception 
in 2004. The contractor is the entity that sends out the survey to states, 
assists jurisdictions during the data collection process, provides analysis, 
and drafts reports. As I will discuss below, working with a contractor can 
provide a number of advantages including allowing the EAC to work with 
some of the foremost experts in the field as well as those who are experts 
in survey administration.
29 THE VALUE OF THE ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY 
244
Technical Assistance
Another advantage to working with a contractor is the staff, time, and 
resources that a contractor can utilize. During my time at the EAC there 
was a staff of fewer than 30 people and of those only myself and one other 
staff member was focused on research and the EAVS. The EAC has many 
other responsibilities and manages to accomplish a great deal with a lean 
staff. However, two researchers are not enough to administer, manage, 
and provide all the assistance the states need when responding to a survey 
of this magnitude.
One of the key components of administering this survey is providing 
technical assistance to states at all stages of the survey. For the 2016 EAVS 
two examples of this assistance come to mind that were critical in success-
fully conducting the survey. First was an in-depth needs assessment of each 
state in the summer before the November election. This allowed the con-
tractor to establish a working relationship with the appropriate points of 
contact and get specific information from the states on how they would 
respond to the survey and any particular needs or limitations they had.
Second, after the election when states were in the midst of responding 
to the survey the contractor had nearly ten technical assistants tasked to 
help states answer any questions they had about the survey. They responded 
to hundreds of inquiries and were able to assist states on a variety of issues, 
from technical questions about completing the spreadsheet, to larger 
questions about definition of terms in the survey.
Who Responds to the EAVS
The simple answer is that the states, the District of Columbia, American 
Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands respond to the 
survey. In reality, this varies a great deal from state to state. The EAVS 
gathers data from states at the jurisdictional level. In most states this is at 
the county level, and some is at the city or township level. States are 
responsible for collecting this data for all their jurisdictions.
Several states in 2016 were able to respond to a majority of the survey 
using information in their statewide election management systems—
sometimes these are referred to as top-down states, where the informa-
tion is gathered and to some extent controlled at the state level. These 
states often have much of the EAVS questions pre-programmed into their 
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statewide management systems and can generate responses with relative 
ease. One challenge for top-down states is ensuring the data generated for 
the EAVS from their systems can be converted into the EAVS template 
for submission.
On the other end of the spectrum are bottom-up states where the sur-
vey questions need to be sent to each jurisdiction and then each jurisdic-
tion needs to respond and send the survey back to the state. The states 
then need to combine all these jurisdictions’ data into the EAVS format 
and submit it in one file. This can present numerous challenges. In some 
cases states have little authority to ensure jurisdictions respond. And for 
jurisdictions not familiar with the survey it can be confusing. In these 
cases, the local jurisdictions often reach out for technical assistance. And in 
several jurisdictions, responses to the 2016 survey were completed by 
hand and sent by mail.
Completing and Validating the Survey
States respond to the EAVS using an Excel template. This Excel document 
includes a series of macros to help the respondent enter and review the 
data for errors. In 2016 another Excel template was created to allow for 
copying and pasting jurisdiction-level data. However, Excel is not the ideal 
mode to collect this amount of data from these many jurisdictions—more 
on that when I discuss potential improvements to the EAVS.
After states submit the data, they are reviewed for accuracy. This 
includes attempting to determine what any empty cells represent—data 
that are missing, data left blank because it is not applicable for a state (i.e. 
the state does not have Election Day registration and therefore has no data 
for this question), or a true value of zero. Or was it mistakenly left empty? 
Attempts are made to catch math errors as well. An example is finding an 
impossible value, such as a state showing it had more rejected provisional 
ballots than provisional ballots issued. And in 2016 for the first time more 
advanced statistical methods were used to see if the data fell between what 
would be expected of a jurisdiction based on data from previous years and 
the characteristics of the jurisdiction. Reports were generated and sent to 
each state flagging possibly problematic data and providing an opportu-
nity for states to make changes or confirm the data is accurate.
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all Challenges, great and small
As the previous section demonstrates, administering the EAVS is not a 
small task and the devil is most definitely in the details. Pulling back for a 
bigger-picture view, one sees these details inform the high-level challenges 
and opportunities for the EAVS as well.
One challenge for the field of election administration which has an 
impact on the EAVS is terminology and the lack of accepted common 
terms across the states. For example, the phrase “early voting” may mean 
in-person voting on a voting machine during a set time before Election 
Day in some states, while in others it may be casting an absentee ballot in 
person at an election office before Election Day. Yet, in other states, in- 
person absentee voting is considered a part of absentee voting. While the 
EAVS attempts to provide clear instructions and definitions within the 
survey instrument, respondents will of course bring their own definitions 
to the table.
Another challenge is whether the right questions are being asked and 
being asked in the best way possible. The survey has been essentially the 
same since 2008 and changing the survey cannot be done easily or taken 
lightly. First, changes require the federal review process noted above that 
must be followed any time changes to the survey are made. Second and 
more importantly, election officials need to be given a good deal of lead 
time to deal with any significant changes in order to make changes in the 
methods that they use to collect the data. And they need to be involved, 
along with survey experts, when these changes are made.
That said, there are times for review and change. In the past, a working 
group was created to review Section B of the survey about military and 
overseas voters, mostly to streamline the questions in that section. And 
this type of review could certainly be helpful for other sections, including 
Section A related to voter registration.
Another area where there is room to improve is the use of the Statutory 
Overview/Policy Survey. In the past it has been released separately from 
the EAVS.  However, it provides important context to the data in the 
EAVS. For example, knowing about why states issue and reject provisional 
ballots goes a long way in understanding the variation in these data across 
states. In the future linking these surveys more directly or even combining 
them could add even more power to the EAVS data and analysis.
This leads to the last but possibly most important potential change for 
the EAVS—shifting from an Excel-based template to an online survey 
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tool. The introduction of an online data collection system could lead to 
more accurate data; reduce the burden and simplify the process for respon-
dents; provide real-time error checks during data collection; allow all states 
but especially bottom-up states a more manageable way to share the sur-
vey at the local level; and allow for the incorporation of the Statutory 
Overview/Policy Survey into the EAVS, building in related legal and pro-
cess questions into the appropriate sections.
ConClusIon
While the EAVS faces some challenges, it is an amazing and unique source 
of election administration data. And every year it is issued, the survey gains 
power, with more data over more elections allowing for better compari-
sons within and between states and jurisdictions, as well as more opportu-
nity to observe trends.
From experience I know a great deal of work goes into both managing 
the survey and responding to the survey. Understanding and answering all 
the questions, verifying the data, and providing the appropriate analysis is 
labor intensive and difficult. However, as the survey has already demon-
strated and with these potential improvements, it is and can continue to be 
an invaluable resource for all those who care about the nuts and bolts of 
our democracy.
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CHAPTER 30
Local Engagement with the Election 
Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS)
Susan Gill
Abstract The introduction of new data collection tools in election admin-
istration can create unique challenges for local election officials. This case 
presents one local election official’s experience with the Election 
Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) from its inception following 
the passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in 2002; also discussed 
is the important role that vendors play in ensuring that local jurisdictions 
provide the type of data required by the EAVS and other election admin-
istration data collection tools.
Keywords Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) • Data 
• Vendors
My name is Susan Gill and I have been the Citrus County, Florida, 
Supervisor of Elections for 23  years. I have served as President of the 
Florida State Association of Supervisors of Elections and have chaired and 
served on many committees. I am currently serving as Chair of the Election 
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Center (National Association of Election Officials)  Board of Directors. 
I am the Co-Chair of the Vote Center Task Force for our State Association.
Citrus County, Florida, is a west central coastal county located approxi-
mately 1.5 hours north of Tampa and 1.5 hours west of Orlando. The 
population is 145,000 of which approximately 109,000 are registered vot-
ers. We are largely a retirement community comprising people who have 
moved to Florida from many different states. In presidential elections, 
86% of the voters 61 years of age and older turn out to vote. The county 
has a small minority population. A federal court order requires ballots and 
all election related materials be printed in the Spanish language starting 
March 2020. The Citrus County Supervisor of Elections has nine full- 
time employees.
The availability of data down to the granular level through computer 
software programs has enabled election professionals to make more 
informed decisions. For example, we are able to make changes in the allo-
cation of resources by analyzing the post-election data on when and where 
voters are voting. Florida law allows no excuse vote by mail, early voting, 
or Election Day voting at the polls, and so these differences really matter.
Analyzing the post-election data showed us that more voters were 
choosing to vote by mail and early vote. As a result, in 2012 we reduced 
the number of polling places by ten to adjust to the higher number of vot-
ers that we expected to vote prior to Election Day. Our State Vote Center 
Committee continues to study the numbers and methods of voting to see 
if our State is ready, willing, and able to move on to Vote Centers, which 
will require a legislative change.
Data are available real time on the numbers of voters voting at the early 
vote sites and at the polls on Election Day. The number of vote by mail 
ballots is available as the signatures are matched on the registration sys-
tem. On our website, voters are able to find out the status of their vote by 
mail ballot: when it was mailed and when the voted ballot was received in 
our office.
The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires the Election Assistance 
Commission (EAC) to gather information from all the jurisdictions receiv-
ing federal funds for accountability purposes. Another survey! We had no 
idea what information would be asked in the survey and what data they 
would be requesting. We knew this was no ordinary survey. We would be 
required to complete the Election Administration and Voting Survey 
(EAVS) survey and the State Division of Elections would be responsible 
for making sure that all counties complied.
 S. GILL
251
When the Election Administration and Voting Survey arrived we were 
so frustrated. We felt like crying! While some of the questions such as 
requests for registration numbers were straightforward, others in the vote 
by mail section were more confusing. The staff, our Operations Manager, 
the Vote by Mail Coordinator, and the Registration Administrator along 
with myself were all involved with gathering this information. We would 
look at a question and each staff member would have a different under-
standing and a different interpretation of what was being asked.
In addition, the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP) had another 
survey that asked the same questions in a different way, which produced a 
different answer that, of course, did not match the EAVS answer to the 
similar question. We did not think the surveys were an effective tool.
Life is better now. The EAC has continually tried to improve the survey 
and make it more user-friendly. The FVAP survey questions are now 
included in the  survey. We receive a copy of the survey ahead of time 
which helps us keep on top of gathering the data that will be required on 
the survey. VR Systems, Inc., our voter registration vendor, has also helped 
design the registration software to make it easier for us to access the data 
the way the EAVS survey requests it.
The usability of the EAVS Report is also better now. There are still areas 
needing improvement. To address these, the EAC and the survey develop-
ers have reached out to election officials to listen to our suggestions. One 
issue we have is that after the survey has been completed online, there is 
no way to print a copy for reference. We only have our handwritten work-
sheet. This is important because our office and the state office receive 
public records requests asking for the same information and we would like 
a copy of the final survey for reference.
A second issue has to do with the due date of the EAVS. The due date 
for the 2016 EAVS was February 2, 2017. We would like the completion 
date for the survey to be the end of December of the election year. This 
will allow us to start the new year having completed all the necessary 
paperwork from the previous year’s election. Lastly, the information pro-
vided to complete the EAVS is not always helpful. For the 2016 survey, we 
were provided additional information which was not provided in the past, 
and some of which was redundant. Materials included A Guide to Election 
Administration and Voting Survey, Statutory Overview, Guide to Using the 
2016 Election Administration and Voting Survey Data Templates, and the 
Template. Our vendor, VR Systems, Inc., was a great help in setting up 
their programs to easily provide the data requested. VR Systems, Inc., also 
used the Suggested Guidelines for Completion of the US Election Assistance 
Commission 2016 Election Administration & Voting Survey.
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The EAVS is mandated by the Help American Vote Act and serves as an 
accountability document for Congress to review. EAVS is probably most 
useful to those doing research wanting to study a large segment of the 
national election community. For an elections official making decisions 
specific to our own county, much of the data we need is available through 
our software and elections systems. However, we do keep our EAVS data 
at hand for Public Records Requests and other surveys. We appreciate the 
continuing effort to make EAVS easier to complete. We now know better 
what to expect and our vendor assists with providing the data in a format 
as requested by the EAVS. We are constantly examining our data to evalu-
ate the need for changes in allocation of ballots, equipment, poll workers 
and making decisions for the future. The State collects data from all 67 
counties and makes it readily available for comparison purposes.
Data collection has come a long way during the time that I have been 
Supervisor of Elections. The EAVS and its improvements help illustrate 
how trends are changing. This type of data is essential for election officials 
making election administration decisions. As we become more familiar 
with the data that we have on hand, we will be able to improve election 
administration even further.
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CHAPTER 31
Innovation in Synthesizing Big Data: 
The Electronic Registration Information 
Center (ERIC)
David Becker
Abstract Maintaining accurate, complete voter lists has been a significant 
and intractable problem. Many eligible voters are not on the lists, which 
can also be fraught with inaccuracies. These issues lead to major problems 
downstream in the elections process, and since so much of election reform 
is viewed through a partisan lens, the inaccuracies can lead to polarizing 
divisions. Bringing together a group of experts and election officials, a 
multistate data center was created, called the Electronic Registration 
Information Center, or “ERIC.” ERIC delivers information on voters 
who have moved, while also allowing for outreach to those not yet regis-
tered. Born in 2012, ERIC has grown from 7 to 26 states and the District 
of Columbia, including states as red as Alabama, Louisiana, and Utah and 
states as blue as Connecticut, Illinois, and Oregon. The ERIC states gov-
ern ERIC, and pay the full costs of its operations, and security of all data 
is maintained through rigorous methods. Since its inception, ERIC has 
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enabled states to update nearly 10 million out-of-date voter records, and 
reach out to over 34 million eligible but unregistered voters, with millions 
of these new voters registered.
Keywords Voter registration • Voter list maintenance • Electronic 
Registration Information Center • ERIC
The Idea
In 2008, I was working with the growing elections team at the Pew 
Charitable Trusts, as it was ramping up its efforts to improve American 
elections. As part of our work, we sought guidance from experts in the 
field. After the 2008 election, we hosted a bipartisan group of over 200 
leaders in the field of elections—election officials at the state and local 
level, campaign staff, researchers, technologists, advocates, and others—to 
discuss the past historic election and possible election administration 
reforms going forward.
I talked to dozens of people, and asked them one simple question—if you 
could fix one thing in elections, what would it be? Remarkably, the answer 
was unanimous—voter registration. Those working in elections knew that 
the voter lists were incomplete, with large numbers of eligible voters not on 
the lists. They also understood the lists were fraught with inaccuracies and 
unable to keep up with Americans’ mobility. These issues led to major prob-
lems downstream in the elections process, including returned mail, excess 
costs, long lines, unnecessary provisional ballots, and voter confusion and 
dissatisfaction. In addition, since so much of election reform was viewed 
purely through a partisan lens, the inaccuracies in the lists led to concerns 
about election integrity, and polarizing partisan divisions. We determined 
that if a solution to the voter list problem could be devised, it could amelio-
rate so many other problems in elections at the same time.
The Process
Beginning in 2009, we began to look for such a solution. I led the effort, 
assisted by John Lindback, the former director of elections of Oregon and 
Alaska, who built the statewide voter database in Oregon. We went in 
without preconceived notions, committed to looking for a real solution 
that would not be undermined by partisan polarization. We began by 
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creating a working group that included state and local election officials 
from both parties, researchers, and technical experts. We called this group 
the Voter Registration Modernization Design Working Group, or 
“VRooM DaWG” for short.1
At the beginning of the first convening of the group, I asked those in 
attendance one question—if we could create a voter registration system 
from scratch, how many would create the one we have now? Not one 
person raised their hand. We were all on the same page about the need to 
improve our system, and then we got started with the hard work of devis-
ing an improved system.
First, we had to define the nature of the problem. It was important to 
educate members of the working group, particularly those with technical 
expertise, who were less familiar with the nuts and bolts of election admin-
istration. Election officials from around the country agreed that the chal-
lenges of maintaining a complete voter lists included the following:
• Voters did not understand how voter registration worked, and when 
they had the responsibility to update their records;
• Voters were moving at high rates, with about one-third or more 
moving within a four-year cycle, sometimes multiple times. And 
those mobility rates were even higher among underrepresented pop-
ulations, including the young and socioeconomically disadvantaged;
• Third party groups were exacerbating the problem, waiting until 
immediately before a major election, and then inundating election 
offices with paper voter registration forms, many of which were 
duplicates or illegible, leading to errors in the voters’ records; and
• While citizens knew to update their address with other agencies, like 
motor vehicle agencies, those agencies were doing a poor job of for-
warding that information in a usable way to election agencies.
One key member of the working group was Jeff Jonas, a data and 
entity-resolution expert, then a fellow at IBM working on cutting edge 
software that, as he puts it, enables “data to find data.”2 Lindback had 
worked with Jonas on a panel at the National Academies of Science, also 
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him. When I noted that we needed someone with particular technical 
expertise in the field of data, John immediately recommended him, and to 
our delight, he accepted.
As I got to know Jonas, I soon realized he was exactly what this discus-
sion needed—a genius about data, unbound to existing election infra-
structure and vendors. Jonas sat quietly absorbing the discussions for 
several days, and in the middle of the second meeting of the group, as we 
were beginning to consider how to design a solution, he spoke up. He 
quietly walked to the front of the room, and showed a slide he’d been 
working on, outlining a rough architecture for a system that could begin 
to address this problem. A hush literally fell over the room for what seemed 
like an eternity, as we began to digest his idea, the silence was suddenly 
broken by a gasp from a single election official. We all could see this was 
the way forward. This was the moment of conception of ERIC—the 
Electronic Registration Information Center.3
Put simply, we proposed creating a multistate data center, running 
state-of-the-art software capable of analyzing and resolving data from 
multiple sources, where the states would upload data from voter files and 
other sources with more up-to-date information (most notably, motor 
vehicles files), and receive reports telling them when one of their voter 
records was no longer up-to-date. There would need to be sufficient data 
points, and multiple sources of data, to minimize the number of “false 
positives” (where a record was erroneously matched to another with the 
same name, not representing the same person), while maximizing the 
chance that a move, or a death, would be discovered and reported. Such a 
data center could deliver information on voters who had moved (within or 
out of state) and voters who had died. States required actionable data 
about this—information they could immediately and confidently use to 
confirm possible changes to a voter’s record—without having to under-
take burdensome supplemental review of that data.
The technology was cutting edge, but strange as it may sound, the 
technology to create such a data center wasn’t the biggest challenge. 
There were several other challenges that needed to be resolved if ERIC 





• How would ERIC avoid the perils of being politicized, being used 
by partisans to feed political whims at any particular moment?
• How could ERIC obtain and protect the data it needed, which was 
often sensitive and protected by law?
• How could ERIC be governed in a way that was effective, nonparti-
san, and transparent?
While we had the rough technical framework of ERIC by the end of 2009, 
consideration of these questions occupied the working group for more 
than two years. We began with discussing who should govern ERIC. This 
was a key point, as the data that ERIC required included sensitive motor 
vehicle data that was specially protected under both federal and state law, 
which could not be shared with non-governmental entities in most cir-
cumstances. Furthermore, ERIC needed to remain above the partisan 
fray, and to maintain a level of transparency that would keep it that way. 
Finally, ERIC would need staff that could dedicate time to effectively 
manage a complex data system, and coordinate with the member states. 
The group agreed that no existing entity fit all these requirements, and 
therefore we resolved to build a new nonprofit membership organization. 
The ERIC nonprofit corporation would have bylaws and a membership 
agreement, and be governed, with operating expenses paid, by the mem-
ber states.
It was essential that the bylaws and membership agreement allowed for 
the states to govern ERIC effectively, but also bound all the states to a 
common, non-ideological set of requirements.4 If ERIC was to succeed, 
the left and right could not utilize it, or be perceived to utilize it, for dif-
ferent purposes to meet their differing agendas. Conventional wisdom 
suggested that those on the left were primarily concerned with more com-
plete voter lists (with more registered voters), while those on the right 
were primarily concerned with cleaner voter lists (ensuring those no lon-
ger eligible were removed). Both are important goals, and we determined 
that ERIC must achieve both to be successful. Therefore, the terms of the 
bylaws and membership agreement made clear that states were required to 
use ERIC data both for reaching out to new voters and for list mainte-
nance to begin the process to remove records that no longer reflected an 
eligible voter in their state, consistent with federal law. And, importantly, 
4 https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/ERIC_Bylaws_2018-11-30.pdf.
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the states would have to document their compliance with both aspects of 
membership in ERIC, or be automatically removed from membership.
The member states would each select a representative to serve on the 
board of directors (almost always the state election director) and, there-
fore, states were essentially, and legally, sharing data with themselves. 
Using a technique called one-way hashing, confidential data such as driv-
er’s license number, the last four digits of the Social Security number, and 
even the date of birth would be protected by scrambling that data into 
long strings of alphanumeric characters, unreadable by humans and nearly 
impossible to reconstruct.5 The data would be stored in dedicated servers 
located within the United States, subject to very high physical and vir-
tual security.
The BIrTh of erIc
Thus, after over three years of analysis and planning, ERIC went live in the 
summer of 2012. A bipartisan group of seven “pioneer” states led the 
way—Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, Nevada, Utah, Virginia, and 
Washington. Four of these states were led by Republican election officials, 
with three led by Democrats. These states received their first ERIC reports, 
indicating millions of eligible citizens who were not registered to vote. The 
states contacted each of these “eligible but unregistered” citizens (or 
“EBUs” as ERIC calls them), with hundreds of thousands of them register-
ing before the presidential election that year. Within several months, ERIC 
had a staff consisting of Lindback as executive director, a man who’s forgot-
ten more about voter list maintenance than most of us will ever know, and 
Ericka Haas, the brains behind Oregon’s voter list and one of the nation’s 
most knowledgeable people about the interplay between voter and 
Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) data, as the ERIC Systems Engineer.
The courage of the first ERIC states, and ERIC’s initial staff, really can-
not be overstated. Nothing like ERIC had ever been built before. While 
ERIC was being built, we were often asked to analogize ERIC to some-
thing that already existed. But ERIC was the first effort of its kind—a 
voluntary consortium of states working together to govern and fund a 
sophisticated technical endeavor. The early members of ERIC didn’t know 
for sure if it would work, or if the data would be of high quality. Similarly, 




left comfortable jobs to take a chance on a nonprofit technical start-up. 
Fortunately, the planning that went into the creation of ERIC paid off, 
and the confidence of ERIC’s early adopters was repaid in full.
how erIc works
As discussed earlier, when a state joins the ERIC community, they agree to 
several responsibilities, all designed to make ERIC effective, efficient, 
secure, and sustainable.
Governance and Budget
Each state agrees to help govern ERIC, by participating as a member of 
the board of directors, and paying for the operating expenses of 
ERIC. When states join, they each pay a flat, one-time membership fee of 
$25,000, and annually, the states contribute dues relative to the size of 
their population (e.g. Delaware pays less annually than Pennsylvania). 
Currently the annual budget of ERIC is under $1 million, paid entirely by 
the member states. And because ERIC’s budget does not increase sub-
stantially as more states join, member states see their annual dues decrease 
over time, as the quality of data increases with more member states.
List Maintenance
ERIC provides each member state with four list maintenance reports—in- 
state moves (voter has a more recent address in another state record, usu-
ally motor vehicles), cross-state moves (voter has a more recent address in 
another ERIC state), deaths (as determined by a high-confidence match 
to the Social Security master death list), and duplicates (one individual has 
more than one record on the same state’s voter list). States commit to 
conducting list maintenance using ERIC reports approximately annually, 
at a minimum (though some do it more often), and to do so in compli-
ance with the National Voter Registration Act, which requires contact 
with a voter who has moved out of state prior to removal from the list.6
6 52 U.S.C. 20507. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/52/subtitle-II/chap-
ter-205. If a state sends a voter who has moved out of state a mailing, and that voter does not 
respond to the mailing, the state moves that voter to inactive status. If an inactive voter tries 
to vote before two federal general elections have passed, they are instantly activated and 
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Outreach
ERIC also provides each state with a list of “eligible but unregistered” 
voters, or “EBUs,” who are eligible citizens who have a record in the 
state’s motor vehicles database (or other data provided by the state) who 
do not have a matching voter record. Each state commits to contacting all 
eligible voters on this list at least once every two years, prior to the next 
federal general election. The first time a state does this outreach the list is 
substantial—roughly equaling approximately 25% of the eligible voter 
population in the state. Subsequent outreach is more manageable, as states 
are only required to contact each potential registrant once, with only new 
matches included in the outreach.
Documentation and Transparency
The membership agreement clearly mandates that states document and 
certify their compliance and outreach, and provide that information to 
ERIC.  If a state fails to meet this requirement, they are automatically 
removed from membership.
Confidentiality of Private Information
Since some of the data that flows through ERIC is sensitive, the member 
states have gone to great lengths to protect the transmission and storage 
of that data. As discussed above, sensitive data goes through a one-way 
hashing process—twice—so that even the states themselves couldn’t 
reconstitute the confidential fields (they would not need to, of course, 
since they’ve got the original source data). Moreover, the states agree not 
to disclose or release any of the data included in the ERIC reports unless 
required by a court, so that personal information is adequately protected.
erIc Now aNd IN The fuTure
ERIC is almost seven years old, and it has grown from those initial 7 
states, to now include 26 states plus the District of Columbia. These 
include states as red as Alabama, Louisiana, and Utah, and states as blue as 
allowed to vote. If they fail to vote or contact the state, they can be legally removed from the 
list after the second federal general election passes.
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Connecticut, Illinois, and Oregon. Georgia just became the most recent 
state to join, and more states are poised to join prior to the 2020 election, 
as they have passed laws enabling their membership. 
Nearly half of the eligible voter population of the United States lives in 
an ERIC state, and with the new states, ERIC’s membership will likely 
exceed half of the voting population by the end of 2019. Those voters are 
seeing real, tangible benefits, even if they might not realize it. Voters in 
ERIC states are more likely to have voter records that are up-to-date, 
meaning fewer problems when they go to vote. In states with same-day 
registration, those voters are less likely to need to rely upon same-day reg-
istration to update their addresses, because the state has already updated 
their records. 7 And the ERIC states are seeing a reduction in costly 
returned mail, because voters’ addresses are more likely to be accurate.8 
All this has occurred as the early members of ERIC have enjoyed a signifi-
cant reduction of approximately one-third in their annual dues.9
ERIC has also managed transition. After serving as ERIC executive 
director for three years, Lindback retired, and the ERIC states conducted 
a search for the next executive director, hiring Shane Hamlin for the job. 
Hamlin was an integral part of the working group that created ERIC. As 
the state election director for Washington State he led many of the discus-
sions that created the ERIC we know now, and in fact served he as the 
very first ERIC board chair when Washington was among the first states 
to join. Though ERIC has gone from a board of only 7 state members to 
26 members, it has managed that transition, with virtually all votes of the 
board being unanimous, despite the political and regional diversity.
And the results of ERIC’s strong and effective leadership have been 
remarkable. Since its inception, ERIC has enabled states to update their 
records to reflect over 7 million in-state moves that previously had gone 
7 https://electioninnovation.org/2018/03/12/minnesota-registration-errors-decline/. 
For instance, after joining ERIC in 2014, Minnesota saw a substantial drop in the need for 
same-day registration in 2016 (compared to 2012), without any drop in overall registration 
or participation.
8 https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/articles/2014/10/16/eric-
reduces-undeliverable-ballots-in-king-county-washington. King County, Washington, saw 
more than one-third reduction in returned mail after the state joined ERIC.
9 https://ericstates.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/FINAL_ERIC_2017_Annual_
Report.pdf.
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undetected. That means over 7 million individual voters who could be 
contacted by election officials to inform them about their next election, 
what was on their ballot, where to vote, and who could vote without any 
hassle or delay. 10
ERIC has identified for the states over 2.5 million records that were 
out-of-date because the voter had moved to another ERIC state. Those 
voters were contacted, and the process for cleaning those records from the 
lists could begin, consistent with federal and state law. Over 240,000 vot-
ers who had died since they last voted were similarly identified for the 
states. When states can accurately and effectively maintain their voter lists 
with data such as this, it significantly tones down the rhetoric around 
potential voter fraud, and can help foster an environment of voter confi-
dence and security.
Finally, and perhaps most impressively, ERIC has helped its states reach 
out to over 34 million eligible but unregistered voters over the last several 
years. The data from recent elections is still being analyzed, but we know 
that over 5 million of these new voters registered, and it’s likely that the 
number is significantly higher. This is probably the single most effective 
voter registration effort in history, and it’s all been driven by the states 
themselves, in a completely nonpartisan way.
ERIC isn’t the only solution necessary to improve our election system. 
Other innovations like online voter registration, and digital automation of 
the motor voter process, can greatly enhance the quality and completeness 
of the voter lists, in conjunction with ERIC. But ERIC has proven itself to 
be an integral part of the solution, and its governance structure, in par-
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